


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THE CASE
FOR VOLUNTARY SERVICE

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*The Handbook of the
Voluntary Service Committee*



LONDON :

PUBLISHED FOR THE VOLUNTARY SERVICE COMMITTEE,

BY

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CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
I. The Problem in its Political and Social Aspect	I
II. The Imperial and Military Policy in Outline	18
III. Voluntary and Compulsory Armies ...	31
IV. The Territorial Force	50
V. The Particular Problem of Home Defence	81
VI. Alternative Schemes Examined	98
VII. The National Service League's Army Estimates	119
VIII. Summary and Conclusion	134

APPENDICES.

	PAGE
I. Notes Containing the Admiralty View of the Risk of Invasion	148
II. Note on the Word "Conscription" ...	151
III. Compulsory Service in the Dominions ...	156
IV. Some Opinions on Voluntary Service and the Territorial Force	160
(a) Voluntary Service as a Policy ...	160

	PAGE
(b) Lord Roberts's Opinion of the Territorial Force—and Others ...	163
(c) Some Leaders of Industry	169
(d) Some Press Views of the National Service League's Campaign ...	171
V. Musketry	177
VI. Principal Terms of Enlistment in the Regular Army	178
VII. The Failure of Compulsory Service Pro- posals to Secure Support in the Houses of Parliament	183
VIII. A "Stale Libel"	190
IX. Territorial Force Composition Tables ...	191
INDEX	195

IT is sometimes said that the principle of voluntary service is so secure, and the attack on it so little likely to be successful, that elaborate arguments in its defence are unnecessary. The writers of this book do not take this view. They believe that it is dangerous to leave any accepted principle undefended when it is exposed to constant and organised attack by a zealous body of propagandists. They have, therefore, attempted in this volume to supply a full and careful account of the reasons which, in their opinion, render it imperative that the voluntary system of recruiting should be retained in the United Kingdom and a firm resistance offered to all efforts to establish the principle of compulsion.

*M*uch has already been written on the moral and social aspects of this question and the importance of these can never be exaggerated; but the special object of this book is to explore the military and strategical points of view and to show that the voluntary system of recruiting, which now obtains in our Regular Army and Territorial Force, is better suited than any other to the special needs and conditions of the British Empire.

THE VOLUNTEER.

IF once the generous chief arrive
To lead him willing to be lead,
For Freedom he will strike and strive,
And drain his heart till he is dead.
In an age of fops and toys,
Wanting wisdom, void of right,
Who shall nerve heroic boys
To hazard all in Freedom's fight--
Break sharply off their jolly games,
Forsake their comrades gay,
And quit proud homes and youthful dames,
For famine, toil, and fray?
Yet on the nimble air benign
Speed nimbler messages,
That waft the breath of grace divine
To hearts in sloth and ease.
So nigh is grandeur to our dust,
So near is God to man,
When Duty whispers low, "Thou must,"
The youth replies, "I can."

Ralph Waldo Emerson.

THE CASE FOR VOLUNTARY SERVICE

CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM IN ITS POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ASPECT

PART I.—CONSIDERATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

SECTION 1.—*Armaments and Competition*

BEFORE effecting any fundamental change in our national military policy, it is essential that we should ask ourselves what will be the result upon our international relations and upon the policy of other nations. All military power is relative, and if a change, though it may make our military forces larger and more efficient, is likely to have an adverse effect on our international relations or on the policy of other nations, it may end in leaving us relatively weaker than before.

To gauge the effect of the adoption of compulsory military service, it is not sufficient merely to state our own intentions. We may be quite certain that the least favourable construction will be placed on our actions elsewhere, and if we are to form any reliable forecast, we must endeavour to put ourselves into the position of a suspicious, even an unreasonably suspicious, outsider. Thus the recent increase in the German Army was ascribed in Germany to the change

in the situation in the Near East; but its effect in France was instantaneous and obvious. Some of the advocates of compulsion openly avow that the army of their dreams is to be available for operations on the Continent. Others, more thoughtful of the opposition which they have to face at home, assure us that this army is to be confined to strictly defensive operations in this country. Yet even the latter cannot argue for five minutes without disclosing the thought which is at the back of their minds that the weapon which they are forging is one which in fact, though not in theory, is to be available for foreign adventure.* If these are the views expressed at home, can it be doubted that foreign nations will not view the proposed army as intended solely for use against an invasion which they in their turn will say cannot reasonably be apprehended? So momentous a change in the military policy of a power which claims to be mistress of the seas will inevitably be interpreted as meaning that the military power so created is intended, or may at some future time be used for the only purpose which it can usefully serve, *i.e.*, operations upon territories other than our own, and equally inevitably the reply will be a demand on the Continent for the most effective weapon to prevent the possibility of such operations, *i.e.*, increased naval armaments.

To a Continental rival military power on our part signifies a weapon of offence to which their defence is increased power on the seas. To us such an increase will represent an addition to the offensive power of our

* "The question is, can we supply France with a force strong enough to redress her numerical weakness? . . . In other words, can we supply at least 300,000 men?"—*Fallacies and Facts*, p. 118.

rivals. Thus the vicious circle is completed and the certain effect of a revolution in our military policy will be to add to the difficulty of maintaining our superiority in the one form of power which is really essential to our safety.

Do not let the argument be misunderstood. We are not to be deterred from taking any step by the mere fear that our motives may be misconstrued. It is not that, but the realisation of what will be the actual effect of the step proposed, which gives us reason to pause before we take it.

SECTION 2.—*Armaments and Co-operation*

The question of the army which may be required to take part in a Continental war belongs to the military problem which is considered in a later chapter; but it is often urged that, unless a change is made, the other parties to the *entente* will modify their policy and the whole balance of power will be shifted.

It is sufficient to point out that there is no evidence to support any such suggestion; the *entente* came into existence under the present system, and there would not appear to be any reason why it should not continue. Our Navy is, after all, no inconsiderable contribution to the strength of the *entente*, and the maintenance of its supremacy is of far more importance than the power to furnish any increased military force which the adoption of compulsory service would possibly enable us to send abroad. If, as will be argued later, compulsory service would impair the efficiency of both the Navy and Regular Army, our power to support the *entente* would be diminished instead of increased.

SECTION 3.—*Armaments and the Future*

Finally, there is the consideration that the step once taken is irrevocable. A voluntary system can be adapted to the changing circumstances of the time. Once start on the road to universal compulsion, and there can be no return. There are few of us who regard armaments and military force otherwise than as an expedient necessary to combat the forces of evil which beset our path. Who can question that for one more nation to enmesh itself in the toils of a military system which is to be compulsory not only on the present generation but on their descendants will be to add one more obstacle to the triumph of right over might, of reason over force?

PART II.—CONSIDERATIONS OF NATIONAL POLITICS

The advocates of compulsory service frequently adduce arguments to show that, apart from any question of military necessity, the system is desirable in itself. Very little consideration will suffice to show that the reverse is the case. The following are some of the very obvious objections.

1. *The Cost*.—Details as to the cost of some of the systems proposed are given in Chapter VII. and Appendix III. The figures show that on any system a heavy addition to the National Budget is inevitable. Not only is this addition a serious matter in itself, but when a large section of the electorate is already of opinion that the present expenditure is excessive, the result is bound to be that the demand for a reduction in other directions will be much increased. Whether

this demand deserves sympathy or not, it exists, and it is folly to deny its influence. Those who recommend this large addition must face the fact that it will make it far more difficult to obtain for the Navy or the Regular Army the money required, and that the question is not merely: "Can the additional expenditure be met?" but, "Can it be met without injury to the other forces of the Crown?"

But the addition to the Budget is only a part of the cost. The adoption of compulsory service means that thousands are annually transferred from productive to unproductive work. The compulsionists boast that they will take the best, and therefore the most valuable, men. Some of the work which would otherwise be done by the men who are training may, no doubt, be done by inferior men who would otherwise be out of work; but allowing even ten shillings a week for each man and four months as the period, the industrial loss would, on this head, work out at £1,200,000 per annum. To this must be added the loss due to the periodical removal of the trained men called out annually. These men's places cannot be filled, and allowing £1 per week for 400,000 men for a fortnight, we have another £800,000. But even this is only a fraction of the loss. It is the constant theme of employers that if Brown goes to camp, it means that Jones and Robinson, whose work depends on Brown being there, cannot get on; and there are many employers who say that if all the men liable to train under a compulsory system were called out it would mean shutting down work for the fortnight, so that five or six men would be rendered idle for every one actually called out for training. It is impossible to make any estimate approaching to

accuracy, but that the economic loss would amount to several millions per annum is unquestionable.

2. *Interference with Personal Liberty.*—This again is a far more serious objection than is often imagined. In this country, above all others, interference with personal liberty is resented. Compulsory armies, whatever their type, involve the necessity of taking steps to see that the service is not evaded. The police and civil authorities must be enabled to keep their eye, not only on the men who are on the active list, but on the reservists. Anyone who cares to study the practical working of a compulsory system will do well to turn to the elaborate German law on the subject. A few examples of the obligations are the following:—

To notify to the police any change of address even in the case of a temporary holiday.

To obtain special permission to emigrate.

To come up for training when and where it suits the military authorities.

Then again it is proposed to place restrictions on employers—though how they are to be worked in practice nobody knows—to prevent any employee from being penalised by his liability to serve.

Some may say that it is no bad thing to make a shirker do some hard work, but the objection to military service on ethical or religious grounds is widespread, and is an objection which even those who do not agree with it cannot easily condemn. The proportion of those who will refuse to submit in this country is certainly not likely to be less than, say, in Australia

and New Zealand; and the number of convictions calculated in proportion to the population would be startling*—a somewhat significant example of the lessons which compulsionists are always bidding us learn from the Dominions.

3. *Inequality of the Burden.*—"Universal service must be, and universal service alone can be, fair" is a favourite theme. But those who dilate on it forget that "universal service" has never been proposed by anyone. The National Service League's estimate of numbers provides for the training of only about one-third of the men reaching military age. These will be selected according to physical standards, but this does not imply that those who will not be trained are physically unfit for industrial competition. The man who is short, or narrow-chested, or who has bad sight or any other slight defect which results in his not being chosen, may be just as effective in a dozen walks of life as the man who has to serve. Yet one will have to serve, while the other escapes. Most secure of all will be the alien who, whatever his efficiency, will always be free. Under the present system, when the burden is light and when the man who cannot undertake it is not forced to do so, there is no real unfairness; under any system of compulsory service it will be a very different story.

So also as regards employers, something has already been said of the loss which will be inflicted, but the loss will not fall equally on all. In some forms of industry, the men can easily be spared; in others

* The total number of defaulters in New Zealand, to April 1st, 1913, was 3,903; and in Australia, up to May 31st, 1913, the prosecutions were 12,373.

only with the utmost inconvenience. Even in the same industry it may be easy for the large employer to spare his proportion of men, while for the man who employs only a few hands, the loss of even one may mean complete dislocation of his business. Then, again, in the selection of employees, there will be the temptation for the less patriotic employer to select his men from those who are ineligible for service.

At present the men can be obtained by following the line of least resistance. If there is occasional grumbling at either the master or the man who does not shoulder the small burden which others think he might well bear, there is no real sense of injustice. Masters and men volunteer to give their share, and, when all is said and done, they are gratified to feel they have done so. Under compulsion it will be a very different matter. There will be real and serious inequalities, and compliance with an obligation from which there is no escape will bring no compensating sense of satisfaction.

4. *Moral and Physical Effects.*—When faced with objections such as those mentioned above, the advocates of compulsion point triumphantly to the moral and physical benefits which are supposed to follow from the discipline and exercise which the training will involve. The physical benefit is undoubted, but to see that those who most need the benefit will not get it, it is only necessary to point out again that the section of the population who alone will get this benefit will be the men who are chosen on account of the physical advantages they already possess. As a scheme of physical regeneration the proposal is ridiculous, and it is noteworthy that the late Mr. Price-

Collier, in his work on "Germany and the Germans," though recognising the improvement in the physique of individuals, is by no means impressed with the general level throughout the country. He states (p. 290), that according to the army standard, both the German peasant and the urban dweller are steadily deteriorating; and (p. 457) that the German recruit, especially from the towns, in whatever part of the country, is losing vigour and stamina. And this is in Germany where the process of physical regeneration extends over two years, while according to the least unpopular scheme proposed for this country it will only last for four or six months! Nor should it be forgotten that, although Lord Roberts paints in attractive colours the comforts and the advantages of a period of life in barracks, the League, of which he is the President, makes no provision in its estimates for permanent accommodation of any kind.

The moral benefit is also open to doubt. In a period of two years, and when the recruit at once joins his future regiment, a good deal may, perhaps, be achieved, but even then the result is apt to be something of a sealed pattern article. On the other hand, under the system of the National Service League, the segregation of some thousands of young men for a very limited period under a few outside instructors with no regimental tradition, no *esprit de corps*, no common bond, except that all have to submit for a time to a system which not a few will cordially resent, does not strike one as an ideal school for morals; nor is it likely that the training of successive contingents of raw—and probably in many cases unwilling—recruits, will prove so pleasant a task as to attract the best

instructors, while the fact that the recruits themselves at the end of their first period will be lost sight of, will remove the most powerful encouragement to an instructor—the knowledge that the future of his unit depends on his efforts.

The presence of even a small number of recalcitrants will render necessary a rigidity of control, a resort to driving instead of leading, which will not mean discipline in its true sense. In an army recruited voluntarily, attraction must play its part, but in a compulsory army it is unnecessary and extravagant. As a nation we are, perhaps, more used to comfort than most. The average Territorial camp does not strike us as anything out of the ordinary in the way of comfort, yet General Langlois wrote of his visit in 1909: "So comfortable an installation for fifteen days' stay profoundly astonished us in comparison with the poor equipment of our own permanent camps."* Retired colonels from their arm-chairs may deplore our national characteristics as decadent, but a four months' training for a fraction of the population will not prove a panacea. On the contrary, it is far more likely that the result will be to create an unfavourable impression and a false idea of what true discipline means.

PART III.—THE EFFECT OF THE AGITATION FOR COMPULSORY SERVICE

At first sight it might seem illogical to base an argument against compulsory service upon a condition of affairs which would cease to exist if compulsory

* "The British Army in a European War." p. 18.

service became the law. But just as the value of an investment cannot be judged only by the price it may ultimately realise, to the exclusion of any question of the immediate return, so it is impossible to decide the question of compulsory service without regard to the risks involved in the process of obtaining it. It is, therefore, not irrelevant to point to those risks as an argument in favour of deciding once for all against compulsory service.

In the first place, any system of compulsory service, even if the principle had been decided upon, would take years to bring into full working order.* But the effect on the present organisation would be immediate,† and the intervening period one of chaos. If it is true that unscrupulous foes are ever on the watch for an opportunity to attack us, their chance would come long before the proposed reorganisation could have achieved anything except the destruction of our present forces.

But there is an antecedent question which must be answered:—What practical prospect is there of carrying a measure of Compulsory Service either in the near or more distant future? We doubt whether there is anyone, however ardent and optimistic a supporter of compulsion he may be, who can honestly say that he sees any prospect whatever. The leaders of the Liberal

* See Appendix III.

† The National Service League's Bill proposes to prohibit the re-engagement of any soldier in the Territorial Force after the passing of the Bill. As the engagements of about 80,000 will normally expire each year, including most of the N.C.O.'s, it will no longer be possible for the Force to train, much less to take the field. There will be no officers available to train the League's recruit contingent, so that it will be three or four years before we have any force at all besides the Regular Army.

Party have pronounced emphatically against it; to the Labour Party it is anathema; individual members of the Unionist Party have in considerable numbers expressed opinions in favour of it, but no one has ventured to suggest that the proposal should be made an item of the party programme, and many Unionists are among its most determined opponents.*

Compulsory service can only be carried as a Government measure. It cannot be so carried unless it has been before the electors at a General Election recommended by the party victorious at the polls. The leaders of the Liberal Party could not, even if they were so minded, recede from their attitude of opposition without destroying their party. The Unionist Party, in the face of a Liberal and Labour opposition, could not hope to win an election if they supported compulsory service as a practical programme. Not long ago the success of Colonel Weston at Kendal was hailed as a victory for the National Service League and Lord Roberts. In fact, it was a testimony to the hopelessness of their cause, for the gallant colonel found it necessary in the clearest terms to dissociate himself from anything like the League's policy by the following announcement: "My scheme is simply that young fellows—not all, mind you, but as many as may be necessary—should be called upon in the winter evenings to do a bit of drill. In addition to the drills, which the young fellows would really enjoy, if they were so arranged as to suit their occupations, the young fellows would be asked in the spring months, on days convenient to them, to go to the rifle range. . . . If they had six musketry attendances

* See Appendix IV.

in the year, it would be sufficient." That the advocacy of such a policy, which, be it observed, does not even involve a compulsory camp of any description, should be regarded as a feat of electoral heroism, is the most convincing evidence of how far we are from the time when any practical scheme can even be advocated at the polls.

If the campaign in favour of compulsion were productive of no ill effects the small prospect of success would afford no argument against continuing the campaign, but unfortunately this is not the case. The Territorial Force lives upon public opinion, and the advocates of compulsory service can only support their demands by dwelling upon existing, or inventing imaginary, defects in the force. The keynote of the campaign of the National Service League is that "the force is an acknowledged failure," a "make-believe army," which will "speedily cease to be a force even in name." Fortunately, these fulminations have somehow missed fire and the gloomy prophecies have not been realised, but that public opinion has been adversely affected to some extent is unquestionable. Many members of County Associations, who have accepted the responsibility of maintaining the force, have—however unintentionally—allowed themselves to be gravely compromised. By appearing one day upon platforms where such opinions as those quoted above have been expressed without dissent, they have made themselves and their appeals for recruits to join this "make-believe" army a subject for ridicule.

In his report for 1910, the Inspector-General of the Forces found it necessary "to place on record that complaints were made by more than one commanding

officer that their endeavours to obtain recruits were much hampered by agents of the National Service League, who are said to go about certain districts advising men not to take service with the Territorial Force.” The Glasgow Territorial Association even went so far as to issue a pamphlet devoted to exposing the arguments for compulsory service, in which they compare the love of the compulsionist for the Territorial to that of the ichneumon for the caterpillar. In the imputation of motive involved, this comparison is, no doubt, in the case of many individuals not justified, but as an indication of the practical effect of the agitation, it is singularly apt.

It is not only in the matter of recruiting that the injury is done; not the least valuable asset in an army is confidence. If confidence in itself is impaired, its fighting power is gravely affected; if the confidence of the public in its power is shaken, the freedom of those who employ it is restricted; if those who may have to meet it in war are convinced that it is of little account, their own confidence is increased.

Prestige is capital. Let us see what the National Service League has done for our prestige.*

1909.

“The fear of German invasion haunts the British mind; it is pushed to exaggeration. Lord Roberts, wishing to lead the country to universal service, blackens the picture . . . the Territorial Force, with one regular division, will amply (*très largement*) suffice for the eventuality of invasion in case of a conflict between France and Germany with their respective

* See, in addition to the quotations in the texts, Appendix IV.

allies." These are the words of the late General Langlois, written in his own journal after a visit to our Territorial camps in August, 1909. General Langlois commanded the crack Eastern frontier troops of France, and was the creator of modern field artillery.

1911.

The tune is somewhat changed, for although the Territorials had worked hard in the interval, so had the League; "the British Public does not seem to allow the Territorial Force all the value that certain French guests who witnessed the manœuvres of some of its divisions in 1909 were good enough to assign it. One has only to look through the opinions expressed in the press and technical journals. . . .

"The training of the Territorial Force is improving; it is already far superior to that of the old Volunteers. The units that took part in the manœuvres did, in fact, acquit themselves honourably. . . . Still, public opinion has quickly convinced itself that the Territorial Force would be incapable for some considerable time of fulfilling the mission assigned to it."—(Captain Sorb, *Doctrine de Defense Nationale*, 1911.)

1912-1913.

The French may have spared our susceptibilities—the Germans do not. The following extracts show only too nakedly the effect of our "patriotic" wrangles on the German military mind:—

"It is, however, very possible that in the event of a European war, the fear of invasion would again rise in England. If it does, then public opinion would only allow the Expeditionary Force to be sent abroad

if it regarded the Territorial Troops as trustworthy defenders of the country. Whether it would so regard them is doubtful, now that the supporters of Universal Service have shattered its belief in the capacity of the Territorial Army.”—(*Internationale Revue über die Armeen und Flotten*, June, 1912, Supplement.)

“Now, as ever, the strength and development of the Territorial Force occasions constant anxiety and Parliamentary fights for the English War Office. The Force forms the principal point of attack for the “Service League,” in concert with its leader—the grey-haired but ardent Field-Marshal Lord Roberts—with the Conservative and Unionist Press, which is devoted to him. . . . The supporters of Compulsory Service set themselves with redoubled zeal to underline with all the more emphasis the present evident and admitted defects in the Force, and to express the most hopeless pessimism as to any further development—always, of course, with the *centerum censeo* of Universal Service.”—(*Militar-Wochen Blatt*, No. 163, of 1912.) (The “M.W.B.” is the semi-official organ of the German Army.)

“It seems clear that Great Britain is nearing a crisis in the development of her defensive organisation. For clearly . . . all parties other than the Government regard the Territorial Force as slowly decaying . . . if, therefore, the Expeditionary Force were put over into the Continent, the Island Kingdom would be practically defenceless against invasion. Thereupon the ever-growing National Service League, in conjunction with the Conservative parties, sets itself to present the idea of Universal Service as a necessity.”—(*Ibid.*, No. 47, of 1913.)

Whatever their intentions, Lord Roberts and his friends are squandering the capital that the British Army has won for us. At present our capital is not quite gone—the Continent cannot quite size us up:—

“As to the Territorial Force, it is hard to form an estimate,” says the *Internationale Revue*.

But if we go on insisting that we are absolutely defenceless, someone is bound to believe us in the long run.

The matter therefore stands thus. The prospect of carrying a measure of compulsory service is so remote that it may almost be said to be negligible. The injury done by its advocacy is immediate and serious. Is it not a sound argument to influence those who may themselves believe that compulsory service is the better policy, and still more those who are hesitating to take sides, to say that the possibility of realisation is not worth the risk, and that it is better, once and for all, to abandon a hopeless pursuit and devote themselves wholeheartedly to making the best of the material ready to hand?

CHAPTER II

THE IMPERIAL MILITARY POLICY IN OUTLINE

PART I.—ITS NEEDS

SECTION I.—*The Empire Overseas*

THE characteristic feature which distinguishes the military problem of the British Empire from that of the other European Powers is that the heart of the Empire has no land frontiers. The problem of home defence is, therefore, primarily a naval problem, while the dominating factor in the problem facing its land forces is an Empire overseas, which cannot everywhere rely for its defence upon its own resources.

Consideration of this factor discloses at once three elements. Firstly, a large force ready for immediate action must be maintained abroad. Secondly, the only path by which reinforcements can be sent, the sea, must be kept open. Thirdly, these reinforcements must be drawn from men available for service abroad, and capable of being immediately dispatched. A fourth element exists which is apt to be overlooked. A campaign in which the seat of the central government and the mainsprings of national existence of a highly civilised community is subjected to direct attack must necessarily be short. The fight for a dependency may be long drawn out. In the former case the disorganisation produced by war goes far to

paralyse the centre of the nervous system, and cannot long be endured, while recovery from a partial reverse may be impossible. In the latter case, the main stream of national life may continue with comparatively little disturbance except in the affected part. Lost ground may be recovered, because the supply of men and material is not cut off. For instance, in the present state of civilisation, a campaign of the character of the South African War could never have been fought in Western Europe.

At the present time the chief demands upon the land forces of Great Britain for service abroad are, in round numbers:—

India	...	...	...	...	76,000
South and West Africa	...	...	...	...	9,500
Malta	...	...	...	...	7,500
Egypt	...	...	...	...	6,500
Gibraltar	...	...	...	...	4,000
China	...	...	...	...	9,000
Smaller Colonial Stations	...	...	...	...	8,000

These garrisons must consist of men enlisted for foreign service, and since the men must be trained and matured before they are sent out, and must remain abroad for a considerable time, they must be enlisted for a long term.

Behind the garrisons must be such reinforcements as may be required. These, again, must be men enlisted for foreign service; some must be in readiness to be sent abroad at once, others available for dispatch to make up wastage as the campaign proceeds. The former must be, not merely so many men available,

but so many organised units, with the necessary commanders and staff, for the one thing in an army which cannot be left to be hastily improvised is the organisation and staff.

The provision made to meet these needs will be discussed in a later section of this chapter. For the moment it is sufficient to describe the problem, and to point out that it is a problem which, except on a small scale and in relation to territories of comparatively minor importance, no other European nation has to face. The statement of the problem is alone sufficient to expose the fallacy of the argument which seeks to draw a conclusion from the singularity of this country in adhering to a voluntary system.

SECTION 2.—*Overseas Trade*

The necessity of keeping the seas open for the dispatch of reinforcements has been already mentioned; but where the centre of an Empire is a densely populated island, the seas must serve another purpose. The supplies, whether of food or of the materials for industry, must come oversea. Important as their sea-borne commerce may be to a Continental nation, their situation is radically different from ours. The closing of the seas will not close every avenue of supplies, and the greater extent and variety of the home country render them less dependent upon supplies from outside. But the question is not merely one of our own oversea trade. It has been pointed out that the Continental nations' oversea trade is a matter of less vital importance. But this is far from putting it down as a negligible factor. The pressure produced by cutting

off the commerce of an enemy may not work so rapidly, but it is none the less a weapon of a very powerful character, and one of which the value is constantly increasing. It is, moreover, having regard to the resources in men which are at the command of the Great Powers of Europe, practically the only offensive weapon available for us.

In conjunction with another Power, our Expeditionary Force is immensely formidable, but alone neither it, nor any army we could trans-ship, would be of any appreciable value in a European war. Arguments based upon the fact that land operations have ultimately determined wars in history are fallacious, inasmuch as sea-borne commerce in those cases had not assumed anything approaching its present-day importance. If our naval supremacy is once established in a modern war, the destruction of the enemies' shipping and the pressure of a blockade represent an offensive power which can be exercised at comparatively small cost or inconvenience, and which must sooner or later place us in a position, if not to dictate, at any rate to exact, the price of victory.

Here again, therefore, we find a distinctive feature of our Imperial policy, the paramount necessity for naval supremacy.

SECTION 3.—*Home Defence*

Enough has already been said to show that the problem of home defence is primarily a naval problem, and, as such, distinguished from that of Continental nations, and that if naval supremacy sufficient to keep open the sources of our supplies is lost, no land force

can save us.* But there is another outstanding feature which must be mentioned here, before the problem is considered in detail in a later chapter, and that is that the presence of the seas, however narrow, that separate us from the Continent, secures for us at any rate a longer time of warning than can be counted on when there is only a land frontier; it limits the hostile force immediately capable of taking action; it restricts the lines available for attack; and it enormously increases the hazard which an invader stakes. The last factor is persistently ignored in argument. The mechanical and physical possibilities of invasion are minutely discussed, but the moral factor represented by the knowledge on the part of a would-be invader that, once launched, his force will be separated by the sea from its base, from its reinforcements, and from its line of retreat, is one which those who are experts in alarms seem, strangely enough, never to have discovered. It is not the mere question of the deterrent effect, though that will be serious enough, it is also the influence on the strategy, tactics, and *morale* of the invaders which renders this factor one of the most important in the discussion of the question.

The foregoing considerations, which have been presented without entering into details reserved for further discussion, serve to show that as in the case of our overseas trade, the essential requirement for home defence is naval supremacy. As regards a land

* It is sometimes argued that a blockade of Great Britain is impossible, and therefore any fears as to our supplies are groundless. But enemy ships are liable to capture whenever met. Without our mercantile marine, we should in a short time be obliged to sue for peace, and it would be quite unnecessary for our enemy to invade us.

force, we can observe that it is required to meet a situation which is not, as in the case of Continental armies, a normal and ever-present danger, but only a possible, and an extremely hazardous, alternative which may in certain eventualities be open to the enemy; that to shape our land force to meet an invasion on a scale only possible after command of the sea had been gained by the enemy would be useless; and that our land forces for home defence may at all events count upon a longer period of warning than an army separated from its potential enemies only by a land frontier.

SECTION 4.—*The Balance of Power*

There is, however, another argument to be considered. Sometimes it is presented under the guise of the maxim that the soundest form of defence is to take the offensive, from which is drawn the conclusion that to defend our shores we must be able to assume the offensive on the Continent. Sometimes it takes the form of the suggestion that unless we are prepared to play a conspicuous part on the Continent, the shores from which our defence is most vulnerable may become a standing menace, either by the alienation of the powers which at present control them or by the passing of that control into other hands. However presented, the conclusion sought to be drawn is the same: We must aim at military operations on the Continent.

That there are possible circumstances in which it might be useful or wise to undertake such operations is not to be denied, and it will be seen that the provision has not been neglected. But the question of

immediate concern is how far should the possibility of increasing the powers which we already possess influence the choice of a military policy? It is submitted that it is, relative to the other factors, of so little importance that it should not be allowed to interfere with any decision which those other factors dictate.

In the first place it has already been pointed out that our most handy offensive weapon is the Navy, so that the maxim quoted only leads us back to concentration on the Navy. In the second place, it has been shown that any movement, recognisable as pointing to a design for operations on the Continent, is likely to be met by a counter movement which will leave us relatively weaker than before. In the third place, we must take account of practical possibilities. A nation will make great sacrifices for what it understands to be home defence; but, however ably experts may argue, it will be a far more difficult matter to prove to those who ultimately determine the limits of military preparations, that a force which is designed for operations outside this country is really intended only for a form of home defence. The army raised for Continental operations must be an army whose terms of enlistment do not limit it to being called out for service in this country, and must, therefore, be either part of the army from which the garrisons abroad are drawn, or else an intermediate creation between that army and the army enlisted only for service at home.

The result of these considerations is to suggest that, although the contingency of operations on the Continent is not to be ignored, we shall, if we allow it to exercise a preponderating influence on our decision, introduce new and serious difficulties into

the problem, and run the risk of giving less than their full weight to considerations which are of vital importance.

PART II.—THE PROVISION TO MEET THE NEEDS

SECTION I.—*The Navy*

The need for a navy, outlined in the previous sections, is met by a present strength which compares with that of the next strongest power as follows:—*

	Gt. Britain.		Germany.	
Dreadnought Battleships ...	...	18	...	13
Pre-Dreadnought do. ...	...	40	...	22
Battle Cruisers ...	...	9	...	4
Cruisers less than 20 years old ...	...	39	...	9
Light Cruisers do. ...	...	62	...	39
Torpedo Vessels ...	...	25	...	0
Destroyers ...	...	200	...	132
Torpedo Boats (1st class) ...	...	70	...	57
Submarines ...	...	72	...	24

The strength in or near home waters is as follows:—

Battleships ...	...	...	...	56
Battle Cruisers ...	...	...	...	4
Cruisers ...	...	...	...	30
Light Cruisers ...	...	...	...	33

The next strongest naval Power is Germany, whose fleet in our home waters is as follows:—

In the North Sea—

Battleships ...	...	...	...	21
Battle Cruisers ...	...	...	...	4
Cruisers ...	...	...	...	4
Light Cruisers ...	...	...	...	14

* Dickinson Return, 1914.

SECTION 2.—*The Regular Army*

The requirements for the oversea garrisons are met, as they can only be met, by a long service* voluntary army. There are two alternative policies by which this army might be maintained. The first is to make the foreign service army a separate branch of the force with no other function except to maintain the overseas' garrisons, the recruits being merely trained in dépôts in England and then sent out. The other policy, which has now been adopted for many years, is that of having only one regular army, with units at home linked with units abroad, and periodically changing duties. The latter system has many advantages over the former. The training of the men before being sent abroad as drafts is much more effective when they are part of a unit than when merely at a dépôt, and it automatically provides an organised force of long service regulars at home and a large reserve available for any purpose for which they may be required, while the alternation between home and foreign service ensures a unity in training and tactics, and makes the army more attractive. The possibilities of alternative systems are discussed in Chapter VI., and the present purpose is merely to point out the results which the present system produces.

These results are the provision and maintenance of:—

- (1) The garrisons enumerated on page 19, amounting in all to a little over 120,000;
- (2) About 130,000 men of all arms with the colours at home;

* The periods of service at present are given in Appendix VI.

- (3) A reserve of 138,000 men who have completed their service with the colours, but are liable to be recalled for service.

The two latter classes are organised to provide a composite force of all arms of six infantry divisions and a cavalry division, about 166,000 of all ranks. This force is usually known as the Expeditionary Force, though the name is somewhat unfortunate, as suggesting that its sole function is an expedition abroad. The reserve is utilised to bring up the units to their war establishment. After providing for this we are left with a few units not allotted to the Expeditionary Force, and the balance of the men with the colours not passed for foreign service and of the regular reserve, amounting to about 100,000 men. The chief function of these will be to provide drafts to replace casualties, but since they will only be gradually required, and plainly could not be sent overseas at a time when the sea was not cleared of the enemy, they must be reckoned as available in the early stages of a war, at any rate for home defence. Being practically without officers, and not organised into units, their utility is limited, but they could undoubtedly contribute towards the home garrisons required, or might be utilised to bring the Special Reserve units up to strength.

SECTION 3.—*The Special Reserve*

The Special Reserve has replaced the Militia. It is liable to be called out for service at home or abroad, the men being given a preliminary continuous training of six months, and afterwards coming out annually for training for about three weeks. The establishment for

which the organisation is adapted is 90,000, but the strength is only about 60,000. The primary function of the Special Reserve, like that of the Regular Reserve, is for the assistance of the Expeditionary Force, but it differs in being organised into units capable of being employed intact and not merely as drafts. But the Special Reserve must also be counted as available for home defence during the early stages of a war.

SECTION 4.—*The Territorial Force*

The Territorial Force is enlisted for home defence, though a considerable number have volunteered for foreign service, and no doubt many more would be willing to do so if required. Its establishment is about 315,000, and the strength on September 30th, 1913, was 249,393. The training and value of the Force is discussed in detail in Chapter IV., but one important feature of the Force which is frequently overlooked may be mentioned here—namely, that the peace establishment is also the war establishment; that is to say, the elements which cannot be improvised, the regular staff and the equipment, are complete for the full establishment of 315,000. The strength in time of peace is, therefore, not the full measure of the power of the Force. Just as the Expeditionary Force is made up to strength in time of war by the inclusion of the Regular Reserve, so in the case of the Territorial Force, although the only men who are actually liable by law to be called out are those in the Territorial Reserve, there are every year thousands of men who leave the Force on the expiration of their term of engagement, many of whom may be relied

upon to rejoin in time of emergency.* As many of these men as are required will find uniform, arms, equipment, and places ready for them, and will be but very little below the standard of those actually serving.

SECTION 5.—*The National Reserve*

The National Reserve consists of men who have completed their terms of service in some branch of the Army and have enrolled themselves as an expression of their willingness to serve in case of great emergency. Some have taken on a definite obligation, though only an obligation of honour, to serve either at home or abroad. Others prefer to reserve entire freedom, but the existence of the Force means that the nation knows where to lay its hands on a large reserve of men trained to arms to whom to appeal in case of emergency. The War Office has—and rightly—resisted a certain pressure towards treating the National Reserve as a third line force to stand by itself. To do so would be to stereotype an organisation ill-adapted for the necessary restrictions, and difficult to assimilate to up-to-date methods, and would necessitate the provision of a staff for which the material does not exist. As a loose reserve the Force may prove of considerable value. Individuals may provide drafts for Regular units; others may rejoin their old Territorial units to bring local companies up to strength, and companies may be organised well qualified for

* The propriety of relying on these men to volunteer again for Home Defence can hardly be denied by the National Service League, which relies entirely upon Volunteers for Foreign Service for the power of expansion beyond the Regular Army which its supporters urge as one of the needs which is not sufficiently met at present.

certain garrison and similar duties, thus relieving units belonging to the organised field forces. It is the custom of many writers to dissipate the Special Reserve and Territorial Force for garrison duties, and to discount these garrisons entirely in reckoning the forces available in the field. But, as will be suggested later, the existence of the National Reserve may do much to render such dissipation unnecessary.

In conclusion, the following table of the military forces of the Crown, exclusive of those in India and the Dominions or Colonial stations, shows, even after making a liberal deduction for ineffectives, a strength which is by no means inconsiderable:—

Regular Army with the Colours ...	125,209
Army Reserve	145,090
Special Reserve	61,427
Territorial Force	249,393
Territorial Force Reserve	1,669
National Reserve	215,451
Total	798,239

The part which these forces will respectively play in the problem of home defence is discussed in Chapter V.

CHAPTER III

VOLUNTARY AND COMPULSORY ARMIES

PART I.—INHERENT CHARACTERISTICS

No small part of the controversial efforts of the advocates of compulsory service is devoted to attempts to depreciate the superiority which the ordinary mind is disposed to attribute to the volunteer over the compulsorily raised army. Their persistence is not surprising. The instinct which, when there is a dangerous duty to be performed, calls for volunteers in preference to imposing the task upon the nearest man, seems so obviously sound, that a good deal of reasoning is needed to show that it is all a stupid mistake. Hence it is that we are treated to lessons in history, ranging from 400 B.C. to the twentieth century, to convince us of so difficult a thesis. But it is no easy matter to trace the influence of a factor which never operates by itself, but is always complicated by other factors, often of equal importance. The pages which follow attempt no such task as that of proving that the voluntary spirit always and everywhere prevails. They aim at pointing out the features which characterise certain types of armies, at showing that, broadly, history emphasises the importance of these features, and at demonstrating the conclusion that the type of armies thus indicated as best fitted for the needs of the central government of the British Empire are those which we, in fact, possess.

SECTION 1.—*Types of Soldiers*

As a preliminary, certain terms need definition. The expressions "Regular," "Militia," and "Volunteer," were so long used to indicate particular branches of the British Forces, that specialised meanings are sometimes attached to them, and confusion is often introduced by using the words with complete disregard of the sense in which they are employed. For instance, we find that in *Fallacies and Facts*, in order to deprive the Territorial Force of any possible credit which might attach to the title "volunteer," a dictum is quoted to the effect that "a volunteer who asks more from the State than his arms, except on active service, is no volunteer." When, later on in the same volume, we find that the voluntary service which the Territorial gives is described as a "blood tax," we may well ask in what Wonderland are we living where the same man is first condemned for asking too much and then commiserated as the victim of a cruel exaction. Small wonder that such contradictory premises lead to strange conclusions!

Let us, then, be clear as to the distinctions expressed by the terms we use. [The first distinction is that between a volunteer, and a pure compulsory system. In the first, a man enters into a contract by his own choice—a choice, may be, in which influences other than the love of fighting play a prominent part—but still a choice. In the latter, no one has the opportunity of saying "Yes" or "No." The law determines his obligation. Intermediate between these two lies the system in which a limited number is demanded and substitution allowed.]

Another, and quite different, distinction is that between the Regular* and the Militia-man. The former, until he passes into a Reserve, is part of a standing army, a soldier, and nothing else; the latter is normally in civilian occupation, called from it, perhaps, for intermittent periods of training, but exclusively a soldier only when called out in an emergency. These distinctions give rise to six types.

- (1) The Volunteer Regular—*e.g.*, as found in the British Regular Army.
- (2) The Substitute Regular in a Conscript System—*e.g.*, as found in the French Army for a time before 1870.
- (3) The Compulsory Regular—*e.g.*, as found in the present French or German Armies.
- (4) The Volunteer Militiaman—*e.g.*, as found in the British Territorial Army.
- (5) The Substitute Militiaman in a Conscript System—*e.g.*, as found in the so-called "Regular Militia" of the early nineteenth century.
- (6) The Compulsory Militiaman—*e.g.*, as found in Swiss and Norwegian Armies.

Now, it is obviously fallacious to compare, say, (1) with (6), and deduce the superiority of the voluntary spirit, or to compare (3) with (4), and draw the opposite conclusion. It is also—though less obviously—fallacious to make any comparison without reference

* The word "Regular" is here used so as to include the men serving in an army of the French or German type. So used, it does not necessarily imply the characteristic of being a professional, in which respect such armies represent really a compromise between a professional Regular Army and an entirely unprofessional Militia.

to the nature of the campaign, the leadership, or the racial characteristics of the raw material.

SECTION 2.—*The Need for the Volunteer Regular*

Certain general features may, however, be noticed. The Volunteer Regular, for instance, who is offered a contract, may be asked to undertake a more onerous obligation, both as to the length and conditions of his service, than can be required under a pure compulsory system to which the nation at large is asked to submit, and, further, the numbers taken can be limited to requirements without resort to the ballot or any similar expedient. The Volunteer Regular, in fact, adopts arms as his profession. Hence such an army is *par excellence* the instrument of a Government which may have to carry on wars at a distance, or of a nature in which the populace takes only a limited interest. So, when the author of the later chapters of *Fallacies and Facts*, beginning with a singular disregard of the fact that none of the voters who can impose a compulsory system are young enough to be liable to the training, commends the compulsory system, and goes on to describe it as "a vow made by the free choice of the individual will," he is blind, not only to the fallacy of assuming that it requires a unanimity of the individual wills to pass an Act of Parliament, but also to the fallacy of supposing that a majority of the individual wills is likely to be prepared to prescribe a general liability to the conditions of service which a world-wide Empire requires that a small minority should accept.

For the British Empire such an instrument as only

a Volunteer Regular Army can provide is a paramount necessity. It does not, of course, follow that a compulsory army for home defence is thereby excluded, though the difficulty, if not impossibility, of combining such an army with a Volunteer Regular Army large enough for our needs is one of the strongest arguments against recourse to compulsion. But it does follow that much of the eloquence expended in commending the compulsory system is mere nonsense. The author just quoted may be pleased to declare that "war, under modern conditions, is an action which either ought never to be committed, or an action in which every able-bodied citizen, without exemption of any kind, should participate to the utmost degree, sharing alike its dangers and its allurements, its glory and its shame." He may condemn the English system as "hopelessly and for ever wrong" because it provides otherwise. But, since he cannot prescribe a system by which every able-bodied citizen is to share, say, the dangers of the continual small wars on the Indian frontier, or even of such a war as that fought in South Africa, the only conclusion which he can ask us to draw is that the British Empire is "hopelessly and for ever wrong," and that our Indian and Colonial garrisons must be recalled forthwith—a conclusion hardly likely to be endorsed by his collaborator, Lord Roberts.

If we look abroad, we find the same lesson. Gustavus Adolphus or Napoleon may have been able to win victories with their conscript armies,* but how long did they retain the fruits? France and Germany

* In neither case were the victorious armies raised on the system of universal compulsion.

to-day resort to voluntary service to maintain their comparatively small foreign forces; Russia finds difficulties, even at home, in inducing the men raised by compulsion to re-engage as non-commissioned officers. Even where the compulsory system has not been abandoned for foreign service, the results are not encouraging as the instances quoted later will show.

SECTION 3.—*The Quality of the Volunteer Army*

But the greater utility of the Volunteer Regular Army does not depend merely on the fact that a contract of service may be made to cover liabilities which a compulsory system must usually exclude. There is a difference in quality—and here we touch upon certain factors which affect a Militia as well as a Regular Army, and particular care is needed to distinguish between the types of army to which certain arguments are applicable.

Under a compulsory system where no substitution is allowed, the army produced is bound to contain a larger proportion of men for whom military service either possesses no attraction or is positively distasteful. The importance to be attached to this factor varies according to the conditions of service of the force, and the purpose for which it is designed. For example, when we compare volunteer and compulsory regular armies, it may be legitimate to argue that the period which has to be spent under military discipline in the case of the latter will go a long way towards eliminating in the men with the colours any active hostility to the service which may have existed

initially. But the argument applies with less force to Reserves, and has very little relevance at all to a militia system. In that case there is only a comparatively short recruit training, and the men for the active army, when called out for fighting, are drawn direct from a life in which civilian habits and outlook have had plenty of time to regain an influence which has at most suffered only a temporary interruption.

Again, it is argued, not without justification, that in many cases lack of employment is a powerful recruiting agent for a professional army, so that the choice does not necessarily predicate either patriotism or a love of fighting, and that the average soldier under a compulsory system is of a higher class than in a professional army. Whether any deduction can be drawn that the ultimate fighting capacity of the former is likely to be superior may be doubted, as the disposition which is attracted by a soldier's life may itself be the cause of a poor start in civilian occupation.* In any case this argument also has no application to a volunteer militia of the type of the Territorial Force where material advantages are not the motive for enlisting, and frequently a considerable sacrifice of time and pleasure is involved. It is, moreover, in the case of the unprofessional army that the quality of the raw material is of more particular importance. The professional soldier has time to acquire much of what may possibly be lacking at the start, and if his pro-

*Lord Haldane stated, in a speech on November 24th, 1913, that he had asked man after man of the recruits at the depôts, "What brought you here?" and the answer generally came to this: "I wanted to see a bit of soldiering." The contribution to the ranks made by generations of military families is another valuable asset

gress is slower it is no great matter. Military service is his profession, and the professional tradition, ambition to succeed, and every other influence which touches him, all prompt him to do his best. But in the case of the unprofessional soldier, keenness, energy, intelligence, and patriotism are of paramount importance.

Thus, although Lord Percy, in his eagerness to depreciate voluntary service, may taunt the army in which he holds a commission,* and though humbler individuals may be expected to raise their hats to an army in which he would have had to serve in the ranks, we may still be permitted to doubt whether the average British Regular may not fulfil the purpose for which he is needed better even than the heir to a dukedom, and to point out that in any case Lord Percy must look elsewhere for an insult suitable for the Territorial Force.

Another feature must be noticed. For the compulsory army the cause in which it is fighting is a vital matter. Apart altogether from actual limitations on the services for which it may be employed, the compulsorily raised army is apt to set limits of its own. The system under which the soldier in such an army serves is based on the conviction of a national necessity. To use it on a service as to which no such conviction exists is an experiment—one on which an inspiring leader may venture, and perhaps succeed—but none the less a hazard. With the professional volunteer army the matter is different: the individuals

* The privilege of undertaking voluntary service would, therefore, seem to resemble somewhat the privilege of entering the workhouse."—*Times*, June 7th, 1913.

who compose it have adopted war as their business, not this war or that, but war anywhere and everywhere, and the business must be carried through. This limitation on the powers of a compulsory army is, of course, in a sense characteristic also of the unprofessional volunteer army, but so long as the objects for which volunteers are enlisted are limited to occasions of evident national peril, the question does not arise.

SECTION 4.—*Regular and Militia Armies*

So far the distinctions to which attention has been directed have been mainly distinctions between the professional and the unprofessional armies, or between the volunteer and compulsory soldier, whether professional or not. Certain distinctions between the Regular and the Militiaman have been referred to for the purpose of indicating their bearing on the course of the argument, but a word must be said on the question of the difference in training. In the technical military duties, it goes without saying that the Regular is better trained than the Militiaman, but it is not in such technical superiority that the difference really lies. A man of ordinary intelligence, willing to learn, can be taught in a surprisingly short time; but the capacity to apply his knowledge under the stress of war is a different matter. It is in this, and the habits and frame of mind which are summed up under the term "discipline" that the Militiaman is likely to contrast least favourably with the Regular. And this contrast is one which cannot be eliminated by mere adjustment of the length of a preliminary period of

recruit training. No doubt the longer the period of such training the more advanced will be the standard of technical efficiency, but the change from the civilian to the military life will be none the less abrupt. In considering the application of so-called "universal" compulsory training to a Militia, in addition to the disadvantage of including in the ranks a proportion of unwilling men, a further practical difficulty occurs. Under a voluntary system, in which it is not necessary that every able-bodied man should be trained, the organisation may be localised by assigning a particular unit of a particular branch of the service as the quota of a certain district, and the training may be carried on to a certain extent throughout the year. Under a so-called universal compulsory system, every available man must, in theory, be trained and fitted into the military organisation, and though to a certain extent local organisation and continuous training may be possible,* the difficulty is apt to lead to the short cut of simply calling up the men for recurring periods and fitting them into units in the easiest way. The result is that the continuous association in civilian life as well as at parades for military instruction, competitions between individuals and local units, etc., which afford the nearest approach to association as an embodied force, can hardly be attained except under a voluntary system which possesses the required elasticity.

This is one factor of importance in its effect on the value of a militia force: there are others which may be mentioned: The presence of regular officers on the

* In Australia variations in the conditions of service and even complete exemptions have been found necessary on a considerable scale.

staffs and in the higher commands who have held those positions during the peace training; the zeal and intelligence of the men; the enthusiasm evoked by the cause; the attitude of the civil population; the character of the campaign; above all, the period which has elapsed between embodiment and employment on active service.

SECTION 5.—*Summary of Characteristics of the Types Considered*

We may now summarise the features which have been indicated as characteristic of different types of armies.

The Volunteer Regular Army is the real professional army, the instrument best fitted, if not the only instrument, for general service, and least dependent upon external influences. It is a voluntary army, and the notion of patriotic duty, if not necessarily innate, is highly developed by the professional spirit and tradition.

The Conscript Regular Army, where substitution is allowed, in some respects approximates to the first in its professional character, but the professionalism is far from complete, the standard is lower, and a considerable disruptive element exists.

The pure Compulsory Regular Army approaches the Volunteer Regular Army in training and discipline; the average intelligence is high; the notion of duty to the community animates a considerable proportion, but the presence of unwilling men is a source of weakness, and, in proportion as the service for which it may be required fails to appeal to the sense of national duty, the value falls rapidly.

The Compulsory Militia is subject to the same shortcomings, in accentuated form; the defects which training as a Regular may eradicate will persist, and the army will, when first embodied, be subject to all the disadvantages which an abrupt change from civil to military life entails.

The Voluntary Militia, though faced with the latter drawback, consists almost exclusively of men who have enlisted from the notion of duty or the determination to be in the fight if there is one. Spirit may, therefore, go some way to make up for what the Regular acquires by habit; progress after embodiment will be more rapid and efficiency largely dependent on the organisation in peace and the handling in war.

PART II.—THE VERDICT OF HISTORY

SECTION 1.—*The Need for a Professional Army*

The verdict as to the need for a professional army for foreign service is hardly open to doubt. Critics, it is true, occasionally point to the tendency to professionalism as a prelude to Imperial disruption, but it would be more to the point if they could instance an Empire preserved on any other system. It has already been noted that France and Germany resort to the volunteer for foreign service. Spain failed in Cuba. In Manchuria, not only did Russia fail, but the contrast in fighting capacity between the Siberian and European reservists was noticeable.* Even the

* Kuropatkin has told us how poorly the reservists from European Russia fought when compared with the Siberian Reservists, who were defending their own frontier, and explains that the distance from their homes had become so great that the Europeans were no longer sustained by the national idea.—*Compulsory Service*, p. 53.

energy of the Japanese Army flagged after Mukden, and Italian experience in Abyssinia, and even in Tripoli, is not exactly encouraging to the advocates of compulsion for service abroad. On the other hand, throughout the South African War, no war weariness impaired the value of the British Regular Army. Their business was to carry on, and they did it.

The instances given have been selected from modern times, because the pure compulsory regular army is, substantially, a modern institution; as we go further back the conscription of a limited number, the practice of substitution or the impressment of a certain number into a professional volunteer army obscure the issue. The history of the Napoleonic armies, indeed, affords an example of the transition from one type in the direction of the other; as the net was spread wider, we find occasions when the professional soldier had actually to be employed, not in fighting, but in keeping men called up by a national levy from deserting.

SECTION 2.—*The Pressed Men*

The conduct and the fate of the unwilling soldier in a compulsory army is not a pleasant subject, but it is one which those who depend upon armies raised by compulsion study with a view to the possibilities of the future. We may, if we choose, nourish the belief that the nation at large possesses some innate superiority, so that the man who at present declines to volunteer will become a hero under compulsion. Indeed, by a curious appreciation of cause and effect, Lord Roberts actually supports his theory that com-

pulsory training will increase the number of volunteers for foreign service, by reference to a statement that, whereas one in five of the voluntary Militia, and one in fifteen of the Yeomanry and Volunteers came forward for service in South Africa, only one man in a thousand volunteered from the civil population.* But it would be well if those who contemplate raising an army in this country by compulsion for a policy war on the Continent would examine, say, Meckel's account of what he saw at the battle of Wörth :—

“ During our advance, while only the whistle of an occasional bullet could be heard, we saw six men in a long queue, cowering behind a tree ; afterwards I saw this sight so frequently that I became used to it. . . . I was already used to the sight of the dead and wounded, but not prepared for what now met my eyes. The field was literally strewn with men who had left the ranks and were doing nothing. Whole battalions could have been formed with them. From our position we could count hundreds ; some were lying down, their rifles pointing to the front as if they were still

* *Fallacies and Facts*, p. 22. In fact, one in three of the Volunteers expressed his willingness to go if required, and one in seven actually went. Having regard to the amount of training the Volunteers had received, the suggestion, coming from Lord Roberts, that it was confidence in his military capacity which induced the Volunteer to come forward is distinctly humorous. Another remarkable reference (p. 31) is that to Mr. Fortescue's figures of the number of militiamen who volunteered to join the Regular Army between 1805 and 1813. Had the fact been stated, as shown by Mr. Fortescue, that these volunteers were drawn *exclusively* from the “ Regular Militia ” of whom 90 *per cent.* were substitutes and not from the “ Local Militia ” raised on a truly compulsory basis without substitution, the only conclusion which could have been drawn would have been that the fighting spirit only existed in the men who were serving by choice and not by compulsion.

in the fighting line and were expecting the enemy to attack at any moment. . . . All these men gazed at us without showing the least interest. The fact that we belonged to another army corps seemed to be a sufficient excuse for treating us with blank indifference. I heard them say: 'These fellows, like the others, are going to let themselves be shot.' The men next to me bore on their shoulder straps the number of a famous regiment."* And at Wörth, be it noted, the German army outnumbering the French by nearly two to one, almost immediately established superiority in artillery, and was ultimately victorious; so that the scene depicted does not represent the mere demoralisation of a routed army. In the same battle in the fighting in the Niederwald, out of 7,350 who entered the wood in the course of the final and successful attack, some 500 went forward in the first line, 2,500 in the second line an hour later, while nearly 3,000 unwounded men remained in the wood, in no formation, out of action.

But, perhaps, the most significant instance of the difference between the volunteer and the pressed man is to be found in the American Civil War. In the early stages the capacity of the Volunteers for bearing losses, badly as they were led, was such as has scarcely, if ever, been equalled since. Later, not only was it necessary to recall Meade from his pursuit of Lee to enforce the conscription; but, even when brought to the front, the conscripts—making every allowance for the "bounty jumper"—were far inferior. "The war of secession," wrote Colonel Henderson, "affords the most ample evidence of the

* Meckel, *A Summer Night's Dream*.

truth of the old proverb that one volunteer is worth three pressed men . . . the conscript soldiers, as well as those who sold themselves for enormous bounties fell short in every respect of the volunteers. They were more liable to panic, less forward in attack, more prone to insubordination, less stubborn in defence, and it was the common opinion in the North that they were even inferior to the negroes." "These opinions," adds Brigadier-General Kemball, "may seem strange at the present day; but it is worth noting that compulsory service has to be combined with thorough training and iron discipline to neutralise the disadvantage of having in the ranks men who fight, not unwillingly, but under compulsion."*

SECTION 3.—*The Question of Training*

If we turn to the contrast between trained and untrained troops, it is curious to find that the instances now most in fashion with the compulsory school are both instances where the defeated troops were almost entirely raised under compulsion, the French in the later stages of the Franco-German War and the Turkish 2nd Redifs in the Balkans. It is curious also that the desired deduction can only be drawn by making the examination so cursory as to ignore the most relevant factors. True it is that the German armies, better led, better trained, and better armed, were ultimately victorious over the army of the Loire, and if the instance were only cited to prove the ultimate

* *Army Review*, January, 1912, p. 270.

fate of an ill-armed,* hastily improvised, untrained force directed by Generals who distrusted their armies, it might be relevant. But to fail to detect in the narrow margin by which at times the army missed success, in the achievements of Chanzy who, almost alone, knew how to handle raw troops, or in such incidents as the recapture by the Western Volunteers under Gougéard of a lost position in the midst of a rout at Le Mans, the possibilities of the voluntary spirit under conditions less hopeless than those which combined against the army of the Loire, is strangely to misread history. To draw a deduction from that heroic failure as to the fate of the Territorial Force which *starts* with the organisation, the arms, the equipment, the staff and regular commanders accustomed to handle it in peace, which the People's Army never acquired, is only admirable in its audacity.

The Balkan War affords an even more significant lesson. If the blame is to be cast on the Redif training, it is to be noted that it was in general rather more than that which is proposed by the National Service League. But the real source of the trouble may be detected in the book of that very correspondent whose remarks have been circulated to every Territorial officer by an anonymous benefactor for no other purpose, apparently, than to shake their determination to do their duty in the system under which they serve. It was not merely cowardice, but often a positive desire to be fighting on the other side which led to the wholesale desertion. And what of the other armies? They were principally raised by compulsion, it is true, but a war of liberation had long been a national passion,

* There were seventy different types of rifle in use.

and the spirit which animated the troops was far more akin to the voluntary spirit than the sort of discipline* which, according to Lord Roberts, can alone win battles. The Bulgarian army had had the longest training. Irresistible in the war of liberation, it collapsed in the war of policy. In the Greek army, which performed, perhaps, the finest feats of endurance, about one-third had had no military training before the outbreak of war, and were under no practical compulsion to serve. Making every allowance for extraneous factors, it would be difficult to find a more convincing example of the futility of the notion that a mere taste of compulsory training can create an army unless there exists already the enthusiasm—which is really the voluntary spirit—than the failure of the Turkish Redifs, the rise and fall of the fortunes of the Bulgarian army, and the achievements of the Greeks.

If we desire to look nearer home, we may note that the Imperial Light Horse, embodied on October 8th, 1899, fought with distinction on the 21st, that the C.I.V., embodied on January 4th, 1900, were pronounced by Sir Ian Hamilton to have been on June 12th equal in fighting efficiency to a Regular battalion, and that the same General states of the Volunteer Companies that in a comparatively brief period they became the acknowledged equals of their comrades in the line, and of the troops sent by the Colonies. “ ‘ Good wine needs no bush ’ ; and it would be superfluous indeed were I to recapitulate the deeds of these corps who, in their first encounters with the

* *i.e.*, as the context clearly shows (*Message to the Nation*, p 49), discipline in the old sense of automatic self-effacement, produced by rigid training, rather than conscious self-control.

enemy, were assuredly neither more highly trained nor disciplined than our existing Territorials."

History, indeed, can furnish us with no example of an army parallel to that which we possess in the Territorial Force, but this much of guidance it seems to give us in deciding whether to abandon our voluntary system : that nothing but a voluntary professional army will enable us to meet our Imperial obligations ; that for a policy war, a compulsory militia as such is a useless instrument, that even as a source of individual volunteers, for drafts for foreign service, it would furnish probably only men disposed to take up soldiering as a profession who would be equally well obtained through our existing Special Reserve or Regular depôts ; that, lastly, for the troops behind our Regular Army, it is not a matter of a few months' training long before the occasion arises, that will serve our purpose. Either we must rely upon the " thorough training and iron discipline " which alone can make soldiers out of unwilling men, or else upon the voluntary spirit which, effectively armed, equipped, and organised, can be sufficiently trained to meet our needs.

CHAPTER IV

THE TERRITORIAL FORCE

THE Territorial Force differs from the old Auxiliary Forces, which it replaced, in four important respects. It is really organised for war, which the old haphazard Yeomanry and Volunteer regiments never were, it is better equipped, it is better led, and it is far better trained. Compulsionists are fond of saying that the Territorial system has "broken down." The wish is, no doubt, father to the thought. The real fact is that the progress made has been satisfactory and adequate, and in some respects even surprising. It is true that we have not yet got out of the system all that it is certainly capable of producing, especially in the matter of numbers, but we are a conservative people, and having regard to the violence of the transition made by the Territorial and Reserve Forces Act of 1907, on the one hand, and the cold water poured upon it by the compulsionists on the other, the wonder is, not that it is not yet completely one with our national life and habits, but that it enjoys the popularity and secures the large measure of devoted support from citizens, in all walks of life, that it does. In a word, the system has justified itself beyond all expectation; for the finishing touches we must wait patiently for the educative effects which it is steadily having, not only upon employers and employed, but also upon the pro-

fessional army itself. The Territorial Force can only reach the zenith of what it is possible for it to achieve when the whole country, and not merely the majority of its voters, is convinced of the folly of compulsion; as soon as that is done and the voluntary system is accepted by military men and politicians alike as the only possible system for our Empire with its own special and peculiar problems, there will be no lack of officers and men to fill its ranks. Until that time comes, it must train itself, as it is doing, to set an example and despise the criticisms of ignorance and prejudice.

SECTION 1.—*Organisation*

THE TERRITORIAL FORCE AS A MILITARY FORMATION

The Territorial Force is organised into independent units of all arms, while certain other troops, mainly fortress artillery and engineers, are allotted to coast defence.

Its field or fighting organisation follows, therefore, exactly on the lines of that laid down for the Regular Army—that is to say, it is permanently formed into units representing the highest number of men which, according to the views of our General Staff, can be commanded in the field by one general. These large units are called divisions, and consist of infantry, artillery, mounted troops, and auxiliary services in their proper proportions, having each an approximate war strength of 18,000 men, commanded in peace by those who will lead them in war.

But whereas the field troops of the Regular Army or Expeditionary Force consist of six divisions and one cavalry division (consisting of four cavalry brigades, each of three regiments, or a total of twelve cavalry regiments in all), the field troops of the Territorial Force consist of fourteen divisions of infantry and fourteen mounted brigades. It provides, therefore, for more than twice the number of divisions of all arms, and more than three times the number of mounted troops than the Regular Army at home.*

The smaller units (infantry battalions, Yeomanry regiments, artillery brigades, etc.) are commanded by Territorial Force officers qualifying for their appointments by a series of examinations for promotion from grade to grade, written and practical, and by selection for fitness to undertake these duties by the General Officer responsible in the various commands. The higher units, such as divisions, infantry brigades, cavalry brigades, are commanded, almost without exception, by Regular officers on the active list. The staffs of the divisions and brigades are found by Regular officers, it being an almost essential condition of their appointment that they should have graduated at the Staff College. Details of the establishment of the Territorial Force of the field are set forth in the

* It is sometimes alleged that the Territorial Force has no horses. This is not the case. It is true that in peace time a large proportion of the horses are hired for the training in camp, and that one horse may thus attend in the same year the camps of two or more regiments. But on mobilisation for war the horses required both for the Regular Army and for the Territorial Force will be "impressed," and a register of all suitable horses has now been taken and is kept up to date in each county. This register shows a total of 462,919 serviceable horses now in the country, of which only 42,769 will be required for the Regulars and 83,697 for the Territorials on mobilisation.

Appendix. In addition to the field troops of the Territorial Force there are a certain number of army troops. These troops are not allocated to brigades or divisions, and their employment on mobilisation will be as directed by army headquarters. The third category into which the Territorial Force is divided is the coast defence troops. These troops are allotted on mobilisation to the defended ports, leaving the field armies as above free for operation as mobile units from a central position against the enemy from whatever direction he may come.

The whole of these troops, whether allotted to coast defence or otherwise, have definite duties allotted to them on mobilisation and definite war stations to which to proceed as soon as the alarm is given. The whole business of assembling them, providing them with transport and warlike stores, and entraining them to their war stations has been worked out in detail, and each officer, non-commissioned officer and man will know exactly what he has to do on receiving the order to mobilise. The plans are thus all ready drawn up so that the Chief of the General Staff at the War Office has only to press a button and mobilisation takes place. Moreover, as the Territorial Force is raised on a strictly local basis, and stands ready clothed and equipped, and has the same "establishment" in peace as it has in war, it can be concentrated at its war stations in three days, whereas the Regular Army, which has its Reservists to collect from all parts of the United Kingdom, clothe and equip them at the depôts, and dispatch them to the colours, cannot be mobilised within a week at the very earliest.

CONTRAST WITH THE VOLUNTEER SYSTEM

The organisation of the Territorial Force into a real army came about as follows: The 1907 Act raised a National Citizen Army (as opposed to a Regular Professional Army) organised on the Continental plan by a voluntary system of recruitment, and instead of decrying this lack of patriotism for not submitting to compulsion, Britons are entitled to claim that the fact that Great Britain is an island and the voluntary spirit have enabled them to succeed in doing what none of the Continental nations—with the possible exception of France during the early stages of the French revolutionary wars—have ever attempted.

Moreover, the Act was no revolution, it was only a wise adaptation of a long-continued process of evolution, brought about partly by the patriotism and energy of the old Volunteer Force, and partly by the old Militia tradition. As regards the first, the transformation of the old light companies or corps of Volunteer riflemen into a Field Army complete in itself was a gradual process brought about by the good sense of the Volunteers themselves. Whether we consider the early movement of 1750 or the Volunteers of the Great War with France, or, again, the third Volunteer movement of 1858, the reason why the Volunteers of those days never attempted to do more than light troops of irregular riflemen is to be found in the theory, prevailing amongst all military men throughout the hundred years in question, that the infantry of the line were to be held in reserve for the decisive occasions of set

battles and were to be covered, whether on the move or at the halt, by skirmishers. It was found that civilian Volunteers of good education and practice in field lore not only made admirable troops, but more often than not excelled the steadier and more disciplined formations in this kind of warfare. When, therefore, the crises of the Seven-Years' War or of the Great War with France, or the dubious intentions of Napoleon III., demanded the expansion of our military strength beyond the limits of the Regular forces, it was natural and sensible of the general public to offer their services in the guise of auxiliary companies of rifle volunteers.

But from 1860 to the end of the nineteenth century the great increase of numbers placed on the battlefield, due principally to the introduction of compulsory service, demanded a high level of field organisation in order that a much greater number of men could be controlled and directed by a single mind. Throughout all these years, therefore, the leading spirits in the Volunteer Force were consistently pressing more and more towards regular formations. The Rifle Companies accordingly amalgamated themselves into administrative battalions in the late 'seventies, and later on these battalions, in their turn, were formed into brigades. Engineer companies sprang up, and in some of the more progressive regiments the foundations of army service corps and medical troops were also laid. In the matter of field artillery the volunteers were lacking (the cavalry of the home army having always been provided for by the Yeomanry force). It was found, indeed, that volunteer artillery were exceedingly useful!

for the service of guns of position, and companies of artillery were established at practically all stations along the coast. Not unnaturally, however, the authorities were disinclined to encourage any attempt on the part of amateurs to be admitted into the arcana of field gunnery, and the very few volunteer field batteries which were allowed received scant official encouragement, and were armed, down to the year 1900, with muzzle-loading guns, first issued to the British Army during the year of the Crimean War.

The organisation of the Territorial Force into divisions of all arms by the Act of 1907 made the provision of the requisite artillery unavoidable, and as the provision of Regular batteries was out of the question, both on the score of expense and also owing to the impossibility of finding sufficient recruits for such a service, the experiment had, perforce, to be made of raising a Territorial artillery. As will be shown when we come to deal with the training and war value of the Territorial Force, the result has been admittedly surprising, and has surpassed the expectation even of its warmest supporters. The point to be insisted on here is that the organisation of our citizen soldiers into a Field Army on the European model has not been a futile attempt to force upon an unwilling nation something which, without compulsion, they know themselves unable to perform; but, on the contrary, it signified a grant to them of recognition as a serious contribution to the defences of the Empire which for years their representatives of the Volunteer Force had striven to obtain. The conversion of the Militia into the Special Reserve under the Act of 1907 set a seal on the gradual

process of twenty years, and involved the enlistment of all its officers and men under an obligation to find drafts to replace casualties for the Regular Army in time of war, and consequently a liability to service overseas during warfare. In times of peace, at least 50 per cent. of the men who enlist in the Special Reserve go on into the Line as soon as the physical training received in the Special Reserve training depôts allows them to pass the standard required. In time of war, by the terms of the Act, the liabilities of the Special Reserve become identified with those of the Line battalions.

The service thus done to the Regular Army and the increased power given to it of serving with efficiency in any part of the Empire was itself of incalculable value, and but for the existence of the Special Reserve as a feeder to the Army, not only in war, but also in time of peace, the absolutely irreducible numbers that are required for our overseas' service could not be obtained.

It remained, however, to provide for the now vanished Militia some efficient substitute in the way of a home defence army. This was done by the creation of the Territorial Force, which was intended to absorb the best elements in the Volunteer Force. The superior class of men which it attracted, the high standard of education and, therefore, of adaptability and keenness, of the men who composed the rank and file; its popularity even with many sections of the population who were still old-fashioned enough to hold it to be a disgrace to the family if a son or a brother enlisted in the Army; and the widespread nature of an organisation which, thanks to the almost

unaided effort of the citizens of this country themselves, had (in contradiction to the Militia centred at a barracks in a single county town) its representatives in every town, and in almost every considerable village throughout Great Britain; these were the elements to which were added the longer periods of training and the revival of county responsibility. Thus whereas prior to Lord Haldane's Act the Volunteers had been administered entirely by their commanding officers, and were, in a sense, proprietary corps for which the county in which they were raised was in no way officially responsible, the Act now definitely imposed upon the county the responsibility for raising and equipping them, and for the provision of the necessary drill stations and rifle ranges. The Lords Lieutenant, who had in old days administered the Militia, found their lapsed responsibilities revived in connection with the new Force, and, subject to a personal power of delegating this responsibility to some nominee of their own, became, *ex-officio*, the Presidents of the so-called "County Associations." Thus it is that our Home Defence Army has "broadened slowly down from precedent to precedent," and is entitled, as it deserves, to receive the whole-hearted support of all Britons.

THE QUESTION OF NUMBERS

The total number of men required to place the Territorial Force in the field at its full strength of officers and men is 11,253 officers and 301,611 men. The actual number of men serving on January 1st, 1914, is 239,819, showing a deficiency of 61,792. This deficiency is, no doubt, serious, and it is very desirable that it should be made good at the earliest

possible moment. Meanwhile, there are three mitigating features. In the first place, as already pointed out, the peace establishment of the Territorial Force is also its war establishment—*i.e.*, the number of men shown as being needed to serve with the colours in times of peace is the actual number of men required to bring the respective units into the field at war strength. In this respect the Territorial Force stands alone among the armies of the world, with the exception of the Indian Army. Continental armies raised on the compulsory basis and the British Regular Army at home retain with the colours, largely for reasons of expense, only a proportion varying from one-third to two-thirds of the men who will be required for service in time of war. Hence mobilisation in the Continental sense and in the sense that it is understood in the Regular Army means the calling up of men who have finished their colour service and passed into civil life as reservists. Now, when a war unit consists as to one-third only of men who have recently been serving with the colours and as to two-thirds of reservists called up from civil life, who may have left the colours five years ago, it will clearly take some further time before these units can recover that solidarity and feeling of confidence of the men in their officers and of the officers in their men which is the hall-mark of good fighting troops. The Territorial troops may, indeed, be, and, of course, are, less well-trained than the actual men serving with the colours whether on the Continent of Europe or in the Regular Army at home. On the other hand, they all stand on the same footing, and are comrades and associates in the closest sense of the term.

In the second place, the figures for recruiting show that the present deficiency is due mainly to the reaction in the two years following the boom in the spring of 1909. As a man enlists for four years, the effect of a reaction only becomes apparent three or four years later, when the time of the recruits taken during the boom expires, unless they re-engage. A very small increase in the present rate of recruiting will maintain the force as near full strength as is possible. See Appendix VI.

Next, it is a delusion to suppose that the Territorial Force is without reserves of any kind from which to draw the twenty per cent. who at the present strength are required to bring the eighty actually serving up to war strength. There cannot be any doubt that this proportion, and extra men that may be required to take the places of newly joined recruits, will easily be forthcoming either from the first category of the National Reserve (of which later), or from ex-Territorial soldiers who have recently completed their term of service and returned to civil life, but who in the extreme emergency of threatened invasion would immediately return to the comrades they had only recently left. These men will be the associates in civilian life of those whom they rejoin. There will be far less difference between them and the men serving than between the ordinary regular and reservist, so that there will be very little of the loss of homogeneity pointed out above as a drawback to an army largely dependent on reserves. Moreover, there will be an almost endless reserve supply of such men to replace any casualties that may subsequently occur, or any voluntary drafts which the Territorial Force may, as

the Volunteers did during the South African War, send out to replace casualties in the Regular Army itself.*

SUPPLEMENTARY SERVICES

Behind the Territorial troops proper stand two preparatory and two supplementary or auxiliary services which, as now organised into a definite relation to military objects, should prove of the greatest possible value, and are still capable of a good deal more development, as experience may suggest and the energy of those concerned with them allow. These are the Officers' Training Corps and the Cadet Battalions, on the one hand, the function of which is to prepare the youth of the country to serve as officers and in the ranks, and the National Reserve and Voluntary Aid Detachments on the other, the first of which constitutes a considerable reserve for bringing units up to war strength on mobilisation, and performing certain duties which would otherwise cause a drain on the field army, and for providing drafts to fill the wastage of war, and the second upon which we can only rely for the care of the sick and wounded.

THE OFFICERS' TRAINING CORPS

The object of the Officers' Training Corps

* Out of a total of 204,743 Volunteers on the Rolls on November 1st, 1899, 71,758 volunteered to go to South Africa, and 29,049 actually went. It must be remembered, moreover, that no general appeal was made for their services; in contradistinction to the Yeomanry, the Volunteers were told they might go as a favour, not asked to go as a duty. In consequence, many Commanding officers actually discouraged their men from going, conceiving it to be the first duty of the Volunteers to replace the Regular garrisons at home. See, for the evidence of these figures, the *Spectator*, March 11th, 1905, pp. 361-2; April 8th, 1905, pp. 508-9.

(O.T.C.), created by Royal Warrant of June, 1907, out of the old Public School and University Volunteers, is to supply subaltern officers for the Special Reserve and Territorial Force in peace time, and also to make good any deficiencies that may be apparent on mobilisation for war. The corps consists of two divisions—the University contingents, or Senior Division, and the School contingents, forming the Junior Division. Any university or school may offer to provide a contingent if it will unreservedly accept the regulations for the corps. The corps is organised and controlled under the personal supervision of the Director of Military Training at the War Office. Its officers are on the unattached list of the Territorial Force, and have the same rights, terms of service, and allowances, and the same liabilities on embodiment. The cadets have no legal liability for service, but a record of all efficient cadets is kept. When an efficient cadet leaves school details of his service are sent, if he goes to a University, to the officers commanding the O.T.C. contingent there, and the names of efficient senior cadets or of junior cadets passing straight into business to the County Association in whose area they reside. When a senior cadet leaves his contingent without taking a commission forthwith, the War Office obtains the record of his permanent address and profession, and will call upon him to volunteer for service in time of need. Regular officers are appointed as adjutants to Universities and schools, or groups of Universities and schools. The training is carried out under these adjutants, the officers of the O.T.C. themselves are under the Director of Military Training, and large combined training camps are held during the

summer vacation. Cadets can qualify for direct commissions by obtaining certificates of proficiency at an examination, the standard of which is very high, designed to produce officers really capable of supplying subalterns for vacancies in any branch of the service.

The scheme during the first four years of its operation has been very fairly successful, as will be seen from the following table giving the number of ex-cadets who, up to date, have accepted commissions in the Special Reserve or Territorial Force.* In addition to those who have actually accepted commissions it must be remembered that there are a large number of others who have passed through the O.T.C. and have received the training qualifying them for subaltern rank; although some have now passed into civil life, and, for reasons good or bad, have not seen their way to serve in time of peace, while others are serving in the ranks, it is certain that they would come forward in sufficient numbers to fill gaps on mobilisation for war.

THE CADET BATTALIONS

In addition to the Cadet Battalions and companies which form part of the O.T.C., there is an increasing number of ordinary Cadet Battalions and Companies all over the United Kingdom. They are recognised

			* Appointed to Special Reserve.		Appointed to Territorial Force.
1909	...	...	15	...	Not available.
1910	...	...	83	...	553
1911	...	...	159	...	Not available.
1912	...	...	213	...	343
1913	...	...	285	...	449

by the War Office, and administered by County Associations, who draw a small grant on their behalf. They form a valuable link between the boyhood of a locality and the units found by that locality for the Territorial Force, and a very large number of their ex-cadets are now passing regularly each year into the Home Army.

No mention is made here of the Boy Scouts' Organisation, or of such of the Boys' Brigades as have decided not to apply for recognition as cadets, through which, of course, the vast majority of the boys of this country pass at one time or other of their boyhood. The primary object of these valuable voluntary organisations is not military, and they, therefore, not only do not receive, but will not accept official recognition by the military authorities. Nevertheless, they are a striking testimony to the popularity of voluntary service in the country when wisely and sympathetically administered, and cannot fail to react favourably both upon the discipline and the numbers of all the branches of the Imperial Forces.

THE NATIONAL RESERVE

Any officer or man who has served in the Army or Navy, or has done efficient service either in the old Auxiliary Forces or in the present Territorial Force is eligible to enrol himself in the National Reserve. This valuable corps is administered by the County Associations, and is commanded by retired officers of distinction. It is divided into three categories, comprising:—

1. Men whose age and physical condition would fit them for immediate service with the field armies of the

Territorial Force on mobilisation for war, and who are willing to take an engagement to that effect.

2. Men who are not available for field work, but would be useful in war time either for work at the training depôts or for embodiment at the garrison and fortress towns.

3. Men who have passed altogether beyond military age, and who join the National Reserve for the purpose of meeting old comrades and encouraging the military spirit in the districts in which they reside. The value of these men as recruiters for all branches of His Majesty's Service is potentially incalculable. It remains for the authorities to work out a system in detail under which they can be utilised to the best possible advantage.

THE VOLUNTARY AID DETACHMENTS

Voluntary Aid Detachments are being organised throughout the country to supplement the medical organisation of the Territorial Force, which already includes medical establishments and units, sufficient for the immediate requirements of the whole of the combatant troops on the march and in action, and for general hospitals. The object of the detachments is to provide, in the event of war in the home territory, trained *personnel* and material for the equipment of clearing and stationary hospitals; improvised, temporary, and permanent ambulance trains; entraining and rest stations; private hospitals and convalescent homes. Detachments are either men's with an establishment of fifty-six, or women's with an establishment of twenty-three, of whom all (except four

cooks) must possess certified knowledge of first-aid. The men's duties are mainly as stretcher-bearers and handymen; the women perform nursing duties. The detachments are organised and administered on a military pattern through the Territorial County Associations by the agency, chiefly, of the British Red Cross Society; but also of the St. John Ambulance Brigade. No part of the expenses of the detachments is borne by Army funds until after mobilisation.

The total number of detachments raised by the British Red Cross Societies in England, Wales, and Scotland in November, 1913, was 1,859, of which 379 were men's. The total *personnel* was 54,039, of whom 16,436 were men. The total number raised by the St. John Ambulance Brigade was 25,554. The St. John Ambulance Brigade also includes the following auxiliary and civil medical organisations:—

Royal Naval Auxiliary Sick Berth Reserve ...	1,015
Military Home Hospitals Reserve	1,821
Bearer Companies, R.A.M.C.	363
Voluntary Aid Detachments (268 units) ...	10,228

The Territorial Branch, St. John Ambulance Association supplies a further ninety-eight Detachments with a membership of 2,251, making a total of 12,479 in St. John Detachments alone.

THE COUNTY ASSOCIATIONS

The Territorial Force, together with the affiliated organisations above specified, is administered by the Territorial Force Associations for each county, set up by the Act of 1907 and commonly known as the County Associations. These Associations are composed of the

Lord Lieutenant or his nominee as President, a Chairman and Vice-Chairman elected by the Association, and a paid permanent Secretary. The members of the Association are in part elected and in part co-opted; they consist of the Commanding Officers of all units in the county, of civilian members nominated by the County Council, of the Mayors of the larger boroughs, and other principal county officials. In addition to the co-opted members representing various sections of the county, whether employers or employed, there is also in each a leaven of military members chosen from among retired Regular or Territorial officers resident in the county. To these Associations certain grants are paid from Army funds for the administration of their units in time of peace, and particularly for their clothing and equipment, the provision of drill hall and rifle ranges, and of transport and horses for the annual training. In addition, the Associations are responsible for the conduct and expenses of recruiting, of travelling on duty within the boundaries of the county, and for musketry practice, etc. The clothing and equipment include reserves of clothing against the event of mobilisation and maintenance of mobilisation stores. The arms for the troops are found by the Army Ordnance Department direct, while the actual expenses of training, whether in camp or week-end camps for individual officers and N.C.O.'s, are paid from the War Office to the General Officers Commanding "as training grants," and are administered by the officers responsible for training.

It has been mentioned that the County Associations are responsible for recruiting. The method by which the quota for each county was arrived at was as

follows : On the introduction of the scheme the General Staff took a survey of the entire country, of the male population in each county, on the one hand, and on the other of the numbers of men actually enrolled in the Yeomanry or Volunteers in the various districts. Guided thus, partly by the numbers which voluntary service had given us in the past, as corrected by the number of men held to be required for home defence in the absence of the Regular Army abroad, they arrived at the fourteen divisions and fourteen mounted brigades given on page 52, plus coast defence troops, with a total war strength of some 320,000 officers and men. As already pointed out, they then made the peace establishment of these units identical with their war establishment, and proceeded to allocate a number of Yeomanry regiments, infantry battalions, artillery batteries, etc., to each county according to its population, and having regard to the numbers of men it had given in the past. In the case of the very small counties, parts only of Yeomanry regiments or infantry battalions were called for. The allocation was made after prolonged consultation with the County Associations themselves as to which various branches of the Service should be represented and in what strength, and is even now subject to minor changes as experience may suggest—within the limits of the authorised field establishments. This business of allocation, naturally difficult, in many cases involved the destruction of existing infantry units and their conversion into artillery or other arms. In other cases it meant the raising of new units altogether. Moreover, there was an undue, though praiseworthy, inclination to attempt to induce those districts and counties which

had not done their duty in the past to find something like their proper proportion of men, while on the other hand the more military and patriotic counties found themselves asked to provide fewer men than they had in the past. This involved the break up of many old battalions, or their fusion into one another, with the immediate effect of destroying the accuracy of the old arithmetical laws of addition. Thus a battalion, numbering 500, when added to one numbered 800, produced not 1,300 men but more often 300, owing to the pardonable disgust of the old members of each battalion at losing their old identity and traditions. Moreover, there was, and perhaps is still, an undue desire to preserve the exact numbers and war establishments fashionable in the Regular Army for the time being, which forced sound old corps into a bed of Procrustes and caused them pain and dislocation. The periods of enlistment were also unnecessarily rigid and forbidding, and the differentiation of pay which places the infantry in a position of inferiority *vis-à-vis* the other arms has also damaged the popularity of that important arm. These difficulties are, however, very well understood by County Associations, and their rectification involves that spirit of compromise and discussion between the civilian authorities on the one hand and the military authorities on the other, which is one of the best possibilities opened out to us by the Territorial scheme. Meanwhile, they go far to explain how it is, not only that the war establishments were not reached at once, but that in many cases they have not been reached even yet.

SECTION 2.—*Administration*

LEADERSHIP

One of the chief defects of the old Auxiliary Forces—the Yeomanry, Militia, or Volunteers—was, not only that they had no higher organisation than companies and battalions, but also that they possessed no officers really capable of commanding any higher units, and no staff officers at all. The Territorial scheme has given us fourteen divisional generals, fourteen mounted brigade, and fifty-six infantry brigade commanders. Practically all of these are Regular soldiers of the required rank, and so, too, are their due proportion of brigade majors and staff officers. In addition, there are a number of carefully selected officers of the Regular artillery who command and train the artillery units of the Force. The selection of all these officers is very carefully made, and their subsequent promotion in the Regular Army, when they return to it, will depend upon the way in which they carry out their duties with the Territorial Force.*

These officers command their Territorial units both

* The following shows some of the appointments now held in the Regular Army by soldiers who have been successfully commanders of Territorial Units: Lieutenant-General Sir H. Mackinnon, late Director-General Territorial Force at the War Office, now General Officer Commanding Western Command; Major-General E. C. Bethune, late commanding West Lancashire Division, now Director-General Territorial Force, War Office; Major-General Sir Francis Lloyd, late commanding Welsh Division, now General Officer Commanding London District; Brigadier-General C. J. Briggs, late commanding South Eastern Mounted Brigade, now commanding 1st Cavalry Brigade, Aldershot; Brigadier-General F. L. Maxse, late commanding 3rd London Infantry Brigade, now commanding 1st Infantry Brigade, Aldershot.

in peace and in war, and when mobilisation is ordered there is no chance of their being carried off to other duties. The units will take the field with experienced generals and staffs, under whom they have trained, and whom they accordingly know and respect. This is a very great advance upon the old haphazard system under which retired military officers or very senior Volunteers or Yeomen were given infantry brigades from year to year, or for the period of camp only, the regiments having, so to speak, to fend for themselves during the whole of the rest of the year.*

The appointment of Regular officers to active commands in the Territorial Force has this further advantage, that it brings the officers of the Regular Army into close association with those of the Territorial Force and thereby, while helping to break down that feeling of jealousy between the two sections of the military forces which was so detrimental to the old Auxiliary Forces, it has an educative and broadening effect upon both parties to the contract. It is a little doubtful at present whether these Regular officers hold their appointments with the Territorial Force long enough to become real experts on its training and to solve problems which are, of course, quite different from those of the professional troops to which they have been accustomed. It is also doubtful whether

* Writing in the year 1891, Colonel G. F. R. Henderson said: "The Volunteer Force as at present constituted is an excellent school of physical training. But this is hardly the purpose for which it is maintained. Give it capable officers, trained company leaders and an educated staff, raise the standard of efficiency, exact a physical test, and it will become the strong arm of a free people, a safeguard against invasion, and an efficient substitute for conscription."—(*Science of War*, p. 229.) Every one of these reforms has been set on foot by the Act of 1907, and almost all are accomplished.

serving, as they now do, under the orders of the Regular commander in all matters of administration and training, enough scope has been left to the energy and initiative of the Commanding Officers of the Force itself. Certainly, the arduous labour of the Territorial officer receives far from its due proportion of official recognition. These, however, are matters of detail only, which can, and will, be solved by time, goodwill, and experience; and, meanwhile, it is an unquestionable advantage, when we come to take stock of the fighting value of the Territorial Force, that it should be led and staffed by men of the same stamp and training as those who hold similar appointments in the Regular Expeditionary Army.

TRAINING

The training of the Territorial Force reaches a standard which is, according to the military correspondent of the *Times*, at least twice as high as that given to the old Volunteers. While perpetuating the admirable system of weekly drills all the year round and of musketry practice, outside the camp period, which had been inaugurated by the riflemen of the old Volunteer Force, the 1907 Act added a much more prolonged period of continuous training in annual camp, and so introduced what was best in the old Militia. The minimum attendances at such weekly drills at their home stations are for recruits, forty in the first year of their service (for artillery, forty-five) and after the first year, ten (for artillery, twenty). But the minimum required by regulation by no means represents the number actually attended; the average Territorial does annually about twice the minimum.

Moreover, the very generous provision of drill halls, with miniature ranges attached, that is now being made all over the country, not only makes the weekly drills much more practical, but brings them within reach of many in the rural districts who, prior to their erection, had no opportunity of serving at all. In addition, the money now provided for week-end camps, regimental tours, and courses of instruction generally, has very materially enhanced the individual training of the commissioned and non-commissioned ranks.

The Yeomanry and Volunteers had, up to the South African War, been allowed to train eight days only in camp, and subsequently four days of camp was the required minimum for individual efficiency. The Act of 1907 increased the minimum attendance to eight days, unless special leave of absence is obtained, while all units are required to be under canvas as units for fifteen days.

During the first six years of the existence of the Territorial Force the following is the percentage of men who attended camp for eight and fifteen days respectively :—

			For 8 days.	For 15 days.	
1908	...	...	35%	...	53%
1909	...	...	29%	...	62%
1910	...	...	30%	...	62%
1911	...	...	29%	...	59%
1912	...	...	26%	...	61%
1913	...	...	22%	...	67%

It is to be noted that when compared with the figures for the Volunteer Force, the number of day's

attendances in camp by individuals have been far more than doubled since the institution of the Territorial scheme. While it is true that in some parts of the country fifteen days' continuous training in camp is still a great difficulty to some of the men, and more particularly to their employers, nevertheless it may confidently be expected that a practical way out will be obtained, and there is no doubt that the ultimate object of the Territorial as regards camp attendance—namely, that every man shall, with rare exceptions, attend for the full fifteen days—will ultimately be realised. It is to be noted further that while the annual training of the Militia consisted of periods varying at different times from a fortnight to a month, at least one week of this was taken up by musketry, and, further, that during the rest of the year the regiment as such ceased to exist and may be said to have hibernated. The Territorial Force, as already said, suffers from neither of these disabilities; even the man who cannot attend camp at all in any particular year, may still render himself efficient at the weekly drills and on the rifle range. Criticism is often directed to the number who obtain leave of absence from camp, but it is usually towards the end of a man's service that leave has to be obtained, and for a man who has attended, say, two or three camps, to miss one is not a very serious matter. Cases of exemption for two consecutive years are almost unknown. In many instances it is actually the most efficient men who are absent, because their abilities render them too valuable to be spared from their civil employment.

One point should be noted in this connection which at first sight is paradoxical enough, but on closer

examination gives us a most instructive insight into the *ethos* or psychology of the voluntary system and of its possibilities in war. This is that the more technical and difficult the arm of the service, the better the class of man who has come forward for service in that arm, and the more astonishing the measure of hard work and devotion given to it. Thus the first result of the bold determination to do anything with mere amateurs in so expert an arm as Horse and Field Artillery has been to call up the very best elements amongst the young men of the day, and has thereby acquired for the Territorial Force a class of men who would very probably never have joined less expert arms like the Infantry, where the business of soldiering for the private soldier is apt, at first sight, to appear so simple as to suggest to energetic minds that it must necessarily be dull. The gunners of the Territorial Force are very largely recruited from men who are engineers by profession, while the drivers belong to that class of men not yet extinct in this country who are fond of horses and realise how much more difficult and therefore more attractive is the business of driving horses in a gun team than of merely riding them as Yeomanry cavalry. So, again, some of the Engineer units of the Territorial Force, and especially the telegraph and wireless companies, are quite as good at their work as their comrades in the Royal Engineers, while the Army Service Corps and the Medical Detachments give scope for activities which are in a very large degree of a civilian and business nature and not of a purely military order.

Service in the Infantry is no doubt less attractive, and the proportion of strength to establishment is

lower. For this arm, particularly, it is important that some further financial provision should be made, as the Council of Territorial Force Associations has recommended, so that neither employers nor employed should be losers by the latter's attendance at camp. But as the high numbers and comparative efficiency of the more expert arms show, the main problem is not one of money at all. It is rather one of obtaining a whole-hearted conviction on the part of all citizens, not only as to the vital importance of the duties which a home army has to perform, but as to the value of the service rendered by the Territorial Force, and of securing, by the greater education of our people in problems of defence, a general consensus of opinion that the voluntary system is the only possible system for Great Britain and her Empire. Then, and then only, will the man who gives up his time to service in the Territorial Force stand on quite a different footing towards his employer and towards public opinion generally, than he who neglects his business for athletics or, still more, for the enervating atmosphere of the cinema theatre or the marine parade.

There is still a very large section of the population which at the present moment gives nothing like the support it should do to the Territorial Force. There are, of course, many millions of persons in this country who are as convinced, as are the Voluntary Service Committee, of the fallacies which underlie the arguments of the compulsionists and of the disastrous effects that the introduction of compulsion in any form would have upon the strategic needs of our Empire. It is perhaps, however, no exaggeration to say that at least 50 per cent. of these persons who are

so sound in theory do nothing whatever to put their theory into practice. It is indeed necessary that they should understand that criticism only is not statesmanship, that an efficient voluntary Home Army is the pivot upon which rests the whole defensive system of the Empire, and that much more than the mere inconvenience and expense of compulsion is involved in the prosperity and the efficiency of the Territorial Force. The members of the Voluntary Service Committee would therefore ask all men of the required age and physical standard who desire to oppose compulsory service to give practical effect to their principles by serving at least four years in the Territorial Force, while as for that large body of voters who are no longer able to undertake active duties of this kind, there are many practical ways by which they can, whether they be employers or not, actively encourage and interest themselves in the welfare of the home defence army.

WAR VALUE

The military value of a force which has never yet been tested in war is a question upon which there is obviously room for large difference of opinion. It must be remembered, too, that while the opinions of professional soldiers vary very greatly on the point, the professional man who has devoted his whole life and energies to soldiering will naturally be prejudiced against the mere amateur. The almost invariable comment on the part of the professional soldier, when he first comes into contact with the Territorial Force, is surprise at the standard of efficiency reached.

Surprise is, after all, an admission of false premises, and, as the length of time since an army has had actual war experience lengthens, false premises are apt to increase. It is significant that the value set upon unprofessional troops, shortly after the South African war had brought experience of such troops, has steadily declined in professional estimation. If therefore the opinions of Regular officers as a whole are even moderately favourable it will be quite fair to give their opinions something rather more than their face value when we come to estimate war ratios.

So far as the performances of similar forces trained for similar or even shorter periods go, there are countless examples in history in favour of troops who, with the very smallest amount of preparatory training and practically no war organisation at all, did wonders on behalf of a cause in which they had all their hearts, and a very large proportion of these examples have been given us by troops of Anglo-Saxon descent.*

Lastly, the critics of the Territorial Force are apt to make one fundamental error in their reasoning. They claim—and other things being equal—claim justly—that it is not fit to meet an equal number of Regular troops. If by Regular troops they mean our own Expeditionary Force, by the rules of war they are right. If they mean the conscripts of Europe immediately upon the outbreak of war, they will still by the rules of war be right, though with a much smaller margin of certainty. But this is only finding fault with second-line troops because they are not fit in the opening stages of a war to meet an equal number of first-line troops. What is too often

* See pp. 48-9.

forgotten is that they are not intended to do so, and that the whole of our strategical plans are based on the contrary assumption. Lord Haldane's statement that the Territorial Force will be embodied on the outbreak of war, and that they will need six months' continuous training from that moment onwards, is twisted into a statement which he never made, that they would be altogether unfit to take the field until those six months had elapsed, and much ridicule is poured upon an army that would only be ready for war six months after it was required. The whole of this seemingly effective argument is a mare's nest, founded upon an entire misconception of the objects for which first and second line troops respectively exist. There are second line troops in Germany and France too; but no one has yet been heard to condemn the Landwehr or the Territoriaux, because they are not immediately fit for service on the frontier. They will be moved up to the frontier to replace casualties as they occur, and meanwhile they will be embodied and under training. Similarly as regards the Territorial Force, they will be needed only when the first line of defence—in our case the Navy—has been passed, and those that think that the British Navy can quickly be destroyed or decoyed away have indeed cause for their extreme despondency. If this occurs, our Expeditionary Force cannot leave England. If, on the other hand, it is our Navy which wins, and clears the narrow seas for the passage of our Army, this again will take time, and meanwhile the Territorial Force, fully organised, well led by trained officers, and already trained at least as well as were the Boers in 1899-1900, will, under the extreme stimulus of a great war, and

backed then at last by the whole-hearted enthusiasm of the nation, be daily narrowing down the difference in training between troops of the first and those of the second line by leaps and bounds. During the early stages of the war any Continental troops which may elude our fleet will be overpowered by the weight of sheer numbers; if they come in greater force in the later stages, they will no longer be the first line men who originally mobilised. Those, ~~or~~ a large proportion of them, will have fallen already, and their places will have been taken by Landwehr, or second-line men, too. What is more, will not a calm consideration of the real possibilities of European war lead to the conclusion that it is, on the whole, more likely that the final and decisive engagements will be fought out, not by the picked soldiers of Europe on British territory, but amongst others by British troops of the second, as well as of the first line, upon Continental territory, against the exhausted and oft-replenished cadres of the Continental conscription? After all, we have the precedent of our own history for such an eventuality, and it must be remembered that many of the men who formed the squares at Waterloo were second-line men, members of the Militia, fighting even in their Militia uniforms.

CHAPTER V

THE PARTICULAR PROBLEM OF HOME DEFENCE

THE brief consideration given to this problem in Chapter II. sufficed to establish the following conclusions:—

- (1) If the Navy is so crippled as to be unable to protect our supplies from oversea, no land force can save us from the necessity for making peace.
- (2) If the Navy is not disposed of, any landing force must be limited in numbers, and cannot depend on any base in its own territory.
- (3) A certain period of warning must be given. These and other considerations now require a more detailed examination.

SECTION I.—*The Supposed Influence of the Fear of Invasion on Naval Action*

Realising that the presence of the Navy in or near home waters is an insurmountable difficulty to their argument, those who demand a compulsory army have endeavoured to show that the primary duty of the Navy will be elsewhere, and that in the absence of such an army the fleet will have to be “manacled” and “anchored around these shores.”

The two duties generally put forward as inconsistent with that of preventing an invasion are trade

defence, and seeking out the enemy's fleet wherever it may be.

The answer to both points is conclusively given in the Admiralty Memorandum of November, 1910. "The main object aimed at by our fleet, whether for the defence of commerce or for any other purpose, is to prevent any ship of the enemy from getting to sea far enough to do any mischief before she is brought to action. Any disposition which is even moderately successful in attaining this object will almost certainly be effective in preventing a large fleet of transports, than which nothing is more vulnerable or more difficult to hide, from reaching our shores." The notion that our fleet is to be dissipated in protecting our ships at long distances from our shores while leaving the enemy able to capture them in home waters, has only to be stated to show its absurdity. So long as the enemy's fleet, or part of it, is available, either for commerce, destruction, or to convoy transports across the North Sea or the Channel, we must keep a superior fleet at hand.

The last resort is the argument that public opinion will not permit the freedom which strategy dictates. But public opinion does not steer our ships, and it has in any case shown itself entirely indisposed to be alarmed by the most strenuous efforts of the National Service League to promote the very evil which its supporters foresee.

SECTION 2.—*Invasion*

Any question of invasion upon a scale only possible for a Power which has command in our own home

waters may therefore be dismissed. If our Navy is not strong enough to prevent that command from being obtained, the only conclusion is that it is imperative that we should not divert from it the money which is needed, by adding to our expenditure the heavy cost of a compulsory land army which could not save us. If it is strong enough, it has no duty to perform inconsistent with that object.

SECTION 3.—*Raids*

Their General Characteristics

The term "raid" is generally used in this connection to indicate a hostile landing which does not aim at a military occupation or at overcoming resistance throughout the country, but is intended to strike a blow which may vitally affect or even determine the struggle.

That there are purposes which such raids may serve may be conceded, but it is to be observed that a raiding force is not for that reason free from the disadvantages which attend the fact that it is not an army of occupation, and further, that the nature of its purpose limits its freedom of action. For instance, it may be sound to argue that a raid may achieve its purpose without the maintenance of communication with a base on its own territory, but it is none the less a fallacy to ignore the fact that the raiding force is subject to all the disadvantages of being severed from such a base. It is equally fallacious to argue that a small highly disciplined force may in time wear down a larger but less highly trained army, and then to apply the argument to a situation in which time may be essential to success,

or to prove that an enemy may be able to land at a particular point, if that point will not suit the purposes of the raid.

We must, therefore, ask what purpose the projected raids are to serve. The National Service League, it is true, argues that the foreigner has only to set foot on these shores to create a panic which will be fatal; but inasmuch as the League aims at creating an army for the express purpose of meeting him on land the argument is presumably not intended to be taken seriously.

Again, the wanton destruction of lives and property is not a method of modern civilised warfare, and would in any case only affect the military situation by strengthening the determination of the nation attacked and arousing the hostility of neutral nations, who would certainly be injured or alienated by such action. It is, therefore, only by inflicting serious or vital injury on our power to carry on the war that a raid can serve its purpose. The possible objective of raids are, therefore, limited practically to our principal naval bases and London, and the nearer the points of landing selected are to one of our naval bases, the greater the difficulty of avoiding the attention of our torpedo and submarine flotillas.

Further, the moment that any landing is attempted, the possible objectives to which it can be directed with any appreciable effect can be gauged with practical certainty, while the number and size of the transports will enable its strength to be estimated with all the accuracy required.

Thus, at the outset, in contrasting the effective power of the raiding and defending forces, we find

that, in addition to the handicap of having to operate in hostile territory to which an invader is always subject, the factors which are usually reckoned as assets of the attacking force operate in the case of a raid on this country to add to his difficulties. In his choice of objectives and starting points, instead of being free, he is narrowly restricted; he has little, if any, opportunity of concealing either his numbers or his plans; he must act without counting on receiving either supplies or reinforcements, and no substantial modification of his original plan can be made to meet a changing situation, without sacrificing the only object worth achieving. On the other hand, the home force has, beyond the usual advantages, exceptional means of knowing the enemy's strength and of anticipating his movements, and the sense of assurance that if certain points are denied to the enemy, time must prove an effective ally.

Strength and Composition of the Raiding Forces

The next question to be considered is that of the strength and composition of the raiding force. This presents a serious dilemma for the Power contemplating the raid. The greater the numbers and the more complete the force in cavalry, guns, and transport, the more serious the difficulties of finding suitable ships and evading our fleet and the longer the time required for embarkation and landing. To attempt to cut down the necessary adjuncts to a force of infantry means that the power of his force is seriously limited. In his evidence before the Norfolk Commission, Sir John French expressed his opinion that an enemy

would bring the recognised proportion of cavalry; and, having regard to the need for avoiding any delay in bringing up supplies and ammunition, it is certain that the transport must be as complete as possible. Ingenious writers may be satisfied to leave their invader to wait to mount his cavalry until he has captured a sufficient number of horses from our Yeomanry, and to leave him undisturbed in collecting supplies from the surrounding country, wherever he may be; but we fancy that an invader will take a different view. He will see that it is essential that he should be able to move rapidly, that his troops must be well provided for to enable them to out-march and out-fight superior numbers, and that his advance must not be hampered by the need of diverting it to the centres of population in which alone food for a large force can be obtained.

A German army corps on a war footing may be taken as fairly indicative of the proportion of the different troops. The principal fighting troops in such a force represent 25,000 rifles, 1,200 sabres, 160 field guns, and the total *personnel* is, roughly, 41,000 men, with 2,400 vehicles, and 14,000 horses. With properly fitted transports, such a force might possibly be carried for a short voyage in shipping of about 100,000 tons, but if the raid is to be anything in the nature of a surprise, this figure would have to be largely increased, owing to the unsuitable character of the available transport. The more closely the problem of shipping, transporting, and landing even a single such army corps is looked at, the greater the difficulties appear. If the largest and swiftest vessels are chosen in order to facilitate the task of escaping the fleet, the

greater the difficulties of finding suitable places for landing, and the longer the time which that operation must occupy. On the other hand, if these are discarded, not only will the difficulty of finding the necessary tonnage be increased, but the presence of a large number of ships, which must all move at the pace of the slowest, will make the chance of evading our fleet practically hopeless. In view of these considerations it is not surprising that the conclusion of the Admiralty, confirmed by the Defence Committee, is that a force of 70,000* men could never reach our shores unless we had lost command in home waters.

The Provision to Meet Raids

But the need for maintaining an ample margin of safety requires that provision should be made for contingencies. Consequently, although we rely mainly upon the impossibility of any force large enough to undertake an invasion escaping the fleet, it has been laid down as a standard that provision should be made for dealing with a force of 70,000 men. It, therefore, becomes necessary to examine what that provision is.

In the first place, it must be observed that the force available at home is not a constant quantity. The essential of any military policy is to be able to cope with any situation which may arise *when it arises*, and not to waste men and money on maintaining a state of preparation which no circumstances can require. It

* There has been a good deal of misconception about the origin of this figure. It is sometimes represented as being derived from a nice calculation of what force might possibly evade the fleet. This is not the case; 70,000 was arrived at as being the *minimum* force which an enemy contemplating invasion would employ.

is, consequently, idle to discuss our power to repel a raid without reference to the circumstances under which the raid takes place. No army in the world is maintained constantly on a war footing, and the idea that a raid might be launched without previous mobilisation may be dismissed for two reasons. Not only is mobilisation necessary for the raiding force itself in order to complete the war establishment of men and horses, but no Continental nation, flanked by rival armies on either side, could afford to weaken its position by the dispatch of so large a force without having mobilised sufficiently to restore the balance. Now mobilisation cannot be kept secret—the mere attempt to do so would involve restrictions on the press sufficient to defeat the object—and there is no reason why we should not be able to mobilise as rapidly as any other nation. Probably we can do so more rapidly; the number of regular reservists to be called up is comparatively small, and the fact that the units of the Territorial Force are localised, while the reservists of the Continental armies are scattered broadcast, makes the rapid concentration of the units comparatively simple.

The result is, that in normal circumstances the invader with his 70,000, or, say, the equivalent of four divisions of the British type, would have to reckon on finding as soon as he landed, the Regular Field Army of about six divisions and a cavalry division of the finest troops in the world, as well as the Territorial Force and Special Reserve. It is clear that in such a case his task would be hopeless, and therefore those who seek to emphasise the dangers of raids always postulate the absence of the Regular Army. Inasmuch

as the Regular Army is intended to be available for use abroad, if required, the possibility of its absence must be considered, but such consideration must include the whole of the circumstances involved by its absence.

*The Call on the Regular Army to Support our
Oversea Dominions*

Now the possibilities for the use of the Expeditionary Force abroad fall into two categories which must not be confused. The first is the use for the protection of our Oversea Dominions or Dependencies; the second is the use in a Continental war. With regard to the first it is to be observed that there is no land frontier in the Empire against which a potential enemy can concentrate rapidly any large body of organised troops. No one in their senses will suggest that England is to adopt compulsory service in order to protect Canada from an invasion by the United States. A Russian advance against India has happily become extremely improbable, and could not in any case become effective until months after the intention became evident.* We have no neighbour on the African Continent capable of any sudden move requiring the dispatch of any large proportion of the Expeditionary Force. The extremities to which the advocates of compulsory service are driven in order to get rid of the Regular Army are well illustrated in the text book of the National Service League, where the question is rhetorically asked whether any Govern-

* Cd. 2,062 of 1904. *Lord Wolseley*. The possibility of our ever requiring three army corps on the frontiers of India could only be occasioned by Russia, and Russia at present is many hundreds of miles away from us. Besides, she could not bring down troops to the frontiers of India without our knowledge, and it would take her months to do so.

ment, in the event of an Indian Mutiny, would hesitate about sending out every available man and boy of the Regular Army and Special Reserve. The answer, which the ingenious author wisely refrains from giving, is that no Government would hesitate, because no such absurd idea would be mooted. In 1857 there were 45,000 British to 230,000 native troops, and from first to last the number of British troops employed was less than 100,000. To-day, the British troops consist of 78,000 Regulars and 32,000 Volunteers, while the native troops number 160,000, and do not include any artillery except twelve mountain batteries. The ultimate suppression of a mutiny might be a long and serious matter, and involve sending troops, probably, from South Africa, and perhaps from England; but it is safe to say that, even if the necessary transport, some 2,000,000 tons, were available—and it is not—the immediate dispatch of the whole expeditionary force is the last expedient which would occur to any responsible statesman.

The foregoing considerations show that, apart from taking part in a Continental campaign, the immediate dispatch of the Expeditionary Force is not a contingency for which provision is required. Whether any situation can arise comparable to that of the South African War, in which ultimately a large force might be required, may be doubted, but in such a case the country will have had months in which to prepare for it, and the Territorial Force, mobilised as soon as the need for sending out a substantial part of the Expeditionary Force had become a practical question, would be very different from what it is to-day. It would have its complete regular staff accustomed to handle it; in

physique, it would have become thoroughly fit; in *morale*, it would have had time to add to the advantage of being a voluntary force of men united by ties of previous association, the stiffening of a continuous period of military discipline; in numbers, it would probably have been brought up to strength by the re-enlistment of trained men or by recruits who would have had time to acquire a sufficient standard to take their place in the fighting ranks.

During the same period the National Reserve would be organised and further trained, so that the bulk of the home garrisons could be met without trenching on the Territorial Field Force. The conclusion must, therefore, be that any Continental Power, viewing the possibility of taking advantage of the situation to pick a quarrel, would have to reckon on the raiding force, if it could ever reach our shores, being met by a superiority of three or four to one of troops which, in Sir Ian Hamilton's opinion, would have a good chance of victory if in a superiority of three to two*—a prospect hardly likely to encourage the dispatch of an army at imminent risk of the entire force being sunk before ever a blow could be struck.

*The Call to Give Military Support to a
Continental Ally*

So much for our power to meet the needs of our Oversea Dominion—and this, after all, is the vital question. The obligation to maintain the Empire our race has created is one for which we must, if necessary, tax our utmost resources. The question of giving military support to a Continental ally stands upon a

* *Compulsory Service*, p. 118.

very different footing. We are free to take whatever course our interests dictate, and as has been pointed out in the first chapter, it is highly doubtful whether we should be doing any service to France by a radical change in our military policy obviously aimed at Germany alone. Let it, therefore, be clearly understood at the outset that, whatever conclusion may be reached as to our ability to spare troops for the Continent, and whatever assumption be made as to the increase in that power effected by adopting any particular form of compulsory service, the question still is: Is that increase worth the price?

Now, it is curious that the forecast of the course of events which ends in the occupation of London is always veiled by the prophets in decent obscurity. Only one instant in the story is portrayed, the moment when the invader lands and finds himself faced by nothing but a caricature of our Territorial Force. Some few chapters in the story may, however, be deduced. War occurs between Great Britain and France, on the one hand, and Germany, and perhaps one or both of the other parties to the Triple Alliance on the other. The great Russian Army is left out of the story, but whether Russia is a belligerent or not—and she certainly would be, if Germany were joined by other Powers—her army must always remain a pressing menace on the Eastern frontier of Germany. Such being the “general idea,” Great Britain, according to these strategists,* decides that it is

* Whether the real crisis would not occur after the first struggle, and whether it is not more probable that the British Army would render more effective service if held as a reserve to be launched at a combatant already exhausted, are matters for debate into which we need not enter. It is sufficient to deal with the assumption which involves the dispatch of the troops at the earliest possible stage.

essential to give military support to France at the critical point, and determines to send out the whole Expeditionary Force. To do this we must mobilise in order to fill the *cadres* with men and horses, and, of course, the Territorial Force and Special Reserve will also be mobilised. Some days, at any rate, must therefore elapse before any of the force can be ready to be sent abroad, and a considerable period before the whole force could be ready. In the meantime, something must have happened at sea. Though Germany may be credited with readiness to ship an army to take its chance amongst hostile destroyers and submarines, it is quite certain that we should do nothing of the sort, and naval success being vital to us, it is obvious that the Navy could not be charged with any convoying duty which might interfere with its operations against the enemy's fleet. It follows that, quite independently of the efficiency of our other land forces at home, no expedition can leave our shores until the enemy's fleet has been either met at sea and defeated, or so securely sealed in port as to make the possibility of an attack on our transports impossible.

And this situation must be maintained until the whole expedition has been landed. The mobilisation and dispatch of the whole Expeditionary Force, two divisions of which are quartered in Ireland, would probably take at least a fortnight. So far, therefore, if the course of events is such as to permit of sending the Expeditionary Force, it must also have been such as to enable the Navy to achieve what the Admiralty Memorandum describes as its main object. In the meantime, what has the enemy been doing on land? Faced with the task of meeting, not only the whole

French Army, but the British Expeditionary Force as well, and threatened, if not attacked, by Russia, is it likely that he will be concentrating four divisions of his best troops at the North Sea ports on the chance of an opportunity for a raid? Scarcely; yet if he is not doing this, the raiding army will, at best, consist of Reserves, and a further interval must elapse before it is ready to start. But whatever be the composition of the force which is to undertake the projected raid, to see whether it can ever start we must return to the naval situation. The German Navy, or what remains of it, if there has been an action, is in its ports. The dispositions best suited for dealing with it are also those best suited for preventing a raid, so that the myth of a navy distracted by considerations of home defence disappears. The assumption of the absence of the Expeditionary Force, therefore, involves as a starting-point that at the end of the first two or three weeks we are in a position better able to prevent a raid from reaching our shores than we were at the outset, at which time, according to the evidence of Admiral Sir J. Ommaney Hopkins before the Norfolk Commission, we have nothing to fear.*

But even if we suppose that all is not yet secure, a still further interval must elapse for the position to be sufficiently altered for a raid to be possible, for the final preparations for starting, for the embarkation, the voyage, and the landing. During all the time which will then have elapsed since mobilisation, the forces at home, the rest of the Regular Army and Reserve, the

* Blue Book Cd. 2062 of 1904.

Q. 3116.—He might attempt little demonstrations? Yes.

Q. 3117.—Small raids? Yes.

Q. 3118.—But they would not do anybody any harm? No.

Special Reserve, the Territorial Force, and the National Reserve will have been free to organise and train with the sole idea of meeting the possible raids. To meet the raid when it comes we shall, therefore, have in organised units a few thousand Regulars, the Special Reserve at, say, 50,000 effectives, the Territorial Force, which, allowing for deductions, for casualties, etc., and on the other hand for men rejoining, may be put at, say, 250,000, and of trained men who could be used for certain purposes, though not organised as a field army, some 80,000 of the Regulars and Army Reserve not sent with the Expeditionary Force and the National Reserve.

With the East Coast as the only practicable place for the landing of a force which must reduce its sea passage to a minimum, the number of troops required for garrison duty will be very limited. Further, we are always told—and it is the assumption on which the *immediate* despatch of the Regular Army to the Continent is demanded—that a decision will be reached in the Continental struggle in about six weeks after the outbreak of war, so that nothing could substantially affect the issue except a blow directed at London and immediately successful, and the task which faces the raider is, therefore, that of covering in a few days something like 100 miles in the face of a mobile force outnumbering them in a proportion of at least three to one, a task which never has been, and, we venture to suggest, never will be accomplished in civilised war.

In the foregoing considerations all possible assumptions have been made in favour of the enemy, assumptions so remote from probability as to bring the

case outside the necessary margin of safety. But if, even so, the timidity of the militants of the National Service League is not re-assured, the retention of, say, a division of the Expeditionary Force would put the matter beyond a doubt. The League does not suggest that their scheme will increase the Regular Army, but only "free" it, so that the question resolves itself into this: Are we to adopt their system of compulsory service for the sake of sending, to take part in a Continental war, only 20,000 more than we can send under the Voluntary System?

Training after War has Begun

The idea of training the Territorial Force after war has begun has been a favourite theme for ridicule amongst those who have failed to realise that they only made themselves ridiculous by their omission to discover that the operations in which the Expeditionary Force is engaged abroad are not operations in which the Territorial Force will be employed. So far from the proposal for such training being unsound, it illustrates precisely the merit of our present policy; the position being such that circumstances may conceivably throw the main burden of military defence at home on the Territorial Force, but only after a period of warning, we provide the force and maintain a sufficient standard to enable it to adapt itself to the burden as the occasion requires. So far from training under these circumstances being less effective, it is obvious that, when patriotism has been stirred by a war in progress, and when the function the force has to fill is apparent, the training of a force of Volunteers

will be a very different matter from the training in time of peace of a force raised by compulsion, and probably sceptical of the possibility of their services being ever required. If the truth of this statement needs practical illustration, it is furnished by the success of the Greek Army in the Balkans, when no less than about one-third of the total Greek Force under arms in the war had received no military training before the war began.*

The conclusion of the whole matter may, therefore, be briefly stated. In normal circumstances our Expeditionary Force is at home, and will be mobilised and more than amply sufficient to dispose of any possible raid if a landing can ever be effected. In abnormal circumstances the Force, or part of it, may be required abroad, but in such cases there must always be an interval of time sufficient to enable the troops at home to reach the standard necessary to keep the situation in hand.

* See "Army Review," January, 1914, p. 52.

CHAPTER VI

ALTERNATIVE SCHEMES EXAMINED

THE previous chapters have been directed to showing that our present system is adequate and well-suited to our needs. If that has been established it is a sufficient defence of the voluntary system. But those who propose any alternative must do more than merely criticise; they must prove that their alternative is practicable and superior.

Some of the alternatives suggested may therefore with advantage be examined. We say *some* because the number of proposals put forward is almost infinite, and the shadowy character of many of them is such as to baffle examination.

1. *Compulsory Service on Continental Lines*

This is the system most in favour in certain military circles. Two years or so of continuous training is the ideal of many supporters of the National Service League. The League, indeed, although it always assures its popular audiences that nothing is contemplated but a period of continuous training of four to six months, followed by three years' service under similar conditions to those for the Territorial Force, still finds it necessary to conciliate the "profound discontent" aroused in the minds of a more select circle

by so meagre a programme, with a hint of better things to come.*

In 1901 the Swedish Army was reorganised on a system almost identical with that proposed by the League, except that professional *cadres* are provided almost equal in numbers to the annual contingent—a practical necessity for which the League makes no provision. It is now proposed to increase the initial period of training to a year to meet exactly the criticism which is levelled against the Territorial Force, viz., that it is not immediately ready for field operations.

In a recent article the military correspondent of the *Times* approves the proposed change, and, being embarrassed by the need of harmonising this view with the support given by the *Times* to Lord Roberts, explains that immediate readiness for war is not required for *our second line* army, but it is immediate readiness for war that the League demands, and therefore they must ultimately ask for what is now required in Sweden.

It is no business of ours to settle the differences amongst the League's supporters, but when we find

* *Fallacies and Facts*, p. 13. Footnote.

"This mention of four months has, I know, caused profound discontent amongst a considerable number of people who, while believing with the National Service League that the safety of the nation can only be secured by Universal Service, cavil at the idea that reasonable efficiency can be obtained in so short a period of training. In some cases this belief is so strongly held as to alienate its supporters from taking any active part in upholding and popularising the cause of National Service. I am glad to have this opportunity to explain that the N.S.L. *has no special predilection for this particular period*. The League's desire is to see the principle of Universal Service for Home Defence accepted, as it seems to its members that if this great principle once gains the consent of the majority of our countrymen, there *will then be no difficulty in adjusting the details of the scheme* which will be necessary to reduce theory into practice." (The italics are ours.)

in the same number of the *Nation in Arms* (Christmas, 1913) a definite announcement, on page 497, that the League does not advocate continuous training for two years—any other idea being “a misconception” which must be “cleared away”—while on page 466 the famous footnote is again quoted to suggest that the period is merely a detail to be adjusted later, we are entitled to devote some attention to pointing out the differences between the two policies. Such an explanation is equally necessary to expose the fallacious manner in which arguments applicable only to one system, are urged in support of another system to which they have no relevance.

The Continental system produces—not a militia—but a standing army and reserve. In Germany, where the system is substantially a two-years' system, a population of 65,000,000 produces a standing army whose peace strength under the law of 1913 will reach about 854,000,* an active reserve of about 750,000, and a reserve of something over 3,000,000 trained men under forty-five. The population of the United Kingdom is about 45,000,000; in arriving at the corresponding figures for an army raised on the German basis some reduction would have to be made for men who would still be needed for a long service army for overseas' garrisons (assuming they could be obtained). We may say, then, that the system would produce a standing army of nearly 600,000, an active reserve of 500,000, and a reserve of over 2,000,000 trained men still of military age.

As an army in the abstract this would, no doubt, be very fine; we need have no fears as to home defence

* *Army Review*, October, 1913, p. 391. This figure includes the “volunteers,” and the extra recruits taken to allow for wastage.

so far as land forces are concerned; whatever advantages in the matter of physique and discipline can be claimed for the Continental system would be ours; we might even hope in course of time to produce something of the Zabern atmosphere. But, with all these advantages on their side, the supporters of this system will hardly object to the mention of a few points on the other side.

The least important of these points is that there appears to be no conceivable situation in which anything but a fraction of this Army can ever be employed. It is obviously unnecessarily large to deal with a raid of 70,000, or even 700,000. Even if enlisted for foreign service, only a fraction of it could ever be transported and maintained. As an army, it would be magnificent, as a weapon to a great extent useless.

The next item which may be examined is the cost. The recent increase in the establishment of the German Army of about 136,000 officers and men involved a non-recurring expenditure of £44,000,000. The creation of such an army as that suggested, including the provision of barracks, but not the acquisition of training grounds, would involve a capital expenditure of at least £100,000,000. The provision of training grounds has been omitted, because it would be practically impossible. The annual expenditure on the German Army now amounts to about £50,000,000. On the same scale the cost in the Budget of our compulsory army would be £38,000,000, to which must be added the cost of the removal of the men from productive occupations. (See page 5.)

But the final objection is even more conclusive.

Not only would a short service army itself make no provision for our overseas' garrisons, but it would make that provision impossible. To maintain a foreign service army of about 3,000, Germany has to pay about twice as much per head as we pay for ours. France, by offering considerable inducements, maintains 28,000 volunteers abroad. We have to maintain 120,000. Writing with the experience of an Adjutant-General, Sir Ian Hamilton does not hesitate to say that it is certain that the men could not be obtained.*

The result of adopting the Continental system would therefore be:—

- (1) The production of an army, which would be to a great extent useless for any purpose.
- (2) Enormous cost.
- (3) The loss of the one thing absolutely essential to the maintenance of the Empire, our power to supply a long service army oversea.

No more need be said.

2. *The National Service League's Programme*

So far as adult training is concerned this programme† in its latest form consists of:—

- (1) A continuous training of from four to six months *in such year as they may select between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one* for all able-bodied youths, except those serving in the Navy, Mercantile Marine, or who may prefer to join the Regular Army.

* *Compulsory Service*, pp. 63-89.

† *Nation in Arms*, Christmas, 1913, p. 497. The question of *cadet* training is an entirely different one to that of actual military service. In any case the League only proposes to spend 10s. per head on cadets, so that the proposed training can hardly be intended to be taken seriously.

- (2) During the next three years a fortnight's continuous training in camp and such musketry and drills as may be prescribed.
- (3) Liability for home defence of the men so trained up to the age of thirty.

The words italicised are new; they represent a concession to certain objections, and introduce an element of uncertainty into the annual recruiting contingent which would be quite impracticable. In a year of bad trade there would be a large influx, while in a good year there would be every inducement to the men, and pressure by the employers to postpone the period of service. The whole organisation of the force would, therefore, be subject to periodical disturbance. Nothing is said as to the case of a man who desires to serve in his nineteenth year, but is not then passed as fit. Presumably, he would, as on the Continent, have to come up again until he is passed or reaches twenty-two. The effect of this will be discussed later.

The production of the League's programme has hitherto been given by the League as follows:—

Total of lads reaching 18 in any year	416,000
Deduct—	
48% for medical rejections and legal exemptions	200,000
Recruits for Navy and Marines	8,000
Recruits for Regular Army ...	35,000
Emigrants	10,000
Mercantile Marine	15,000
Total	268,000
Leaving to be trained	148,000

It is to be noted that "legal exemption" and exemptions for emigrants have now disappeared. As regards medical rejection out of the 1913 "classe" in France, *i.e.*, men aged twenty, 71·83 per cent. were taken; of those aged twenty-one, 83·87 per cent.* If, therefore, as appears to be the case, under the latest version, men may be taken up to twenty-one, the figure of 48 per cent. is quite unnecessarily high for medical rejections, and as there are now no "legal exemptions," and men are not to be allowed to evade service by emigration, the figures must be revised. A further point is that if, as we are told, many recruits for the Regular Army will be drawn from men who have done this term of compulsory service, the deduction of 35,000 is an error. Whether many men would so transfer or not, it may be taken as practically certain that most of those contemplating service in the Regulars would try the short service first. The net result should therefore be something as follows, accepting the other figures in the League's table:—

Total available annually (average)	416,000
Deduct—	
25% rejections	104,000
Navy and Marines	8,000
Men joining Regular Army	
direct, say, ...	10,000
Mercantile Marine	15,000
	137,000
Leaving to be trained	279,000

* *Army Review*, January, 1914, p. 257. In the Norwegian Army (1905) the rejections were 24.2 per cent. in the Northern, and 16.4 per cent. in the Southern districts.—*Territorial Army in Being*, p. 124.

The League's estimate, therefore, is about 90 per cent. too low; but, from their point of view, it is most important to keep the numbers down. There is, first, the question of cost, discussed in a subsequent chapter; secondly, the difficulty of finding officers, which is mentioned later; and, thirdly, the stupidity of having an army quite unnecessarily large. We will, therefore, give the League the benefit of its lower figures, but at the same time it must be observed that numbers can only be so reduced either by resort to the ballot, or else by fixing a very high physical standard.* In either case the use of the term "universal" becomes an entire misnomer, the talk about all sharing the burden of service becomes nonsense, and it is evident that employers will have a large choice of men quite well fitted physically for civil employment who may be employed without the inconvenience of their being periodically called out, so that patriotic employers and the men serving will be more, and not less, penalised than under the present system. Moreover, the physical training will be only given to those who are in no need of it. At once, therefore, the system is shorn of the advantages which constitute the greater part of the oratorical recommendation by which it is advertised.

The cost of the force is shown in Chapter VII. to

* The latter alternative would create another difficulty. It would exclude all those who at present only pass into the Regular Army after the improvement in physique effected by a term in the Special Reserve and many of those who enlist direct into the Regulars. As the Special Reserve is to be abolished, this would mean that many men would be lost altogether. In any case, the recruiting of the Regular Army out of men rejected for the citizen army would seriously impair the prestige of the former.

involve an increase on the present estimates of about £7,000,000 for adult training alone, assuming the abolition of the Special Reserve, and we may therefore pass at once to the military aspect. The first point to observe is that the men doing continuous training are recruits, and not part of the organised force designed to take the field. The whole Army is, therefore, like the Territorial Force, a purely militia body, normally occupied in civil life. We do not hold that it is for this reason unsuited to our needs, but it will not answer the purposes which the National Service League requires. The foreword to *Fallacies and Facts* contains the following quotation: "Regular troops alone are equal to the exigencies of modern war, as well for defence as for offence, and where a substitute is attempted, it must prove illusory and ruinous. No militia will ever acquire the habits necessary to resist a Regular force." Yet the League offers us nothing better than a militia! We are bidden to be ready for an invasion landed by surprise in a time of profound peace before mobilisation can be completed.* Yet the League's army would be as peacefully in their beds as the Territorial Force! The League appeals to Lord Roberts's authority; Lord Roberts asks for a year's consecutive training to begin with,† and the League offers us four months! The League tells us that we must be prepared to face a Continental invasion without assistance from the Regular Army, and appeals to Lord Wolseley's authority. Lord Wolseley says: "If you imagine you could trust them—i.e., troops with six months'

* *The Briton's First Duty*, p. 107.

† Cd. 2062 of 1904, Q. 1109.

training—without Regular troops to fight the best troops of France, it would be madness!"* We are constantly told of the need for a power of expansion to support the Regular Army abroad. Yet the first item of the League's programme is to sweep away the Special Reserve, the only force outside the Regular Army which is liable for foreign service—the very force, moreover, which their text-book tells us may be required at any moment to be sent abroad to its last man!†

The fact of the matter is this: If the needs which the supporters of the National Service League urge really exist, then the League's proposals do not answer them. Hence the "profound discontent" of their supporters who genuinely believe in those needs, and therefore disbelieve in the League's programme. The Army, which consists of men whose occupation for the time being is soldiering and nothing else, who are physically trained for immediate readiness for war, and who are living the life in which the habits of the soldier form part of the everyday routine, is one conception. The Militia Army, in which the men are normally following civilian occupations, and steeped in civilian habits, is another conception. Between the two a great gulf is fixed, and those who believe that nothing but the former will suffice are doing a grave disservice to the nation by flirting with the League's proposals for a militia.

So much for the primary characteristics of the League's Army, a characteristic which, if it disqualifies the Territorial Force, equally disqualifies the

* *Ibid*, Q 1473.

† *The Briton's First Duty*, p. 108.

force which is offered in substitution. Let us turn to other features. The League's programme offers some increase in numbers; but, in reckoning the increase, allowance must be made for the loss of the Special Reserve. And, again, if the League's arguments are to be accepted—*i.e.*, if we are to take 400,000* as the force to be met at a week's notice—the increase is quite inadequate. The force will have fewer youths in its ranks; but, on the other hand, it will not have a N.C.O.† or man of more than three years' service. The physical standard‡ would, no doubt, be higher, but it is to be observed that the campaign for which our Home Defence Army is required would be a short one, fought in a country where the means of communication are excellent and the ground comparatively easy, where the climate is seldom severe, and amongst a friendly population, so that the standard required for a long campaign in a hostile and difficult country is not demanded.

Lastly, the men will start at a more advanced stage in their technical training; that is to say, they will be better shots, more adept at handling their arms, quicker at appreciating and executing orders, and

* N.S.L. Leaflet, *Statement of Our Case*.

† Unless it is proposed to introduce suddenly the Regular N.C.O.s employed in training recruits; such N.C.O.s would be strange to the men, and their introduction would be certain to cause friction.

‡ The physique of the Territorial Force is a favourite theme of criticism amongst those who know least of it. The performance of units at the end of even a short time in camp are generally unexpectedly satisfactory. After paying a remarkable tribute to the equipment of the infantry soldier (which Lord Roberts has dubbed a failure!), General Langlois wrote in 1910, "a body of fully trained troops in good condition, wearing our equipment, would certainly have been more exhausted by such a day's work than these youths, many of whom were scarcely eighteen."—*The British Army in a European War*, p. 43.

superior in some other similar respects. But, if the arguments in the preceding chapter have been sound, there will be time for a great deal of leeway to have been made up before the Territorial Force can be required to fight, and it is, after all, not the mere technique which takes the time in the making of a soldier. It is the acquisition of all that goes to make up *morale* and discipline. "The characteristics or emotions," writes General Haking, "which, from a military point of view, require the most serious consideration, are courage and fear, surprise, respect and disrespect, cheerfulness and dejection, comradeship, emulation and *esprit de corps*. Good discipline means that all the qualities quoted above which are favourable to success in war have been imparted during peace training, and those which are detrimental have been eliminated to the greatest possible extent."*

To such discipline, a period of four months' compulsory service, anything from one to three years back will contribute little. The years spent under a voluntary system by men who serve because they like it, and are throughout in constant association, off duty as well as on, will do far more.

Again we may quote from General Langlois's opinions formed after a visit undertaken for the particular purpose of studying the Territorial Force: "The standard of technical efficiency is evidently not all it might be, but its moral force is greater. This is a factor which is not sufficiently taken into account in discussing the value of this Army, controversy turning almost entirely upon the question of numerical strength and on the number of days in the training

* *Company Training*, p. 2.

period, but it is a powerful element of strength which compulsory service would not give.”*

So much for numbers, physique, age, and technical training; put at its highest, the advantage which the League's Army can claim over the existing system amounts, when considered in relation to the demand to be made on a home defence force, to very little.

What is there on the other side?

Firstly, the matter of officers. The League's programme requires (1) 2,250 Regular Officers for the training of the recruits, in addition to the further officers to command and staff the larger active Army; (2) about 17,000 Territorial Officers. Their proposals for finding these officers are examined in detail in the next chapter. They are shown to be absurd. The position therefore remains as at present, viz., that the supply of Regular Officers cannot properly meet the demand, while 10,000 Territorial Officers appears to be about the maximum attainable.

Nor could a mere increase in the pay proposed by the League cure the difficulty in finding Territorial Officers. No one who means to get on in life could throw away the amount of time asked by the League, whatever the temptation offered by temporary emolument. The whole system is, in fact, a “make-believe,” which crumbles as soon as it is looked at.†

* *The British Army in a European War*, p. 39.

† It is sometimes argued that there can be no real difficulty in finding the officers, since it is done under similar systems in Switzerland and Norway. The answer is that the Swiss and Norwegian systems are very different from the League's. For example, the League's period of training for the infantry recruit is 120 days; in Switzerland it is 65, and in Norway 48. In neither of the latter countries is there any Regular Army except the permanent staff of officers and N.C.O.'s for command and training, and in neither country does the work required of the non-regular

If the scheme breaks down on the question of officers, it is, perhaps, unnecessary to go into further objections, but there is one which is so serious that it cannot be passed over, the same objection as that urged against the Continental system, viz., the effect on the recruiting for the Regular Army. In this case, no doubt, the validity of the objection is more open to question. On the one hand, it is said that the fact that men join the Regular Army now from the Special Reserve and Territorial Force shows that a little experience proves an encouragement to enlist. On the other, it must be pointed out that the facts do not in the least prove the conclusion, because no one can say how many of the Special Reserve recruits joined with the idea of giving soldiering a trial, and then decided against it; until this is known, the effect of everyone giving service a trial cannot be deduced. It must further be observed that the Special Reserve and Territorial Force, being dependent on volunteers, must be made attractive, and it by no means follows that a turn of training in a compulsory school will leave a pleasant impression.* But the argument does not depend alone upon the debateable point of whether men will get "fed up" or not. There is a much more serious cause for anxiety. The Regular Army

Officers approximate to that required by the League's programme, while the positions open to officers in the Territorial Armies, though the *nominal* rank is no higher, are in fact far more attractive, owing to the absence of a Regular Army to monopolise the higher functions.

* It is here, too, that the fallacy of drawing any deduction from such an experiment as the Spectator Company comes in. When an enterprising Officer is determined to produce a satisfactory result, a very different atmosphere is produced than is the case when a batch of compulsory recruits has to put through a training which is nobody's hobby.

depends for its recruiting largely on the surplus of men on the labour market. Under the League's scheme 130,000 (150,000, less 20,000 now taken for the Special Reserve) will be taken right off the market for a period of from four to six months. No doubt, there will still be fluctuations which will from time to time give rise to a surplus, but the fact remains that there will be regularly 130,000 less to meet the demand. Sir Ian Hamilton again gives it as the conclusion, based on his experience as Adjutant-General, that "it is my firm opinion that the acceptance of the proposals of the National Service League, as they stand at present, would, within two years, bring about something very like disaster in the recruiting market for the Regular Army."* Put at its lowest, there is a very serious risk of depleting the Regular Army still further, and it is a risk which we cannot afford to run.

To this risk must be added the certainty of the abolition of the whole of the Special Reserve, with the result that behind the Regular Army and Reserve, we shall not have a man enlisted for foreign service. The League, no doubt, will rely upon the trained men to volunteer; but, clearly, if the active army is required for home defence, no units can be spared, and consequently only drafts of individuals could be sent, and it would be impossible to do what can be done at present, release Regulars in oversea stations by replacing them with Special Reserve units.

The objections to the League's scheme may, therefore, be summarised as follows:—

1. It won't work, because the staff for training the recruits and officering the Army cannot be

* *Compulsory Service*, p. 113.

obtained under the scheme, and no sufficiently trained *cadres* are provided.

2. If it could be worked, it would give us for home defence a militia army which would be stronger in numbers than the Territorial Force, and to that extent, if the Admiralty view is correct,* in excess of our requirements.
3. It would entail serious risk of depleting the Regular Army, which is essential to our needs.
4. It would destroy the present provision for expansion, and, at best, offer an inferior substitute.
5. It would not be universal training for able-bodied adults, but could only be reduced to manageable proportions by resort to the ballot or so high a physical standard as to be grossly unfair.
6. It would throw on the Budget a further charge of about £7,000,000 and involve a further loss of at least £2,000,000 per annum by the transference from productive to unproductive labour.†

This is the scheme which commands the widest support. The League commends it as the solution propounded by a combination of Lord Roberts, Admiral Sir Gerard Noel, and two "pillars of the Empire," Lord Curzon and Lord Milner, and claims

* See Admiralty Memorandum printed in the Appendix. The National Service League has endeavoured to extract consolation from the remark of the First Sea Lord that "the presence of a sufficiently trained *professional* army in these Islands at all times is quite as necessary as the other arm of the service." The speech was made at a purely social function in support of an institution for the *regular* army, and the meaning read into it by the League has been publicly repudiated. (See Mr. Asquith's Speech on February 27th, 1914.) But, in any case, the request is for a *professional* army, which the League does not offer. If the statement is to be taken as a considered pronouncement that the whole Expeditionary Force will not, under any circumstances, be sent abroad, then the demand to be made of the non-professional army is smaller, and the need for the League's army so much the greater.

† See p. 5.

that "they are entitled to ask for and receive careful consideration for the solution."* We venture to doubt whether any one of the above ever contributed anything to this "solution," except a blessing after it was produced, and we should not be surprised to find that the consideration given to it in the preceding pages is more careful than that which any one of them gave before the blessing was pronounced.

3. *A Two-Year System Limited by Ballot*

The objection to universal service on the German model on the ground of its producing an army far beyond any use to which it can be put, has been met by the suggestion that the numbers taken should be limited to requirements by ballot. Such a system has been carefully examined by Sir Ian Hamilton and condemned.† Unless accompanied by the abolition of the linked battalion system, and therefore of the existing Expeditionary Force—the men for oversea duty being merely trained in depôts‡—the cost would be prohibitive. An Expeditionary Force of some sort is essential, and a short service force, raised by conscription, would be immensely inferior for long range purposes to our present long service voluntary army. But the military aspect is really hardly worth considering, because no Government would dare to propose a two-year compulsory system which did not even pretend to be universal.

* *Nation in Arms*, Christmas, 1913, p. 487.

† *Compulsory Service*, pp. 93—101.

‡ The main objections to this have been stated on p. 26.

4. *The Swiss or Norwegian Systems*

These systems are on the same sort of basis as the National Service League's programme, but the period of preliminary training is only about half as long, while the number of years spent in the active army is longer. Worked alone they are practicable, but any attempt to combine them with a long service voluntary army raises all the objections discussed in considering the League's scheme, though some of them are not quite so accentuated. The cost would be very little less than that of the League's scheme, as a mere reduction in the period of service would not effect any substantial economy. It would still be necessary to choose between having a really universal system which would give numbers far in excess of any possible requirements, and a merely nominally universal system in which two-thirds of the available men were allowed to escape on one pretext or another. Finally, the result, for the purposes required, would be little, if at all, superior to the Territorial Force, and would certainly not compensate for the loss of the Special Reserve, and the probable depletion of the Regular Army.

5. *Filling the Territorial Force by Ballot*

This is certainly the least objectionable proposal, and if it were really proved that the numbers were below the margin of safety, some practicable scheme might be evolved. But there are serious difficulties. If voluntary enlistment were entirely displaced, all the advantage of getting only the willing men and

those who can serve with the least possible dislocation of industry would be lost, and it is more than likely that the gain in numbers would be attained only by a loss in discipline and spirit. On the other hand, the alternative of requiring counties to raise a quota by compulsion if voluntary enlistment failed, would probably lead to a most undesirable form of indirect compulsion applied by the influential to those who were not in a position to resist, in order to avoid the need of resorting to the ballot. The scheme commands but little support. The idea of the ballot is thoroughly unpopular. The whole argument of the majority of the supporters of any compulsory system is that the training of the Territorial Force is entirely inadequate, and they are, therefore, equally opposed to any mere increase in numbers. The advocates of voluntary service derive their confidence in its sufficiency from considerations of the military needs of the country, which do not depend for their validity upon a matter of a few thousands less or more. They believe that the present system meets those needs, and that as soon as the agitation for compulsion dies its natural death, the existing level will be easily maintained and surpassed. Consequently the scheme, though it may not have many very bitter enemies, has many opponents and practically no friend. In other words, its prospects are hopeless.

6. The Australian or New Zealand Systems

The National Service League is never tired of commending the example of these Dominions. The training undergone is, however, substantially the same

as that which they condemn in this country as productive of only a "make-believe army." The pay in Australia is lavish beyond anything dreamed of even in our voluntary system,* and as nobody suggests that we require an army of the numbers which would be produced, we should merely be throwing away millions for something which, however valuable under the conditions prevailing in the Dominions, would be useless for our purposes.

7. A Little Drill and a Little Shooting

There remains one other scheme—it has, we believe, only one real friend—Colonel Weston's system of "a little drill and a little shooting for the young fellows."† Very excellent things in themselves; unfortunately, they do not produce an army, and until the proposal takes such shape as to give us an army to criticise, we will turn our guns on to those who sought to give to an electoral contest a significance which they knew perfectly well it did not warrant. Nothing could have been more candid and straightforward than Colonel Weston's advocacy of his own policy and his repudiation of the National Service League. Nothing could have been more uncandid than the attempts made in the press to represent the result of the election as setting the seal of approval on the League's policy.

The foregoing pages have dealt, we believe, with all the proposals which have been seriously put before the public. They are all either useless or mischievous or both. That the able and distinguished men who

* See Appendix III.

† See p. 12.

advocate these various systems can produce nothing better is the most convincing proof of the conclusion that, whatever attractions compulsory service may seem to possess in the abstract, as soon as an attempt is made to propound a concrete system, the task of adapting compulsion to our Imperial needs is revealed as hopeless. The Voluntary System, whatever its imperfections, holds the field in this country unchallenged by any serious competitor.

CHAPTER VII

THE NATIONAL SERVICE LEAGUE'S ARMY ESTIMATES

It is an interesting task to endeavour to estimate from the material at present provided, the available military strength of the country, exclusive of Regular Forces, in the event of the National Service League's programme being adopted, and the effect of the programme on the circumstances of the existing Territorial Force. The League's programme was officially explained in an article, communicated to the *Army Review* of April, 1912, by Colonel A. Keene, D.S.O.

SECTION 1.—*Present Establishment*

The present establishments of the Special Reserve and Territorial Force, exclusive of the Officers' Training Corps, are as follows:—

Special Reserve—

Regular Establishment	...	977	
Special Reservists		80,120	
Total			81,097

Territorial Force—

Divisional and Brigade Staffs

and Adjutants	...	...	633
Permanent Staff	...	...	2,206
T.F. Officers	...	...	11,258
T.F. Men	...	...	301,632
Total	...	...	315,729
Total	...	...	396,826

The Special Reserve establishment provides for a force of 3 Cavalry Regiments, 957 Royal Garrison Artillery, 2,054 Royal Engineers, 101 battalions of Infantry, 4,000 Army Service Corps' drivers, and 3,995 Royal Army Medical Corps' *personnel*, all liable, when called out on permanent service, to serve either in the United Kingdom *or elsewhere*. The Territorial Force is liable for service in the United Kingdom only.

The League's programme substitutes for this a recruit contingent of 150,000 undergoing training, and an active force with a total establishment of 414,000 officers and men, all of whom will have passed through the course of recruit training in the ranks for a period varying from four to six months, but *none of whom will be liable* as Territorials for *service elsewhere* than in the United Kingdom. It is proposed to invite Territorials so trained to engage to serve abroad with the Regular Army in time of war for an annual bounty of thirty shillings. But there is, apparently, no intention of forming any *cadres** liable for service abroad.

It is, perhaps, hardly realised that the League's

* *i.e.*, organised bodies of cavalry and infantry in skeleton form.

programme abolishes the Special Reserve as such. Though its actual present strength is only about 63,000, the *Cadres*, which now exist and can be filled up in various ways, constitute a valuable addition to the striking force of the country. The threatened loss of these seems to cause but little perturbation, probably because the nature of the addition is so recent and so little realised.

The power of supporting an Expeditionary Force abroad will thus be altered by substituting a list of 80,000 *individuals* for the organised *troops* of the Special Reserve as enumerated above.

The proposed changes in the Territorial Force are more difficult to grasp, because the information is so meagre. The field force of 414,000 will be up to its establishment in time of peace, whereas the present strengths of the Special Reserve and Territorial Force are about 79 per cent. and 80 per cent. respectively of establishments which together are only 18,000 less than that of the League's active army.* We are given to understand that the only other material

* The establishment of the Territorial Force was deliberately fixed at a much higher figure than the anticipated peace strength in order to provide for the intake of men who, having completed their service, would volunteer to join in time of war. The League, which depends for volunteers for *foreign service*, can hardly question the propriety of anticipating that men not legally liable to serve will come forward for *home defence*. The League constantly represents 315,000 as the number fixed by Lord Haldane as the *minimum* required for home defence. The fact is that Lord Haldane regarded 250,000 as the *maximum* needed in time of peace, and stated in introducing the scheme: "I believe that the auxiliary forces will give us a force which in time of peace need not exceed a quarter of a million, and in time of war will reach the strength of 300,000." (*Hansard*, February 25th, 1907.) The establishment of the field army available on mobilisation is therefore increased by 18,000 while the power of supporting the Expeditionary force abroad is to consist of a list of 80,000 individuals.

change is that the recruits will have been clothed and trained for a continuous period, that they will be better trained, but that in all other respects the Force will carry on as at present. It would seem to follow that the remaining expenses per head, apart from those of recruit training, will be the same to the country and to the individual. A difficulty seems to arise here, because at present no man need serve if his personal expenses at home do not permit the petty expenditure inevitable to volunteering. If, therefore, compulsion is applied, it is clear that he must be found in all necessities.

But so far from the expense to the country being the same, it is suggested by the League that the Force, apart from recruit training, is to cost considerably less. It becomes, therefore, an interesting point to endeavour to ascertain where the saving is to be. According to the League's estimates, the cost of the existing Special Reserve and Territorial Force if at full establishment would be £4,816,665; the cost (exclusive of recruit training) of the new Territorial Force is to be £2,182,000, or, adding the bounty for foreign service, £2,302,000. If we eliminate the Special Reserve from the calculation on the ground that they at present go through a recruit training similar to that advocated by the League, it would seem that whereas an establishment of 315,000 Territorials would cost, according to the League, £3,515,000, 414,000 are to cost, exclusive of recruit training, £2,182,000. How is this saving to be accomplished? It becomes necessary to examine the present expenditure debited against the Territorial Force.

SECTION 2.—*The Present Cost of the Territorial Force**

In the Army Estimates for 1913-14 the proportion of the cost of the annual training thrown on to the training grant was shown at £659,000. A further sum of £379,000 was allowed to Associations for expenses in connection with annual training in camp, including travelling and carriage and hire of horses and wagons, and a further £66,000 for forage, straw, etc., was charged to Vote 7. The number of officers and men attending camp for eight days or more in 1913 was 219,535. The average cost of camp per head at present is, therefore, about £5. It must be noted, however, that if the whole number had attended for fifteen days, the excess cost would be the total amount of a week's pay and allowances for about 55,000 officers and men, that being the number who attended in 1913 for eight days or less. If a fortnight's camp were compulsory, as under the League's programme, it is clear that the cost per head for the camp training alone would be much more than £5, which is the *total* amount allowed by the League as the cost of training a Territorial soldier. It is true that the League allows a sum of £500,000 to meet the expense of armaments, stores, horses, etc., but this expenditure would scarcely cover the requirements of the Territorial recruit dépôts as well as the fortnight's camp.

The other principal items in the cost of the Territorial Force, as shown in the Estimates for 1913-14, were as shown in the following table:—

* The cost for 1914-15 is about £200,000 higher, but as the object of this section is to arrive at the cost of the League's army, in which the new Camp bounty would not be paid, the 1913-14 figures afford the best comparison.

		Total.	Cost per head of Establishment.
(1) Permanent Staff (total effective services) ...	£522,500	£1	13 0
(2) Training Outside Camp (charged to Training Grant)	£90,000		5 6
(3) Buildings and Ranges	£290,000		18 0
(4) Small Arms and Ammunition	£145,000		15 0*
(5) Grants to County Associations for Administration, Clothing, Travelling to Drill and Musketry, &c. ...	£901,000	£2	16 0*
(6) Miscellaneous ...	£63,000		4 0
			£6 11 6

Of these items, when applied to the League's force, the cost of *providing* clothing must be deducted, as this is debited to the recruit training, and 9d. per day in camp for extra messing allowance must also be deducted, as the League will not permit this luxury. Deducting £1 3s. od. (the basis of the grant) for the former, and 11s. od. for the latter, the cost, exclusive of camp, works out at £4 17s. 6d. The cost per head under the League's scheme, including camp, would therefore be about £10 os. od., or £4,000,000 for the entire force.

* Item (4) depends on strength and therefore the cost per head must be reckoned on the strength and not the establishment. The same is true to some extent of item (5), but as the cost of clothing is eliminated later, this will not very largely affect the result.

SECTION 3.—*The League's Estimate*

The League arrives at £5 as the cost of training subsequent to the recruit training by the extremely simple method of taking the present average cost of an *infantry private* of the Special Reserve after his first year—namely, £9, and deducting the amount of his bounty, £4. To take this as the basis of the cost of the further training of a force of 400,000 N.C.O.'s and men of all arms, is a rough and ready method of estimating cost which only needs to be glanced at to be cast aside as worthless. It is true that the League takes a further sum of £200,000 for administration, but it is clear that this sum is arrived at by studying the Army Estimates Appendix (Estimates restated), where we find that the item "Staff and Administration" covers the cost of the War Office and Staffs of Commands and Districts, and the League's £200,000 is merely inserted as a provision for increased work in these departments. The League makes a contingent provision of £783,912, but deficiencies and errors in other items of the nature indicated cannot be fairly met by such a sweeping and non-committal estimate.

It would, therefore, seem necessary to assume either that the League has under-estimated the cost of the further training of the Territorial Force by about 90 per cent., or that the League intends to withdraw a large proportion of the facilities for training at present existing. The pamphlet published by the League in February, 1909, from which Colonel Keene's figures are taken, definitely states that the

Territorial will receive Regular's pay during his "repetition courses." Therefore, the item for pay and allowances will hold good. It is clear that the cost of conveyance to camp and hire of horses and wagons cannot be omitted. The cost of upkeep of clothing will hardly be lessened by increased usage, while boots and shirts and other smaller items must be provided for penniless men, and therefore for all. It is hoped that expenditure on musketry and ranges will not be further curtailed—indeed, unless it is largely increased, the musketry training of 550,000 men on Territorial lines will afford grave difficulties.

Possible economies are, therefore, confined to the withdrawal of Regular divisional and brigade staffs, adjutants and permanent staffs, and the closing of units' headquarters. The League has on occasions protested that it has no intention of closing headquarters, but the absence of any provision or reference in Colonel Keene's paper, or in the pamphlet, to the cost of headquarters or of the Regular establishments for the 414,000, make it clear that it is in these items at any rate that economy is to be practised. The regular establishments of the training depôts will not be available because the periods of training recruits and repetition courses will coincide.* It is not easy to imagine what will be the increased military value of a Territorial unit with no permanent staff, or the condition of the orderly rooms during the year with no adjutants and no paid caretakers. Clerical work, orders, and the constant flow of instructional arrangements left to the tender mercies of unpaid officers and

* If they do not, then a large capital cost for barracks must be faced.

men who are hard at work as civilians, would be scarcely likely to produce higher efficiency. Indeed, the withdrawal of the permanent staffs is wholly impracticable, and the like withdrawal of the regular divisional and brigade staffs would be a grave misfortune. But it is clear that the League makes no provision for their cost, unless they are merely "contingencies."

SECTION 4.—*The League's Scheme for Officers*

If, instead of taking a purely artificial basis, the fallacy of which has been repeatedly pointed out, the League would take the concrete figures for the Territorial Force, and point out exactly where the saving comes in, some reliance might be placed on their estimates. Some saving is no doubt made in the grants to officers, and in view of the constant assertion that commissions are to be open to the poorest, and given to merit alone, it is interesting to note the League's views on the way to attract officers to the Force. Fourteen thousand are wanted—8,000 subalterns and 6,000 in the higher ranks—for the active force, and 3,000 for the recruit training. Subalterns are to be obtained at the rate of 5,000 a year, one in every thirty recruits, by restricting commissions to boys who have first obtained Certificate A at school and reached a certain educational standard, and who have then passed through a four or six months recruits' training in the ranks, "without distinction of wealth or class," and been recommended for the rank of sergeant. Having

reached these dizzy heights, at the cost to the State of 10s. a year while a boy, and £22 while a recruit, the fortunate one will be invited to become a probationary officer, and if successful in obtaining a commission in the active force, will exchange service in the ranks for the next three years for service as an officer. But his probation must be worked out by service in an Officers' Training Corps for a year, or for six months in a training brigade. During this probation he is to cost the State no less than £20! Having passed through his probation period, he will become a full-fledged officer, and is to cost the State on an average £13 a year for the rest of his career as an officer, inclusive of all charges and expenses, including fifteen days' camp. The generosity of the proposal is somewhat overwhelming. No provision is made for replacing the present Special Reserve Officers who are available for service abroad. Indeed, on investigation, it appears that the League calmly proposes to take officers for the Territorial Force on mobilisation from the Regular units serving at home—*i.e.*, the Expeditionary Force itself! No mention is made by the League as to the constitution of the new Officers' Training Corps, or training brigades, to which probationary officers are to be attached. How the training is to be carried out, when the existing Officers' Training Corps are abolished, is left to the imagination. Cadets in future are to be maintained on a grant of 10s. per annum, to cover all charges of uniform, equipment, camp, shooting, and instruction, and 50 per cent of the boys of the country are to be compelled to become cadets provided they are already

physically fit. No adjutants or sergeant-instructors, no efficiency or other grants, no outfit allowance, no pay and allowances or money for training are in future to be provided for the Cadets or the new Officers' Training Corps except out of the 10s. per Cadet and £20 per officer training; and officers of the Territorial Force, who are even now considerably out of pocket, will have the pay and allowances which they at present receive cut down to what £13 a year can buy, and they will have the pleasure of buying their own outfits. As a working plan for getting and keeping officers the scheme is a marvel of commonsense!

To the present normal expenditure on Territorial training, the National Service League proposes to add the cost of training recruits from four to six months. This additional cost is estimated by them at £4,837,125, and is arrived at by multiplying 150,000 by the estimated cost of training an *infantry* Special Reserve recruit for five months, and adding the cost of the training staff. But the figure taken as the cost of training a Special Reserve recruit is only that which covers such expenditure as can be regarded as personal to the man, and excludes the cost of horses, saddlery, harness, and warlike and other stores, for which 18s. per head of the whole establishment of 550,000 (recruits and trained men) is allotted by the League. If cavalry and artillery recruits are to be adequately trained in sufficient numbers, it seems somewhat rash to work upon the present cost of training infantry Special Reserve recruits, seeing that the whole circumstances of the training would be vastly different from the training of a handful of the latter at an existing dépôt.

SECTION 5.—*The League's Scheme for Recruit Training*

The recruit training is, of course, the rock upon which the whole efficiency of the League's scheme depends, and just as the efficiency of a school depends upon its teachers, so the efficiency of the recruit training will depend upon the stamp of officer and N.C.O. constituting the training staff. It almost takes one's breath away to find that the League recommends its own organising secretaries and other retired officers as the regular officers to train the recruits. Two thousand two hundred and fifty additional billets, "all in the British Isles, and *permanent and stationary*," are to be opened as well-paid posts to those officers who have left the Army at a comparatively early age, presumably because they were tired of soldiering, or were not fit for promotion, and yet "who would no doubt come forward gladly for so congenial a task as soldiering at home in billets which would allow them to remain in one place." It is true that the League hints at an alternative method of making promotion to commissioned rank on a large scale from the ranks which would "give us very suitable men for the work" and popularise the introduction of universal service. But the organising secretary might reasonably protest against such a scheme, and therefore it is not more than a hint. As for the N.C.O.'s, they are to be found by the National Association for the Employment of Ex-Soldiers, and in twenty-five years' time, we might have battalions of recruits with no officer or N.C.O. under sixty, all having left the

Army a quarter of a century ago, and having remained "in one place" ever since. The provision of the 3,000 Territorial subalterns is almost more humorous. They will apparently never rise above that rank, and never have any duty except training successive batches of recruits. They are to be employed for from four to six months of the year, and will cost the State exactly £50 each per annum. Obviously if they are employed for about half the year they cannot follow any other serious business or profession. They must therefore be either men who can afford to earn little more than £50 per annum, or else men whose ambition does not rise above that amount; in other words, the "idle rich" and the agricultural labourer will be the only competitors for the positions of perpetual subalterns. What are we to think of a scheme which proposes to compel 50 per cent. of the youth of the country at a most impressionable age to spend four or five months in the care of such a training staff?

SECTION 6.—*The Probable Results*

To sum up the position it would seem that the adoption of the League's programme if carried out according to the League's estimate would involve the destruction of the Special Reserve *Cadres*, and the consequent reduction of the strength of our Foreign Service Army, the destruction of existing Officers' Training Corps, and the loss of their output of recruits for commissions, the destruction of all voluntary organisations, like the Boys' Brigade and the Boy Scouts, who object to the War Office control (inevitable with the adoption of compulsory military training for boys), the deprivation of all existing Territorial

units of their permanent and training staffs, and yet a great increase in the amount to be spent on equipping, maintaining, and training the Home Defence Force.

It is impossible to frame an accurate estimate of the cost of the League's proposals under workable conditions without further material, but the following additions must certainly be made:—

(1) It has been shown that, unless impossible economies are to be effected, the cost of annual training has been underestimated by about £2,000,000.

(2) The War Office estimate of the cost of the training staff for the recruit training exceeds that of the League by £900,000.

(3) Fifty per cent. of medical rejections for cadets is too high, and should be about 33 per cent. This brings the number to be trained annually to 1,000,000. The present cost in the Estimates for a member of the junior Officers' Training Corps is £1 12s., and parents spend a considerable further sum. The League says that this is only the extravagance of the voluntary system, an assertion which will be believed when the possible economies are pointed out.

As an example of the economy of a compulsory system it may be noted that in Australia the estimate for uniform allowances, &c., to the cadets is £269,550 for the year 1912-13. As the allowance to junior cadets (under fourteen) is only 4s. per head, the bulk of this must be spent on the 92,000 senior cadets, *i.e.*, at least £2 10s. per head. If £1 10s. only is allowed for 1,000,000 cadets, this would mean an increase of over £1,000,000.

(4) Capital expenditure has been entirely omitted from the League's estimate, but armaments must be provided and periodically replaced by new patterns. Training grounds must be obtained, and probably barracks will have to be built, as six months' training under canvas is quite impracticable. An increase of 117,000 in the peace strength of the German Army involved a capital expenditure of £44,000,000. To provide for the five months' recruit training of 150,000 men, and also for the increased establishment of the active force can hardly cost less. This would add at least £1,000,000 for interest on the debt.

These additions come to £5,000,000, and added to the League's estimated increases of £3,800,000 and £500,000, make the total addition to the Budget expenses at least £9,000,000.

CHAPTER VIII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Let us now briefly recapitulate some of the arguments which have been set out in detail in the previous chapters. They lead to the general conclusion that compulsory military service is neither suited to our circumstances nor required for our security; and that the attempt to set it up would have disastrous consequences upon our sea-power, greatly complicate the problem of raising the voluntary forces which are necessary for our Imperial over-sea purposes, add new complications and embarrassments to European policy, and throw unnecessary, unequal, and unpopular burdens upon the people of this country. Further, it is submitted that the moral and physical benefits claimed for compulsory military service have not been proved and could not be realised by any of the schemes that have been presented to the public.

The military advocates of compulsory service are accustomed to argue as if there were no limits to the expenditure of a country on armaments, provided cause can be shown for suspecting danger from any quarter, however remote. Statesmen, on the contrary, know that there is a severe limit which cannot be passed without causing internal disaffection and discontent, and creating poverty which will eventually weaken the defensive resources of a country and its strength in war much more than the additional

armaments will fortify them. We have seen in our country during the past few years the acute conflicts which are caused by large new demands on the taxpayer; and these are likely to be still further embittered if it can plausibly be said that money needed for internal reform has to be withheld because of unnecessary or extravagant expenditure on armaments. Thus the problem for all nations, ourselves included, is how to apply a given quantity of money and energy to the best advantage for purposes of national security, these purposes being determined by the special circumstances and conditions of each nation separately.

COMPULSORY MILITARISM AND SEA POWER

In solving this problem the British nation can get little or no help from the example and experience of other Powers. Almost all the analogies drawn from their practice are misleading and fallacious when applied to British conditions. They have land frontiers which must be defended by military forces; we have sea frontiers which can only be defended by a Navy. For all of us the primary object is to keep the enemy out, instead of waiting to fight him when he has come in; but, whereas others must do this by land forces commensurate with their neighbours' land forces, we must do it by sea forces superior to our neighbours' sea forces, and can do it in no other way. If we keep the command of the sea, no invading force on any formidable scale can land in this country; if we do not keep it, it is doubtful whether any invader will think it worth while to reduce us by landing a

military force. For the blow at the heart will have been struck, our mercantile marine will have been captured or forced to remain in port, with the result that we shall be in the position of a beleaguered fortress, cut off from the food supplies on which our population live, deprived of the raw material which feeds our industries, isolated from our Dominions and Dependencies across the Seas. That is a position which could not be retrieved by any defensive army, however valiant, well-organised, or numerous; and we can imagine no more deplorable position for a Government than having to confess, at such a moment, that it had scattered its resources between Army and Navy, and spent upon an Army which could not be brought into action money which, if applied to the Navy, might have rendered the country absolutely secure from the invader.

All that part of the compulsory militarist agitation, therefore, which suggests to us that the defects of the Navy might be made good by increasing the Army, or that, if we had a larger Army, we could do with a smaller Navy, is not merely untrue: it is actively and dangerously misleading. We are aware that the advocates of compulsory military service profess to be as zealous for the Navy as for the Army. They tell us that what they propose to spend on the compulsory defensive Army is comparatively little, and they speak as if it could be easily afforded and the large and constantly increasing demands for the Navy met in addition. The reader will find the financial estimates and assumptions on which these ideas are based carefully examined in the preceding chapters. Our general conclusions are that the cost of the schemes now pro-

posed is greatly under-estimated, and that none of them could be final or could realise the expectations formed of them without a greatly increased and constantly increasing expenditure. All the criticisms directed against the Territorial Force by the compulsory service party lead logically to the conclusion that the Army which they propose to substitute for it must be on an approximate equality in training with the foreign armies against which it would or might be matched. In any case, we may take it as certain that any considerable increase in military expenditure would lead to demands for corresponding reductions in naval expenditure. The Naval Estimates alone present a sufficiently perplexing problem to all Cabinets, and this might easily become insoluble, if the liabilities of the War Department were largely increased. One of the main reasons which reconciles the public to the present great expenditure on the Navy is the belief that it saves them from the necessity of providing a great Army for home defence. If they are now told that they must have such an Army as well as the supreme Navy, they will inevitably become sceptical about the value of sea-power and the need of providing for it on the scale hitherto thought necessary.

We are perpetually being told by the conscriptionist party that we must have "a second string to our bow," or that "it is dangerous to put all our eggs in one basket." These metaphors are mischievous and meaningless. There can be no second string to the naval bow; we must put our eggs into that one basket. No military force will enable us to put less money into the fleet, or justify the fleet in

taking risks with the supreme interest with which it is entrusted. It is extremely probable that the provision of a large new military force would require us simultaneously to increase our Navy. For foreign nations would inevitably regard this army as a possible weapon against them, and guard against it, not by the increase of their military forces, but by the construction of larger navies to make its passage across the sea impossible. This, in turn, would require us to increase our Navy. All armaments, military or naval, are relative and competitive. Nations ask not only how each other's forces are intended to be used, but how they may be used in circumstances which none of them can foresee, and make counter-preparations accordingly. No large new departure on our part would be excepted from this rule, and if we adopted the new military policy proposed to us, we should almost certainly discover that we had greatly increased our expenditure on both services, without either increasing our relative power in war or diminishing the risks to which we should be exposed, if we were defeated at sea.

THE ALLEGED DANGERS AND HOW TO MEET THEM

In the preceding chapters we have carefully examined the various hypotheses which are relied upon by those who would alarm the country about the danger of invasion. Our conclusions are, broadly, that they are far-fetched and improbable, and that, so far as they need be taken into account, they are either sufficiently guarded against by the existing military dispositions, or could be, by comparatively slight

modifications of these. Most of the alarmists assume that at the moment of peril the fleet will have been lured away, the Regular Army be engaged in operating across the sea, and the consequences of leaving the country thus exposed have been unforeseen by our statesmen. Even so, if the fleet were in being, the invasion of this country would, as history shows, be an extremely risky operation for the invader, but such a coincidence of stupidity with adverse circumstances is fortunately not a contingency which need be taken into account, or which could be provided against by any insurance. The conclusion that this country cannot be invaded on a large scale, *if the fleet is supreme*, stands unassailed by any recent argument. There remains the risk of raids as an incidental operation of war undertaken in face of a superior fleet. This is acknowledged to exist, and the Territorial Force is specially organised to meet it.

But the nature of the risk is commonly very much misunderstood. It is frequently said that the Committee of Defence have laid it down that the country is open to a raid or invasion of 70,000 men. This is a perversion of a totally different proposition. The War Office has said that no enemy would attempt to invade this country with less than 70,000 men, and the Admiralty has said that this or any larger number could not escape the Navy. The problem of raids is thus to provide against any smaller number which might slip through the meshes of the naval net. Authorities differ about this number, and most naval authorities put it far below 70,000. But this figure may be conveniently regarded as the maximum against which a purely home-defensive army need be

provided, and we show in the preceding chapters that the Territorial Force is well adapted to meet this contingency, that its training is specially devised to suit the conditions of an Island Power, as distinguished from a Continental Power, that there are good and well-considered reasons for the proposed training after embodiment, and that in almost any conceivable circumstances there will be a formidable force of regular soldiers in the country, to say nothing of the large number of reservists, ex-regulars, ex-Volunteers, ex-Territorials, and other men trained to arms, who are always in the country and capable of useful service in an emergency. The common talk of Englishmen being untrained to arms is quite untrue. The number of Englishmen who have been trained to arms in one way or another, and are still of military age, has been estimated by a good authority as not less than 2,750,000,* and large numbers of these could be relied upon to rally to the national cause, provided the organisation is ready.

THE ULTIMATE AIMS OF THE CONSCRIPTIONISTS

There are, however, very good reasons for suspecting that a considerable number of the more competent soldiers who advocate compulsory service are thinking not of home defence, but of operations abroad, not of the National Service League's army, but of an army to be used against Continental armies, and therefore trained approximately in the same way, and for the same length of time, as those armies.

* Col. F. N. Maude, C.B. Special Prize Essay, Royal United Service Institution, 1905.

Students of strategy have no belief in a defensive army chained to these shores; some of them believe that, as an American writer has said, an army of defence is an army of destruction for the country that relies on it. Their talk and speculations are of operations on the Continent, in alliance with one Power, and in hostility to another Power. It is not within the scope of this book to discuss these speculations, or the ideas of policy on which they are based. There are undoubtedly some ideas of policy which could not be carried out without a compulsory army, and a compulsory army on the Continental model. But the conclusion which follows from the argument in the previous chapters is that no policy ought to be undertaken by the British people which entails this consequence; that the burden of maintaining a supreme Navy and providing an Army for the needs of the Empire over-seas is as much as one nation can sustain, and that the force which we possess for these purposes is sufficient to arm us adequately for the defence of our interests, if we are wisely governed. In the meantime, it is a special danger of the compulsory service agitation that it cloaks ambitious designs for military intervention in Europe under the plea of home defence. There is reasonable ground for suspicion that if the comparatively small army on lenient conditions of training demanded by the National Service League were once conceded for home defence, it would rapidly be extended on the plea of military necessity, until it became an army on the Continental scale, with the length of service and rigorous training required by warfare as practised in Europe to-day. The first step, once taken, would be

irretrievable, and would more and more entangle this country in European militarism.

A true understanding of the problem of defending these islands, and of the circumstances for which a home defensive army is needed, and should be trained, disposes of the chief criticisms commonly advanced against the Territorial Force. The reader, who has followed the argument in the preceding pages, will see that the attack on the Territorials is based partly on a misconception of their purpose and probable uses, and partly on a desire to obtain a quite different kind of force, with much more ambitious purposes and uses. In order to make that clear, we have entered at length into the question of the organisation and training of the Territorial Force, and of its numbers and efficiency at the present time; and we hope that the material thus provided will be of use in meeting the campaign of depreciation and misrepresentation which has been directed against this Force during the last few years.

TWO INCOMPATIBLE SYSTEMS

There remains a final consideration of the greatest importance. In the speech which he made on behalf of this Committee (Caxton Hall, November 24th, 1913), Lord Haldane laid special stress on the danger, lest in attempting to obtain a compulsory army we should destroy the existing voluntary Regular Army, which is specially needed by the British Empire for its over-sea purposes. "I hold," he said, "—I have thought it very long, and my meditation and experience have not made the

feeling less strong—that in this country you cannot combine voluntary and compulsory service, and at the same time as you raise a compulsory army keep up recruiting for your over-sea army.” This is the conclusion to which Sir Ian Hamilton comes, from careful examination of foreign experience, in his book on compulsory service, and it is of the utmost importance from all Imperial points of view. The over-sea Army is a necessity, and it can only be provided on the voluntary principle. No one has yet proposed to take men compulsorily from London, Manchester, and Liverpool, and make them serve on the Indian Frontier. To run the risk of destroying our Imperial Army for the sake of providing the British Islands with an additional security which they do not need might not unjustly be described as “Little Englandism” in a panic.

MORAL, PHYSICAL, AND SOCIAL RESULTS OF COMPULSORY SERVICE

So far for the military, political, and strategical aspects of compulsory service. But there remain the moral, physical, and social, and these also the reader will find carefully examined in the foregoing pages. The advocates of compulsion apply a very singular logic to these aspects of the question. When they wish to impress the country with the advantages of compulsory militarism, they declare that there is nothing like military service to improve the manhood, strengthen the character, and raise the physique of the people. When they wish to discourage voluntary service, and decry the Territorial Army, they say it

is a hardship and an injustice that men should of their own free-will seek to get these advantages for themselves. But in point of fact there are no virtues in military service which become hardships and injustices, when it is voluntary. The contrary is rather the case. Service freely given is more likely to brace and elevate than service reluctantly exacted. Compulsory service redresses none of the inequalities that are attributed to voluntary service. It falls more hardly, not less hardly, on the poor man who gives his all, than on the well-to-do man who has leisure and means to fall back upon. The loss and inconvenience to the small employer whose business may be brought to a standstill by the withdrawal of one or two assistants for the period of the fortnight's camp under the present system is not denied. But at any rate the period of camp is fixed, after consultation with the County Associations, for those seasons when the interference with business in the particular district concerned is least, and since not the whole available male population is required for the Territorial Force, an employer under a voluntary system can in exceptional cases exercise a veto on a specially valuable employee's attending camp in any particular year, or even on his enlisting at all. Under a compulsory system, on the other hand, the times of training will be fixed to suit the exigencies of military training and of rigid economy. For instance, unless the training were in the summer, an enormous capital outlay on barracks would be required. As regards the hardship to employers in having valuable men taken away from them, not for a mere fortnight only, carefully chosen to

coincide with the holiday season, but for four months or longer, no consideration whatever could be paid to such cases. Small employers might have all their employees or none at all taken away from them, according to their age and physical condition, and even large employers, in industries which employ a high proportion of young hands would find themselves in far greater difficulties under a compulsory system. The idea that a voluntary system is less fair, and entails greater hardship on employers than compulsion is, in short, wholly illusory. Where compulsion is in force we find as a fact that exemptions and mitigations are much more frequent in the case of the well-to-do than in the case of the poor. These various inequalities and hardships may have to be borne in countries with land frontiers, where compulsory service is necessary for national safety; but there is no reason why we should inflict them upon ourselves, who have sea frontiers and sea-power for our defence.

We are far from decrying the virtues of military training, and we desire to see as many young men as possible undertake it voluntarily in the Territorial Force. But the idea that compulsory militarism would raise the physique of the country as a whole is groundless. The recruiting-sergeant must take the fit and reject the unfit. That part of the population which most needs physical training and discipline would thus receive no benefit. Nor does experience suggest that the massing of recruits of the age of eighteen under canvas or in barracks without the discipline and tradition of regimental life, and possibly under inferior instructors, would have good moral results.

ADVANTAGES OF THE VOLUNTARY SYSTEM

It cannot be doubted that exemption from compulsory military service has been an immense advantage, socially and economically, to the British people. It is for this reason among others that, with a smaller population than some of their principal competitors, they have been able to keep the industrial primacy of Europe. From the economic point of view at all events, it must be a severe handicap to a nation that its manhood should have to be withdrawn for long periods from industrial life. Nor is there any evidence that the British people are less manly, less courageous, less adventurous than their neighbours, because they are exempt from this particular liability. Their surplus energy is released for numerous other activities, which make at least as great a demand upon character and physique as military service. There is no nation which is supplying so many men to open up new countries, to govern, police, and administer such vast and diverse communities. Upon none is there such a constant demand for brains and energy. All these activities are in the truest sense "national service," and it is a very narrow spirit which would limit that phrase to service in camp or on the battlefield. The idea that certain virtues can only be cultivated in military surroundings is no longer true, if it ever was true. Modern industry exacts discipline, obedience, courage in facing danger and death as rigorously as the camp or the barrack. No one who has lived for any length of time in a manufacturing centre will credit the idea that the working-class are growing less virile, or that they need a new kind of military training to give them fibre. It is not

the least part of the disservice which the campaign for compulsory militarism has rendered us that it has produced the unjust impression that the British nation is losing its manliness and hardihood.

The people of this country are now spending over fifty millions on their Navy, and twenty-seven millions on their Regular Army. They are asked in addition to submit to compulsory military service, and to find an unknown number of millions to finance it. No nation has ever borne this triple burden, and if we had to submit to it, we should not only be no better off, but actually worse off than our neighbours for being an island. For whereas *they* can be secure with their armies, we should be required to keep the supreme fleet, in addition to a compulsory Army; and, since we are an Empire as well, to provide a special, and necessarily very expensive, voluntary Army for over-sea purposes. It is certain that we should break down under this burden, and highly probable that in the attempt to carry it, we should so scatter our resources between Army and Navy, or between Home-Defence Army and Imperial Army, as seriously and dangerously to diminish our total power. It is certain that any considerable addition to our military forces would lead to corresponding efforts elsewhere, and highly probable that these would be naval rather than military, since the object of our competitors would be to prevent our Army from being landed on their shores. Thus the proposed Army would not only *not* relieve our naval burdens, but almost certainly add to them. We are convinced that when they have reflected on this argument, the English people will make short work of the compulsory service agitation.

APPENDIX I

NOTES CONTAINING THE ADMIRALTY VIEW OF THE RISK OF INVASION*

The really serious danger that this country has to guard against in war is not invasion, but interruption of our trade and destruction of our merchant shipping.

The strength of our Fleet is determined by what is necessary to protect our trade, and, if it is sufficient for that, it will be almost necessarily sufficient to prevent invasion, since the same disposition of the ships to a great extent answers both purposes.

The main object aimed at by our Fleet, whether for the defence of commerce or for any other purpose, is to prevent any ship of the enemy getting to sea far enough to do any mischief before she is brought to action. Any disposition that is even moderately successful in attaining this object will almost certainly be effective in preventing a large fleet of transports, than which nothing is more vulnerable or more difficult to hide, from reaching our shores.

To realise the difficulty that an enemy would have in bringing such a fleet of transports to our coast and disembarking an army, it is necessary to remember that all the ships operating in home waters, whether they are in the North Sea, the Channel, or elsewhere, are in wireless communication with the Admiralty and the Commander-in-Chief, so that if a fleet of transports is sighted anywhere by a single cruiser, or even by a merchant ship if she is fitted with wireless, every ship which happened to be in a position to intercept the transports would at once get the order to con-

[* These notes were supplied to the War Office by the Board of Admiralty in November, 1910.]

centrate as necessary for the purpose, whether she was at sea or in harbour.

It is further necessary to remember that, even supposing that by some extraordinarily lucky chance the transports were able to reach our coast without being detected, their presence must be known when they arrive there; and long before half the troops could be landed, the transports would be attacked and sunk by submarines, which are stationed along the coast for that purpose.

Besides the submarines there would always be a large force of destroyers, either in the ports along the coast or within wireless call, as, in addition to those that may be definitely detailed for coast defence, the system of reliefs for those acting oversea will ensure a large number being actually in harbour at their respective bases, or within call while going to or returning from their stations.

Those destroyers, though specially stationed with that object, will always form, in conjunction with submarines, a very effective second line of defence in the improbable event of such a second line being required.

To understand thoroughly the small chance of an invasion from the other side of the North Sea being successful, it is necessary to put oneself in the place of the officer who has to undertake the responsibility of conducting it.

His first difficulty will be to consider how he is to get his great fleet of transports to sea without any information of it leaking out through neutral nations or otherwise.

Next, he will consider that somewhere within wireless call we have nearly double the number of battle-

ships and cruisers that he can muster, besides a swarm of destroyers.

He has probably very vague and unreliable information as to their positions, which are constantly changing.

His unwieldy fleet will cover many square miles of water, and as all the ships will be obliged to carry lights for mutual safety, they will be visible nearly as far by night as by day. How can he hope to escape discovery?

Many of his transports will have speeds of not more than ten to twelve knots, so that there will be no hope for escape by flight if he is met by a superior force.

If he is sighted by any of our destroyers at night, they will have little difficulty in avoiding the men-of-war and torpedoing the transports.

Is it possible to entice part of our Fleet away by any stratagem? Possibly. But even if he succeeds in drawing off half our fleet, the other half, in conjunction with destroyers and submarines, would be quite sufficient to sink the greater part of his transports, even if supported by the strongest fleet he could collect. The fleets would engage each other, while the destroyers and submarines torpedoed the transports.

Finally, even if he reached the coast in safety, he would see that it was quite impossible to guard his transports against the attacks of submarines while he was landing the troops; and that it was quite certain that a superior force would be brought to attack him before the landing could be completed.

Taking all these facts into consideration, he would probably decide as the Admiralty have done, that an invasion on even the moderate scale of 70,000 men is practically impossible.

APPENDIX II

NOTE ON THE WORD CONSCRIPTION

In the controversy of Voluntary *versus* Compulsory Service, so much attention has been directed to the meaning of the word "Conscription" that it seems worth while to examine it in the light of history.

To begin with, it is to be noted that controversialists on all sides have made play with the word without knowing or caring to define its exact significance either to themselves or their audiences. All that matters for *ad captandum* arguments is that Conscription is an unpopular word, with unpleasant associations. The National Service League, for instance, belabours the scarecrow of Conscription quite as vigorously as the pacifists do, much to the amusement of critical outsiders. "NO CONSCRIPTION" is the attractive title of one of their leaflets in favour of universal service. "We do not advocate Continental Conscription," they say, "which means taking men away from their civil avocations and putting them in barracks for two or three years," etc. At the same time, in the more serious atmosphere of a *Times* discussion, the League endeavours to prove that "Conscription" does not now exist even upon the Continent of Europe, but is completely obsolete as the cardinal method of raising

armies. All letters on the subject that emanate from the League open with the words, "As so much misapprehension exists as to the meaning of the word 'Conscription,' " etc. A body that knowingly uses the word in two distinct senses according to its audience is certainly doing nothing to remove the misapprehension.

Those who support the time-honoured Voluntary system as best suited to the needs of the British Isles and the British Empire, and to the genius of the race that peoples those Islands and that Empire, have no need of *ad captandum* arguments of this kind, and can afford to discuss the phrase, as they can afford to discuss the systems it covers, on its merits.

Conscription, as a system of **recruiting individuals**, means levying men, whose names appear on the lists, compulsorily for military service, according to the lists prepared by the local authorities—nothing more and nothing less.

When, therefore, the National Service League exclaims "No Conscription," it is stultifying its first principle.

Conscription, or rather "The Conscription," as a system of **maintaining armies**, meant essentially the levying, by lot or otherwise, of a **small proportion** of the able-bodied males between certain narrow limits of age, for **five or more years' continuous service** with the colours in a **purely professional, general-service army**. In practice conscripts were allowed to provide voluntary substitutes (see chapter on "Voluntary and Compulsory Armies") and the old conscription-army thus resembled in most essential respects the voluntary

long-service force that we know in England. On the Continent, since 1870, the type has (temporarily at any rate) disappeared and been replaced by:—

The typical Continental army of to-day, which is a **semi-professional army**, or indeed an **un-professional army**, maintained by the incorporation of a **large proportion—in theory the whole**—of the able-bodied males of the statutory age, for **one, two, or three years' service**.

The National Service League, then, cannot have it both ways. If it asserts that "The Conscription" as a military system is a thing of the past, then in so far as Conscription is a term possessing any meaning to-day it means compulsory enlistment in any shape or form. France, which originated the word, has never ceased to use it in this sense, although there is no country in the world that more fully applies the theory of universal service. In current French, the army system is based on "*service personnel obligatoire*," and the soldier is an "incorporated" man. But when he joins the regiment he is called a **Conscript**. In other words, the system is not "Conscription," but the recruit is a "conscript." For it is only a simple accident of history that has appropriated the word conscription to one type of army. France adopted that type of army after the Revolution, and other nations copied her. Thus, when the Prussian system of Universal Service came to the front, the system prevalent elsewhere came to be called "Conscription" simply for purposes of technical discussion. The

German system was called "Universal Service," and the French "Conscription," because, though both rested on the conscript, they differed in the essential points mentioned above, and had to be named differently.

As a matter of fact, in our own history we have had both systems existing at the same moment. And as the National Service League is fond of referring to the Militia of the Napoleonic Wars in support of its case, hoping to prove thereby (a) that Universal Service is not un-English, and (b) that Compulsory Universal Service will not prevent volunteers from coming forward for general service overseas, we may perhaps point out that the Militia in question was not one force but two, of utterly different types.

There was, first the "Regular Militia." This was a nominally compulsory force, raised by county quotas, but it was really a force of substitutes (see Fortescue, *The County Lieutenancies*), that is, Volunteers. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that this Militia transferred to the Line in great numbers. The men composing it were of the Regular Army type, who joined the service as substitutes instead of directly, because they got a higher bounty by so doing.

There was also, after 1808, the "Local Militia," a force of totally different character, based on the existing volunteer force, and purely citizen in type. Here universal service without substitution was enforced. But there was no volunteering for the Line from it. The distinction is perfectly plain. Substitution or some equivalent element is the hall-mark of the Conscription Army. But a conscript is any man

who serves under compulsion in any form of army and on any terms.

To assert, as does the National Service League, that Conscription is not the same as Continental Universal Service, and then to say that it does not advocate Continental Conscription, is either wilfully misleading or indicative of an imperfect knowledge of armies that ill becomes those who presume to design an army system for their fellow-countrymen.

APPENDIX III

COMPULSORY SERVICE IN THE DOMINIONS

The Voluntary Service Committee has no wish to criticise the military systems of our Dominions. They are the best judges of what suits their needs, which are entirely different from ours. But as we are often asked to follow the example of Australia and New Zealand, it is right that we should understand exactly what that means.

NEW ZEALAND

Compulsion was first introduced by the Defence Act of 1909, and provided for the training of all males physically fit from the ages of twelve to fourteen as Junior Cadets, fourteen to eighteen as Senior Cadets, eighteen to twenty-one as a Territorial Force. This has been amended by eliminating Junior Cadets from military control, substituting attachment of wages or military detention for imprisonment as the means of enforcing fines for non-attendance, extending the period of service to twenty-five years of age for the Territorial Force, and thirty for the Reserve.

The following table of strengths in 1913, and when the scheme is in full operation, indicate that some time is needed to bring a system into full working order :

	1913.	Full scheme.
Territorial Force	23,919	30,000
Senior Cadets	24,770	45,000
Rifle Clubs	5,373	25,000
	54,062	100,000

The white population of New Zealand is about

1,029,000. With certain permissible variations, the annual training is:—

Territorial Force—30 drills of $1\frac{1}{2}$ hours, 12 half-day (3 hours), or 6 whole-day (6 hours) parades; 7 days (exclusive of days of arrival and departure) in camp, and a course of musketry.

Cadets—50 drills of 1 hour, 6 half-day parades, and a course of musketry.

Rifle Clubs—18 drills and a course of musketry.

Of the men posted to the Territorial Force, 82·49 per cent. in 1912, and 83·78 per cent. in 1913 attended camp.

It will be noted that the drills for the New Zealand Territorial Force considerably exceed the minimum laid down for our own Territorial Force, but do not largely, if at all, exceed what is actually done by many of the latter, that the period in camp is about the same as that attended by the home Territorials who get leave of absence for one week, and is only about half the full period of fifteen days attended by the majority of our men. In 1913 the percentages of the strength attending camp at home were, for eight days 22 per cent., for fifteen days 67 per cent., or 89 per cent. in all. The percentage attending camp is, therefore, actually **higher under our voluntary system.**

The estimates for 1913-14 put the recurring expenditure at £409,000. On the same basis, for the population of the United Kingdom, this would work out at about £17,000,000, as compared with about £5,000,000 on the Estimates for our present Special Reserve, Territorial Force, Senior and Junior Officers' Training Corps, Cadets, and National Reserve.

AUSTRALIA

In Australia, a Defence Act introducing compulsion was passed in 1909, and after being amended, came into force on January 1st, 1911.

The training provided for is as follows:—

	Age.	Service.	Annual Training.
Junior Cadets	12-14	2 years	90 hours.
Senior Cadets	14-18	4 „	4 whole-day, 12 half-day, and 24 night drills.
Militia	... 18-26	8 „	For the first 7 years, drills equivalent to 16 whole days, of which at least 8 must be spent in camp. Longer periods are prescribed for Artillery and Engineers.

It is estimated that the system will produce 100,000 Senior Cadets, and 128,000 Militia actually training, *i.e.*, excluding the eighth year contingent and certain specialist services. The number of Militia training in the year 1911-12 was 43,700, which again illustrates the time required to introduce a new system. The annual training is more than the minimum required at home, but less than that performed by the greater part of the Force.

The annual cost in Australia is estimated at £2,500,000: as the population is one-tenth of that of the United Kingdom, if the cost were proportionate,

a similar system would cost us £25,000,000! No doubt it would be done cheaper here, but it is significant that this modern democracy, when adopting compulsory service, required a scale of pay (4s. a parade for privates and 10s. a parade for sergeants) far beyond anything dreamed of by our volunteer Territorials.

It will be seen that the training given both in Australia and New Zealand is practically no more than that which our critics here deride. As regards numbers, the existence of the Regular Army and Navy makes comparison difficult, but the annual contingent in Australia in 1913 was 19,000, which would mean 190,000 on the basis of our population. The numbers joining the Regular Army, Special Reserve, Territorial Force, and Senior Officers' Training Corps in 1913 (excluding enlistment between branches) was about 110,000, so we do not compare so badly.

What can be done under a voluntary system may be illustrated from Natal, where, before the union, 2·8 per cent. of the population were serving in an active Voluntary Militia, as compared with 3 per cent. estimated as the product of the compulsory systems in Australia and New Zealand. Sir Ian Hamilton states as the reason that "public opinion compelled practically every healthy male to serve for a period 'voluntarily.' If he failed to do so, the women and his old comrades of the school cadet corps marked him down as a shirker." There, indeed, is an example worthy of attention.

Another useful example is the South African Defence Act, which requires those who do not volunteer for service to pay £1 per annum for twenty-four years.

APPENDIX IV

SOME OPINIONS ON VOLUNTARY SERVICE AND THE TERRITORIAL FORCE

(a) Voluntary Service as a Policy

THE RT. HON. A. J. BALFOUR, AT BERWICK, on
September 9th, 1905, said:—

“How are we to find an army numerically sufficient to defend the possessions far oversea? . . . You cannot solve that problem by conscription. No Western country, no country of Western Europe, has ever attempted, or will ever attempt, in my opinion, to employ an army raised by conscription principally for the purpose of defending its possessions thousands of miles distant across the ocean. The experiment has never been tried by a highly organised community. I do not think it will ever be tried. I am certain the present Government (a Unionist one) would never be responsible for so wild an experiment; and I do not believe its successors, whoever they may be, or how many of them there may be in the vista of the future, will ever show what some might describe as greater courage, but I should describe as greater rashness.”

In the House of Commons, on April 23rd, 1907, the
Rt. Hon. gentleman said:—

“I believe a voluntary system is a system that this country will never consent to abandon.”

LORD HALDANE, IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, April 23rd, 1907 :—

“I feel that, in enabling the people to defend themselves we are getting rid of that unrest and want of tranquillity which affords the greatest impulse towards compulsory service. I say that in our plan you have a bulwark against compulsory service. If you retain the present confused state of things it is impossible to predict what vicissitudes of political feeling that confusion in military affairs may bring about in the way of an impulse towards conscription. Therefore, we take our stand upon this Bill as a bulwark against compulsion, and we rejoice to find the right hon. gentleman, the Leader of the Opposition, is in accord with our view that the nation is not likely to turn to that remedy.”

The advocates of Compulsory Service never attacked the Volunteers as they have attacked the Territorial Force. Why? Just because of the truth of Lord Haldane's words. The efficiency of the Territorial Force is the obstacle to Compulsory Service which its supporters cannot overcome.

COLONEL SEELY, IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, on April 11th, 1913 :—

THE PRINCIPLE OF VOLUNTARY SERVICE

“I suggest that we shall be wise on this occasion to adopt the principle of the hospitals and lifeboat service instead of adopting the principle of the Insurance Act with regard to National Defence. My reasons for this are as follows:

First of all, the advantages of a voluntary army are so great that they cannot be exaggerated. . . . If there be any doubt on the subject, I will quote a very great soldier who supported the voluntary principle more vehemently than any other soldier, I mean Lord Roberts. **Now Lord Roberts, referring to the South African War,** when he left the war—and I want this to go home—referred to all the different forces who served with him, and he said: **‘England, relying as she does on the patriotic voluntary system for her defence, is resting on no broken reed.’** Could any words be more emphatic? They were not spoken words, but deliberately written words. Every soldier must admit that if you can get it, a voluntary army is far better.”

MR. PERCY ILLINGWORTH AT MANCHESTER (March 7th, 1913):—

“As an old Territorial officer, I deeply resent this wanton attack on a Force which, if it is given fair play, is excellently fitted to cope with the task which is allotted to it, which was to resist a possible attempt at invasion in case of a temporary reverse at sea. You may deplore the growth of naval expenditure; but, as an island Power, we have to face the fact that it is our first duty to provide a navy adequate for our defence. If our navy were destroyed, though you had every man in the country in arms, nothing would save you from being starved into submission. On the other hand, if you had an all-powerful navy and a conscript army, you would lay yourself open to the charge that you desired these arrangements, not for defence, but for aggression.”

COLONEL SEELY on the Government and Compulsory Service, BUCKINGHAM GATE (December 5th, 1912):—

“This, then, is the decision to which the Government adhere. They know the institution of compulsory service to be quite impossible at the present time. Even if it were possible, it would take many years for an army based on a principle so novel to the British people to be an efficient engine of war. The times in which we live are not favourable to great changes which must weaken us during the transition period. His Majesty’s Government have no intention whatever of adopting the system of compulsory service for fighting units. Far from abandoning the voluntary principle, they intend to foster, encourage, and extend it by every means in their power. This, then, is final, so far as we are concerned, and I go farther and say that no alternative Government that could be formed would come to a different conclusion at the present time.”

*(b) Lord Roberts’s Opinion of the Territorial Force
—and Others*

LORD ROBERTS said, AT MANCHESTER, on October 22nd, 1912:—

“The Territorial Force is now an acknowledged failure—a failure in discipline, a failure in numbers, a failure in equipment, a failure in energy. I have so often demonstrated this thesis. I have so often analysed the contradictions in the arguments of the

supporters of the Territorial movement; I have so often exposed their vamped up statistics, and the rewards and encouragements offered by politicians to every soldier or civilian willing to say a word in praise of that scheme—I have done all this so often that there seems nothing left for me to say. To you, as experienced business men, I will merely repeat this one statement—a statement the truth of which is known to every practical soldier—**so long as the Territorial Force is based on voluntary enlistment it is impossible to give its members a sufficiently lengthy and continuous period of training, to ensure a discipline which will stand the severe test of modern war.**”

MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRANCIS LLOYD, the General Officer Commanding the London District, late Commanding the Welsh Territorial Division, when Lady Lloyd distributed the prizes to the 28th Battalion, County of London Regiment (the Artists' Rifles), at the headquarters, Duke's Road, Euston Road, said:—

“I regard the Territorial movement as the expression of a free people, who mean to remain free. It is the greatest expression of the country, the expression of free service, which has carried us through many a campaign in the past and will carry us through many a campaign in the future.”

On another occasion he stated of the Territorial Force:—

“It had discipline, training, and equipment. If the untrained French who rose in 1870 had had as much training as the present Territorial Force,

the result of the Franco-German war might have been very different.”—*Daily Telegraph*, December 1st, 1913.

Does Lord Roberts suggest that these are dishonest statements, prompted by the hope of “rewards and encouragements offered by politicians”?

In the *Revue Militaire Générale*, 1909, the late GENERAL LANGLOIS, one of the most distinguished French Generals, published his opinions, formed after a tour of inspection of the Territorial Force. These articles have been translated by Captain C. F. Atkinson and published under the title, *The British Army in a European War* (Hugh Rees Ltd.). He wrote as follows:—

“However, these points of practical detail will be acquired by degrees, and will become petrified into habits; for **what is most striking of all is the enormous ascendancy the leaders have over the men, the keenness of the latter, their eagerness to learn, and the application and earnestness which they throw into all their drill and instruction work. No, this Territorial Army, at any rate its infantry, is not a worthless ‘national guard,’ but a militia which even now is a factor to be reckoned with.**” (p. 36.)

“The equipment of the British infantryman is perfect.” (p. 43.)

“The manœuvres of this army which we had the good fortune to witness convinced us that the British Territorial Infantry is really adequate for the duties which it will have to undertake—repelling an invasion in a country favourable to

the defence—and for which it is preparing itself, patiently, resolutely, and diligently. (p. 67.)

These passages deal with “discipline,” “equipment,” and “energy.”

Was General Langlois bribed, too?

This was in 1909, since when the Force has greatly improved.

COLONEL BROMLEY-DAVENPORT, Unionist Financial Secretary to the War Office, 1903-5, who himself served in South Africa, answered Lord Roberts at CHESTER, on October 29th, 1912, as follows:—

“He did not think that we ought to abuse our institutions. It was not for us to cry down what we had got; there were plenty of people to do that. A blind optimist was a source of danger, no doubt, but, at any rate, his blindness was unconscious. A blind pessimist, however, who wilfully banded his eyes and blinded himself to everything good in order to enlarge upon and exaggerate everything that was bad, was not only a source of danger, but of mischief. **It was a poor compliment to all the Territorial Forces of England which had worked all through the last four years, and, as he thought, shown good results;** it was a poor compliment to those distinguished officers who had been appointed instructors and trainers of the Territorial Forces, to say that the end of it all was an acknowledged failure in discipline, numbers, training, and everything. **That was the way to make failure.** One had only to shout failure to make it, and if one wanted success one must shout it.

“**Lord Roberts had been carried away by his enthusiasm for compulsory military service.** He (Colonel Bromley-Davenport)

had always been of opinion that, for us, compulsory service was unnecessary. It was an unfortunate necessity for European nations whose boundaries were almost imaginary lines. For us, surrounded by the sea, and with the advantage of the protection of the sea, it was not, and never had been, a necessity. But **when Lord Roberts asserted, as proof of the necessity for compulsory military service, that the Territorial Force was an acknowledged failure, he was riding his hobby a little too far. He was guilty of an injustice to tens of thousands of people, and guilty of an exaggeration not less grotesque than the exaggeration of other extremists** who would ask us to believe that the Territorial Force was equally as efficient as the Regular Forces. He protested against exaggeration on the one side or the other. There was a great deal to be said for compulsory military training from the national point of view. Very likely it would improve the physique of the nation, and inculcate habits of discipline and subordination to properly constituted authority. He pointed out, however, that if they were going to effect any great social and political change, they had no chance of doing it unless they could persuade one of the great political parties in the State to take it up, and **he asked which of the two parties would take up compulsory military service and fight a General Election upon it?** The answer was, **Neither of them.** . . .

"He denied that the Territorial Force was a failure. It was a success—a remarkable success, which had been achieved in the face of many difficulties and discouragements. It was hardly too much to say that in certain quarters there had been

a kind of conspiracy to belittle the Territorial Force in order to bring about the only alternative—compulsory service. In spite of this, he declared it had not been a failure, and it was their duty to make the best of it. The spirit of patriotism was not dead; only patriotism was a plant which could not thrive in an atmosphere of discouragement.”

In the summer of 1913 Lord Methuen visited a number of Territorial Camps in order to form an opinion as to the Force. He published the views thus formed in *The Nineteenth Century and After* for October, 1913.

Where he thinks it necessary, he is frankly critical, but his criticism is made with a view to bringing about improvement. The advocates of Voluntary Service and members of the Territorial Force will always be grateful for well-informed criticism offered in such a spirit. We have no desire to present Lord Methuen as a participant in a controversy into which he expressly disclaims any intention of entering, but we give the following quotations as indicative of an attitude which we earnestly commend to military critics of the Territorial Force, who are not prepared definitely to side with us in the controversy.

“I do not enter the lists as a champion for compulsory or voluntary service; both have their advantages and disadvantages. I do champion the Territorial Army, and I admire the fine spirit that has kept it alive under very depressing circumstances.”

“From all I could gather from those officers who from their positions are competent to give an

opinion, the progress made in the Territorial Force is as good as one has any reason to expect."

"If the Territorial Force is not in the high state of efficiency that one would wish to see, the fault does not lie with the members of the Force. The splendid spirit that pervades it is at once noticeable. The same individual intelligence was no doubt in existence in many of the old Volunteer Corps, but there was lacking throughout the Force, taken as a whole, the determination to look at things seriously that is to be seen in the Territorial Force. This is, perhaps, the best answer that can be given to those who believe the voluntary spirit is dead."

"That there is a feeling of apathy amongst the class which ought to take the lead is true enough, and it is hard to keep one's patience when one has to listen to men abusing the Territorial Force who have it in their power to render it efficient, if, instead of grumbling, they would put their shoulders to the wheel and give a helping hand."

• (c) *Some Leaders of Industry*

THE WITNESS OF A LARGE EMPLOYER OF LABOUR

"As a practical man, I refuse to propose the imposition of unnecessary burdens on our people, and I regard the Territorial Army as supplying the means of forming a perfectly adequate second-line force. . . . The Territorial is receiving military instruction in drill hall, on rifle range, and on manœuvre ground at intervals all

the year. . . . In fact, the Territorial system devised by Lord Haldane, properly understood, supplies the means of evolving during the first stage of the war a second Regular Army. . . . Once abolish the voluntary system, and there will be an end of the enormous amount of unpaid service now so gladly given.”—From an article by SIR JOHN BARKER, BART., in the *Manchester Courier*, May 2nd, 1913.

MR. MAX MUSPRATT, at the Imperial Industries Club Dinner, June 25th, 1913:—

WHAT THE UNITED ALKALI CO. DOES

“Our Company employs something like 10,000 men. We offer, at any rate, if it is not full wages, very nearly full wages, to any men who are absent on training. That means to say that any working man can get two weeks’ holiday in every year without any cost to himself, and that is, needless to say, with the routine and monotony of industrial pursuits, an enormous concession. Of the 10,000, about 250 take advantage of that, and, I believe, the reason is solely and entirely that it has not been properly brought to their minds. If the recruiting of the Territorials was systematically conducted, showing the attraction it was to the ordinary working man to undertake this period of service, you would have the numbers of the Territorials going up by leaps and bounds.”

SIR ROBERT HADFIELD on the Industrial Dangers of Conscription:—

“You ask me to state what I think would be the effect of compulsory training upon our daily work. **Personally, I think the result**

would be most disastrous. But, quite apart from this, why do we wish to copy Continental nations when for hundreds of years we have held our own against the whole of the world without adopting their methods? I am quite at a loss to understand this 'panicky' feeling. . . . Not very long ago I had some of the directors of the largest Continental works going round the works of my own company. These gentlemen were from the famous works of Krupp. After walking round our works they made this very remarkable statement to me. **'We only wish we could get our men to work as your men do.'** That comes from educated and trained men who represented a country where compulsory military training prevails. Therefore, with all due respect to Lord Roberts, whom I venerate to the highest degree, I regret differing from him as to the necessity of compulsory training."—*War and Peace*, November 20th, 1913.

(d) *Some Press Views of the National Service
League's Campaign*

TERRITORIAL ESTABLISHMENTS

"Those who interest themselves, whether from duty or inclination, or both, in the progress of the Territorial Force, must have noticed with pleasure the evidences of activity and hopefulness of ultimate success which stand out so prominently in proceedings of the County Associations throughout the country. The perusal of their reports provides an excellent corrective to the gloomy and pessimistic futilities of certain speakers, who, not-

withstanding all their protests to the contrary, seem to lose no opportunity to decry and disparage the Force. . . . **Competent authorities having declared that the Territorial Army, when completed to its proper Establishment and trained to the required standard, is sufficient for the purpose of home defence, one would think that all public-spirited men would co-operate to secure the fulfilment of these two conditions. . . . We deny that the voluntary system has failed; if it has received a temporary set-back, it is due to the efforts of those who in trying to advance their own unpopular programme, do not scruple to belittle the Territorial, and even the Regular Army. The Territorial conception holds the field. Here we have a scheme which has been evolved after much thought and labour, blessed and approved by men of much military experience, adapted to British temperaments and British military tradition, and possessing all the elements needed for the gradual formation of a really national army. Why, then, not help towards carrying it forward to final success?"—*United Service Gazette*, November 7th, 1913.**

NATIONAL SERVICE LEAGUE INCONSISTENCY

"The charge against the National Service League of obstructing the Territorial movement is always met with indignant denials, but whether the members mean to disparage the Force or not, the fact remains that their whole scheme is inconsistent with, and repugnant to, the Territorial idea. The League cannot advocate the one without condemning the other, and that being so all their protestations about being second to none in

their admiration of the spirit which actuates the members of the Force, and of the success achieved in the face of difficulties and drawbacks, sound singularly hollow and insincere. **Service in the Territorial Force is national service, and the fact that we have not at this moment a Citizen Army full up to establishment is largely due to the mis-directed efforts of the League.** The ordinary man is perplexed and bewildered by the conflicting claims to his support of the voluntary service advocates on the one hand, and the Compulsory Service League on the other, and ends by giving his adherence to neither. **The claim that the National Service League has always done its best to support the Force is one which we find very hard to reconcile with some of the statements of its emissaries, as reported in the public press.**"—*United Service Gazette*, November 28th, 1913.

COST OF CONSCRIPTION IN GERMANY

" However much the expenditure on fleet and army may be disguised, the burden is colossal. In the year 1878 the net expenditure, ordinary and extraordinary, for purposes of defence, for Army and Navy and all other military purposes whatsoever, including pensions, amounted to 452,000,000 marks; in 1888, to 660,000,000 marks; in 1898, to 882,000,000 marks; and in 1908, to 1,481,000,000 marks. The total expenses net of the Empire in 1908 were 1,735,000,000 marks (£86,750,000), showing that only 254,000,000 marks (£12,700,000) out of the grand total were spent on other than military purposes. As the Army and Navy now stand at a peace strength of some

700,000 men, and as these men are all in the prime of their working power, the loss in wages and in productive work may be put very conservatively at 600,000,000 marks, which brings the cost of the support of the military establishments of Germany up to 2,000,000,000 marks and more per annum, or 500,000,000 dollars (£100,000,000).

“Many Americans were dismayed when our total national expenditure reached the 1,000,000,000 dollars point, and the Congress voting the expenditure was nicknamed the ‘Billion Dollar Congress.’ What would we say of an expenditure of half a billion dollars for defence alone!”—PRICE COLLIER, *Germany and the Germans*, pp. 430-1.

LORD ROBERTS AND MR. ARNOLD FORSTER

LORD ROBERTS made a statement in the HOUSE OF LORDS, on July 10th, 1905, as follows:—

“I have no hesitation in stating that our armed forces as a body, are as absolutely unfitted and unprepared for war as they were in 1899-1900.”

On July 13th, 1905, MR. ARNOLD FORSTER replied in the HOUSE OF COMMONS:—

“I was not responsible, Lord Roberts was responsible, for the Army in 1903. . . . I do not pretend to know whether the Army improved or whether it deteriorated between the date to which he referred and 1903; but of this I am quite certain—that since 1903 there has been a rapid, a great improvement in the

personnel and in the organisation of the Army. . . . I know perfectly well that we are very far from the condition which we ultimately ought to reach, and which I hope we shall reach; but I think I can say enough to prove that there has been a steady progression in the direction which we all wish to travel."

THE QUESTION OF NUMBERS

In the HOUSE OF COMMONS, on July 14th, 1904, when he was talking of reducing the strength of the old Volunteer Force, MR. ARNOLD FORSTER said:—

"I propose to fix the establishment of the Volunteers at 200,000, and to reduce the strength by absorption in the first instance to 180,000."

And on March 29th, 1905, he told his supporters why. He then said:—

"The Volunteers have been made use of in foreign wars as individuals and not as a military force, and **if they are to be employed as a military force** it follows as a necessary consequence **that they should be organised** in such a way **that they could go to the seat of war** with their own organisations and their own officers."

We are now told that a Force which is admittedly at least twice as well trained as the Volunteers, is organised as Mr. Arnold Forster wanted the Volunteers to be organised, and exceeds the strength he proposed by about 70,000 men, is a "failure"!

VARYING OPINIONS

No. 1.—FIELD-MARSHAL LORD ROBERTS, at the MANSION HOUSE, August 1st, 1905 :—

“The truth is, I rather understated than overstated the fact; for while, as regards organisation, efficiency, and power of expansion, we are no better off than before the war; in one particular we are worse off—I mean in the falling-off in the number of officers.”

No. 2.—THE RT. HON. A. J. BALFOUR, in the HOUSE OF COMMONS, on August 3rd, 1905, asked whether Lord Roberts’s speech represented the views of the Defence Committee, of which he was a member, Mr. BALFOUR said :—

“A member of the Defence Committee may make a speech without committing the Defence Committee. Lord Roberts spoke on his own personal responsibility.”

No. 3.—MR. BALFOUR, in the HOUSE OF COMMONS, on August 8th, 1905, said :—

“I do not agree that the Army is in the same condition that it was in 1899. It has improved, in my opinion, upon the Army of 1899, just as the Army of 1899 improved on that of 1895.”

APPENDIX V

MUSKETRY

It has been constantly stated that 100,000 of the Territorial Force failed to qualify in musketry in 1912. The statement indicates the length to which attempts to depreciate the Force can be carried, inasmuch as the figure is only arrived at by including the whole of the Artillery, Army Service Corps, Royal Army Medical Corps, etc., who are not tested in musketry.

There is no doubt that the difficulty of access to ranges is a serious matter, and that there is much room for improvement. But there has been steady progress. Of the arms who fire the test, the number who passed has risen from 75 per cent. in 1911 to 85 per cent. in 1913, and the failures are mostly amongst the recruits. Of trained men in 1913, 93 per cent. passed the test.

APPENDIX VI

STATISTICS

PRINCIPAL TERMS OF ENLISTMENT IN THE REGULAR ARMY

(OCTOBER 1ST, 1912)

			Colour Service.		Reserve Service.
Household Cavalry	...	...	8 years	...	4 years
Cavalry of the Line	...	...	7 "	...	5 "
Royal Horse and Field Artillery	...	...	6 "	...	6 "
Royal Garrison Artillery	...	...	8 "	...	4 "
Foot Guards	...	...	3 "	...	9 "
Infantry of the Line	...	...	7 "	...	5 "

Comparative Statistics with regard to the British Army—1862-63 and 1912-13

Total Establishment at Home and in Colonies.

		1862-63.		1912-13.
Officers	...	8,034	...	9,800
N.-C.O.'s and men	...	137,416	...	176,800
Total	...	145,450	...	186,600
Total numbers in India	...	83,523	...	75,886

Strength at Home and Colonies by Branches of the Service.

		1862-63.		1912-13.
Horse Artillery	...	1,933	...	3,116
Cavalry	...	12,133	...	14,754
Field and Garrison Artillery	...	19,001	...	29,976
Engineers	...	4,565	...	9,818
Guards	...	6,306	...	7,416
Infantry of the Line	...	87,318	...	88,863

Total Estimates.

		1862-63.		1912-13.
Effective	...	£13,172,012	...	£23,955,000
Non-effective	...	2,130,858	...	3,905,000
Total	...	£15,302,870	...	£27,860,000

TOTAL NUMBER OF MEN RAISED BY VOLUNTARY ENLIST-
MENT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND LIABLE TO SERVICE
IN WAR

		Army, including Territorials.			Navy, including Reserves.		
1901	...	...	788,552	...	...	...	142,800
1902	...	...	789,927	...	...	...	141,625
1903	...	...	730,978	...	...	...	145,625
1904	...	...	738,014	...	...	...	150,000
1905	...	...	739,309	...	...	...	154,100
1906	...	...	751,829	...	...	...	152,000
1907	...	...	744,555	...	...	...	Not ascertained
1908	...	...	656,642	...	...	...	151,100
1909	...	...	735,213	...	...	...	172,743
1910	...	...	722,966	...	...	...	184,471
1911	...	...	720,770	...	...	...	178,531
1912	...	...	713,466	...	...	...	181,531
1913	...	...	699,861	...	...	...	185,093

STATISTICS OF THE TERRITORIAL FORCE

Year ending Sept. 30th.		Men joining.		No. whose engagements terminated during the previous 12 months.	No. leaving on termination of engagement.	
1909	...	120,749	...	Not published	...	31,859
1910	...	45,900	...	Not published	...	23,422
1911	...	41,569	...	45,957	...	15,962
1912	...	61,542	...	80,403	...	34,585
1913	...	72,293	...	114,621	...	62,978

Year ending Sept. 30th.		No. enlisting in Army, Navy, or Special Reserve.		No. leaving for other causes.		Strength on Sept. 30th of Territorial N.C.O.'s and men.
1909	...	7,357	...	9,974	...	260,389
1910	...	7,145	...	18,365	...	257,337
1911	...	6,299	...	22,157	...	254,688
1912	...	6,490	...	22,991	...	252,154
1913	...	7,427	...	18,653	...	249,393

These figures are extremely instructive. They show that recruiting, the real index of the popularity of the Force, has recovered from the reaction of 1910 and 1911. They also show the exact effect of the *Daily Mail* boom in 1909, viz., (1) reaction in subsequent years, due to units up to strength ceasing to recruit, and men being taken in 1909 who might normally have joined in the next two years; (2) increasing number of men leaving "for other causes" during 1911 and 1912; (3) abnormal number of men whose engagements expired in 1913 and consequent drop in strength. If, say, 40,000 of those who joined in 1909 had been spread over 1910 and 1911, the Force would have shown a gradual increase up to about 270,000 N.C.O.'s and men. If recruiting can now be maintained at its present level—and with encouragement it should be increased—the Force in two years should be about as near its establishment as is practicable having regard to the fact that, as soon as a unit gets up to strength, there is sure to be a drop in the energy devoted to recruiting, which means a subsequent fall below establishment. The figures should prove a great encouragement to those County Associations who have recently been passing resolutions indicative of a pessimism for which there is no justification. No one would wish to blame the *Daily Mail* for what was a well-meant, if short-sighted, effort; but that that paper should be the loudest in making the situation for which it is itself largely responsible a ground for denouncing the Territorial system, and so discouraging re-engagements, is a fair matter for complaint.

NUMBERS OF MEMBERS OF TERRITORIAL FORCE ATTENDING
CAMP FOR 15 AND 8 DAYS RESPECTIVELY, AND ANY
NUMBER OF DAYS BETWEEN THESE PERIODS, SINCE THE
FORMATION ANNUALLY

				For 15 days and over			For 8 days and less than 15 days
1908	...	...	...	105,296	...	...	69,007
1909	...	...	...	169,911	...	...	78,326
1910	...	...	...	168,175	...	...	74,723
1911	...	...	...	155,257	...	...	76,502
1912	...	...	...	161,914	...	...	67,400
1913	...	...	...	164,926	...	...	54,609

NUMBERS OF VOLUNTEER FORCE ATTENDING CAMP FOR
SIMILAR TERMS FOR THE YEARS 1905-1907

				For 15 days and over			For 8 days and less than 15 days
1905	...	...	...	24,882	...	...	148,925
1906	...	...	...	24,202	...	...	144,520
1907	...	...	...	4,459	...	...	151,228

NUMBER OF RECRUITS JOINING THE ARMY, NAVY, AND
TERRITORIAL FORCE IN ANY GIVEN YEAR

Year.			Army.			Navy.
1900	...	...	227,339	...	...	Not ascertained
1901	...	...	171,887	...	...	" "
1902	...	...	152,284	...	...	" "
1903	...	...	101,719	...	...	" "
1904	...	...	139,690	...	...	" "
1905	...	...	113,917	...	...	" "
1906	...	...	122,348	...	...	" "
1907	...	...	114,777	...	...	" "
1908	...	...	125,609	...	...	10,358
1909	...	...	170,451	...	...	13,589
1910	...	...	87,852	...	...	15,187
1911	...	...	89,738	...	...	15,176
1912	...	...	110,152	...	...	20,095
1913	...	...	114,418	...	...	Not ascertained

TOTAL NUMBERS OF MEN WHO HAVE RECEIVED AND ARE RECEIVING MILITARY TRAINING AND WHO MIGHT BE CALLED UPON FOR SERVICE

In 1905 Colonel F. N. Maude, C.B., P.S.C., in one of the Special Prize Essays of the Royal United Service Institution, showed that we had about 2,750,000 men of military age, "more or less trained, upon whom we can draw in times of uttermost peril," and that by 1925, allowing for increase of population, and presuming the same average rates of enlistment to be maintained, there will be about

4,500,000.

"Not a bad result," continues the author of the calculation, "for a purely voluntary organisation to attain, seeing that it is slightly in excess of what the German law of Conscription would give us on an equal basis of population."

APPENDIX VII

THE FAILURE OF COMPULSORY SERVICE PROPOSALS TO SECURE SUPPORT IN THE HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT

On three occasions attempts have been made to get Compulsory Military Training Measures a first or second reading, but opinion has been overwhelmingly against them. In the first place, Captain Kincaid-Smith introduced a Bill in 1908 which was refused a first reading. Further, in July, 1909, a second reading of Lord Roberts's National Service Bill was negatived, and in 1913 the National Service and Territorial Force Bill stood adjourned on second reading.

The Failure of the National Military Training Bill

This Bill was introduced by Captain Kincaid-Smith on July 7th, 1908, its purpose being to establish compulsory military training in the Territorial Force. The first three clauses laid it down that any British subject should be liable at the age of eighteen to not more than forty-eight days' military training, at the age of nineteen to not more than thirty days, and between the age of twenty and thirty to not more than fourteen days every alternate year. A further clause provided that persons unfit at eighteen years of age, but subsequently found to be fit, should be liable to serve. When the question was put for leave to bring in the Bill the House divided as follows:—

Ayes, 34. Noes, 250. Majority against, 216.

*Lord Roberts's National Service Bill in the House
of Lords (July 12th, 1909)*

When this Bill came up for second reading the following amendment, moved by the DUKE OF NORTHUMBERLAND, was carried:—

“ That this House fully recognises the need of a home army, amply sufficient to secure the country against all risks from invasion, and the advantage of giving to as large a part of the population as possible a sound groundwork of military training, but it is not prepared to proceed further with a measure which, while involving unknown demands upon the national resources, would supersede the system accepted as sufficient by the military advisers of His Majesty's Government.”

Some important pronouncements were then made, LORD MIDLETON said:—

“ Their lordships would be taking a great responsibility if, against the military opinion of the trusted advisers of the Government, they passed this Bill—for they had not merely to deal with a resolution or an abstract proposition—and imposed on the House of Commons the duty of finding an extra five millions of money. By such a course they would probably retard instead of advancing the establishment of an efficient military system.”

LORD LANSDOWNE said:—

“ It has been said that, after all, this Bill will not do much harm. I cannot accept that view.

In my humble opinion, if your lordships vote for the second reading of a Bill of this kind it means that you approve of it, and that you are ready, if the opportunity offers, to take it up yourselves; and I, for one, am not able to say that that is the manner in which I regard the matter. **This Bill, remember, is not merely an attack upon the Territorial system instituted by Mr. Haldane; it is an affirmation that the voluntary system has been tried in this country and has failed.** It is an affirmation that we desire to substitute for that voluntary system a system based upon compulsion, and compulsion in the particular form in which we find it in the clauses of this Bill.”—House of Lords, July 13th, 1909.

LORD LANSDOWNE:—

“I can never bring myself to believe that we are so absolutely and completely at the mercy of the invader as the noble and gallant earl would have us believe. I observe that three conditions are always assumed: (1) that the whole of our Regular Army has gone abroad; (2) that our Fleet has been decoyed away and disabled; and (3) that the Territorial Force has not yet had time to undergo the training necessary to render it efficient. I find it difficult to believe that the whole of these conditions are likely to present themselves simultaneously at the very outbreak of a war. If I may sum up my view I would say that while I am ready to go the full length in insuring against all reasonable risks, I do not want to lay upon the country the burden of insuring against risks which do not seem to me to be reasonable.”—House of Lords, July 13th, 1909.

LORD LANSDOWNE :—

“ There is another by-product of this measure which I regard with the utmost apprehension. I mean its effect upon recruiting for the Regular Army. **It seems to me impossible that a Bill of this kind should come into operation and not very seriously affect recruiting for the Regular Army.** In what way it would do so may not be very easy to foretell, but that it would have an effect of that kind I, for one, have no kind of doubt. But, then, what about its effect on the Territorials? The supporters of the noble and gallant earl recommended this Bill to us on the ground that it fits in with the scheme of the Government and is calculated to promote the success of the Territorial system. I cannot believe that that is the case, and I must say that on a point of that kind I think we must, to some extent, at any rate, defer to the opinion of those who invented the Territorial system, and who are now carrying it into operation, and they tell us in the most unambiguous language that **the adoption of this Bill, far from promoting the success of the Territorial system, far from being helpful to it, would, on the contrary, be destructive and injurious to it.**”—House of Lords, July 13th, 1909.

LORD LANSDOWNE :—

“ I do not believe public opinion in this country is ripe for such a change as we are asked to make, and I do not believe that the proper way to ripen it is to pass this Bill through the House of Lords. The enthusiasm exhibited at public meetings requires to be a good deal discounted. You have to reckon with a great deal of inarticulate opposition to compulsion. Compulsion to

many people—people, perhaps, who do not express their opinions very loudly—is hateful, and **I believe that if this Bill were to become law, and if it were to be studied and the attention of our people called to the heavy pains and penalties which are to be found in some of its provisions, there would be a very strong feeling of reaction against it, a feeling which, in my belief, might go very far to check the progress and impair the usefulness of the many measures which are now in force for the advancement of military efficiency in this country.**”—House of Lords, July, 13th, 1909.

LORD LUCAS said:—

“It was claimed that the adoption of the scheme of the Bill would strengthen and increase our power of taking the offensive. **The Government believed** that the very opposite would be the outcome, and **that the more the centre of gravity was drawn into a home defence the more would the nation's power of taking the offensive be impaired,** and the more would those forces which would have to take the offensive be starved in both men and money. **The scheme would cost at least £8,000,000. Was anyone prepared to say that there was the faintest indication in the country of an intention to add to the already heavy expenditure on the Navy and the Regular Army another £8,000,000 to the cost of home defence?** There lay one of the most crucial points of the whole question. **If the country had the suggested system it would have sooner or later to take money for its maintenance**

from the funds available for the Navy and the Regular Army.”—House of Lords, July 12th, 1909.

National Service (Territorial Force Bill)

This Bill, read for a first time in the House of Commons on March 13th, 1913, **proposed to impose on all male British subjects**, resident in the United Kingdom, **the obligation on attaining the age of eighteen years, of serving in the United Kingdom in the Territorial Force, if they were required to do so by the Army Council.** Only those persons who were specifically described in the Bill would be exempt from the obligation. Provision was made for the Army Council to regulate the number of men required from time to time for the Territorial Force by altering the physical standard for enlistment or suspending the re-engagement of men.

Service would be for a period not exceeding four years, as prescribed by the Territorial Force Act, 1907. No person could be required to serve abroad.

The exemptions scheduled were men who have served in the naval or military forces, police, men employed in the British Mercantile Marine, the sons of widows upon whom their mothers were dependent, and people certified by the Army Council as entitled to exemption in the interests of the public service.

The debate on the second reading on April 11th stood adjourned.

Lord Willoughby de Broke's Bill.

The Second Reading Debate on this Bill was resumed in the House of Lords on March 19th, 1914, when by 53 votes to 34 the Peers declined to give it a Second Reading. During the course of the debate LORD LANSDOWNE said :—

“I say quite frankly that I do not believe that at this moment the condition of public opinion with regard to compulsory service is such as to justify either party in attempting to press it upon Parliament. I believe that feeling is common to the Front Benches on both sides, and not on account of what I may describe as mere party timidity.”

APPENDIX VIII

“ A STALE LIBEL ”

Lord Roberts has recently described the complaint that the National Service League discourages service in the Territorial Force as “ a stale libel.” Perhaps Lord Roberts has in mind the saying “ the greater the truth the greater the libel.” At any rate, we beg to draw the League’s attention to the views quoted on pp. 14 *et seq.* and to invite an explanation of the following passages:—

“ The National Service League derides the Territorials.”—*Fallacies and Facts*, by LORD ROBERTS, p. 205.

“ The Territorial Force was essentially a fraudulent affair.” . . . **“ The greatest calamity that could have befallen this country would have been for the Territorial Army to have been a so-called success.”** . . . “ The only two directions in which the Territorial Force had shown an increase were expense and inefficiency.”—LORD WILLOUGHBY DE BROKE, at the annual dinner of the National Service League, 1913, as reported in *The Nation in Arms*, 1913, p. 369.

“ I tell you plainly that I know of no reason under our existing situation why any young man should join the Territorial Force.” . . . “ The effort which had been made in the voluntary Territorial system had been a lamentable and grotesque failure.”—THE RT. HON. F. E. SMITH, K.C., M.P., at the Fairfield Club, Liverpool, *Morning Post*, January 10th, 1914.

VOLUNTARY SERVICE

TERRITORIAL FORCE COMPOSITION
TABLES.

TERRITORIAL FORCE COMPOSITION TABLES.		War Establishments.				
		Personnel.		Transport.		
		Officers.	Others.	Horses.	Vehicles.	Drivers. Horses.
		(These figures are as given in the Territorial Force Year Book.)				
3 Yeomanry Squadrons + Regl. Headquarters with 2 Machine Guns = 1 Yeomanry Regiment ...	25	457	474	18	19	35
8 Cyclist Companies + Battalion Headquarters with 2 Machine Guns = 1 Cyclist Battalion ...	22	506	504 (cycles)	22	22	47
8 Infantry Companies + Battalion Headquarters with 2 Machine Guns = 1 Infantry Battalion ...	30	991	58	16	36	192
4 Infantry Battalions + Brigade Headquarters = 1 Infantry Brigade ...	125	3,992	253	66	146	96
4 15-pr. Q.F. Guns + 8 Wagons = 1 Horse Artillery Battery ...	7	153	171	16	53	398
4 15-pr. B.L.C. Guns + 8 Wagons = 1 Field Artillery Battery ...	5	143	131			
3 Field Artillery Batteries + Brigade Headquarters + 1 Ammunition Column = 1 Field Artillery Brigade ...	25	616	573	80	220	228
4 5-in. B.L. Howitzers + 8 Wagons = 1 F.A. Howitzer Battery ...	5	136	116			139
2 F.A. Howitzer Batteries + Brigade Headquarters + 1 Ammunition Column = 1 F.A. Howitzer Brigade ...	18	387	350	44	128	
4 4.7-in. Q.F. Guns + 8 Wagons + 1 Ammunition Column = 1 Heavy Artillery Battery ...	6	214	161	28	77	
Headquarters	5	32	33	1	1	2
3 Yeomanry Regiments ...	75	1,371	1,422	54	57	105
1 Mounted Brigade { 1 Horse Artillery Battery ...	9	223	244	31	81	147
contains { 1 Mtd. Bde. Ammunition Column ...	5	83	48	16	24	35
1 " " Transport and Supply Column ...	6	105	53	16	27	44
1 " " Field Ambulance...						
Total	100	1,814	1,800	118	190	333

APPENDIX IX.—Continued.

		17	74	65	3	5	7	
1 Division contains	Headquarters ...	375	11,976	759	198	438	576	
	3 Infantry Brigades ...	75	1,848	1,719	240	660	1,194	
	1 Field Artillery Brigade	18	387	350	44	128	228	
	1 Heavy Artillery Battery	6	214	161	28	77	139	
	2 Field Companies Royal Engineers	12	418	144	34	68	112	
	1 Signal Company	2	61	41	6	11	20	
	1 Yeomanry Regiment ...	25	457	474	18	19	35	
	1 Divl. Transport & Supply Column	22	331	197	67	97	138	
	3 Field Ambulances ...	30	969	174	66	84	132	
Total		590	16,765	4,115	707	1,591	2,586	
The Territorial Force contains	Army Troops	14 Mounted Brigades ...	...					
		14 Divisions ...	...					
		23½ Infantry Battalions ...	...					
		14 Cyclist Battalions ...	...					
		1 Balloon Company ...	...	65	51			
	Garrison Duties	5 Wireless Telegraph Companies, each	...					
		5 Cable	...	69	46	9	21	36
		5 Airline	...	170	124	20	35	63
		89 Garrison Artillery	...	220	157	23	58	105
		6 Heavy Batteries	...	77	67			
		24 R.E. Works Companies	...	125				
		21 Electric Light	...	4,442				
		23 General Hospitals, each	...	119				
		2 Sanitary Companies	...	100				

BRIGADES.	DIVISIONS.	MOUNTED BRIGADES.	DISTRICTS.	COMMANDS.
1st, 2nd, and 3rd London . .	1st London	London	London.	—
4th, 5th, and 6th London . .	2nd London	—		
Norfolk and Suffolk . .	East Anglian	Eastern	No. 9	Eastern
East Midland				
Essex				
Surrey	Home Counties	South-Eastern	No. 10	
Kent				
Middlesex				
Northumberland	Northumbrian	Yorkshire	No. 5	
York and Durham				
Durham Light Infantry . .				
1st, 2nd, and 3rd West Riding	West Riding	—		Northern
Lincoln and Leicester . .	North Midland	Notts and Derby North Midland	No. 6	
Staffordshire				
Notts and Derby				

TITLES.—Continued.

Seaforth and Cameron Gordon Argyle and Sutherland	Highland	Highland	No. 1	Scottish
South Scottish Scottish Rifle Highland Light Infantry	Lowland	Lowland	No. 2	Scottish
Warwickshire Gloucester and Worcester South Midland	South Midland	1st South Midland 2nd South Midland	No. 7	Southern
Devon and Cornwall South Western Hampshire	Wessex	1st South Western 2nd South Western	No. 8	Southern
North Lancashire Liverpool South Lancashire	West Lancashire	—	No. 3	Western
Lancashire Fusiliers East Lancashire Manchester	East Lancashire	—	No. 4	Western
Cheshire North Wales South Wales	Welsh	Welsh Border South Wales		

INDEX

	PAGE
Abuse of the Territorial Force, Lord Methuen on ...	168
Administration of the Territorial Force ...	70-80
Admiralty Memorandum Quoted ...	148-50
Advantages of the Voluntary System ...	146
Aims of the Conscriptionists ...	140-2
Alleged Dangers and How to Meet Them ...	138-40
Alternative Schemes Examined ...	98-118
Armaments and Competition ...	1-3, 138
Armaments and Co-operation ...	3
Armaments and the Future ...	4
Army Ordnance Department, and Arms for the Troops ...	67
Army, the Question of a larger Army and a smaller Navy...	136
Arnold Forster, Mr., on the Question of Numbers ...	175
" " " " Improvements in the Army ...	174
Attendance at Camp ...	73, 180
Australia, Compulsion in ...	7, 158
Balance of Power, The ...	23-5
Balfour, Right Hon. A. J., on Voluntary Service as a policy	160
Barker, Sir John, on the Adequacy of the T.F. ...	169
Barracks, No provision for, in N.S.L. Estimate of Cost ...	9
Battle of Wörth, What Meckel saw at the ...	44-5
"Blood Tax," The T.F., according to N.S.L. ...	32
Boys' Brigades and Boy Scouts under Compulsion ...	131
British Naval Power ...	25
Bromley-Davenport, Colonel, on "Success of Territorial Force" ...	166
Burden of Compulsion, Inequality of ...	7-8
Cadet Battalions and Companies ...	63
Camp, Attendance at ...	73, 180
Camp, Comfort of ...	10
C.I.V. under Fire ...	48
Coast Defence Troops in the T.F. ...	53
Collier, Price, on "The Cost of Conscription in Germany"	173
Competition and Armaments ...	1-3
Complaint of Inspector-General about N.S.L....	13
Compulsion, Cost of ...	4-6
Compulsion and Effect on Labour ...	5
"Compulsory Militiaman," The ...	33

	PAGE
Compulsory Militarism and Sea Power	135-8
Compulsory Service on Continental Lines	98-102
Compulsory Service, Brigadier-General Kemball on... ..	46
" " and the attitude of the Political Parties	183-9
Conscription and the possibility of Service abroad	2
Conscription, the Meaning of the word	151-5
Conscriptionists, Ultimate Aim of	140-2
Considerations of International Politics	1-4
Continental Allies and Military Support	91-6
"Continuous Association" more easily attained under a Voluntary System	40
Contrast of the Territorials with the old Volunteers... ..	54-8
Convictions in Australia and New Zealand	7
Co-operation and Armaments	3
Cost of Compulsion	4-6
County Associations	66-9
Defence Committee on Raids	87
" <i>Doctrine de Defense Nationale</i> " on the Territorials	15
Dominions, Compulsory Service in	156-9
Economic Effects of Compulsion	134
Effect of the Agitation for Compulsory Service	10-17
Effects, Moral and Physical, of Compulsion	8-10
Empire Overseas, The	18-20
Employees, Restrictions on	6
Enlistment, Terms of, in some branches of the Regular Army	178
<i>Entente</i> , The, and our present Naval and Military Systems... ..	3
Ethical and Religious Objections	6
Expeditionary Force and Service Abroad	89-96
Expenditure on Armaments, Limitation of the	134
Features which characterise certain types of Armies	41-2
Field and Fighting Organisation of the T.F.	51
Financial Unsoundness of the N.S.L. Proposals	132-3
France's Return to Three Years' Service	2
French, Sir John, on Raiding Forces	85
German Army Increase, and its Effect on France	1-2
German Law and Obligations of Soldiers	6
German Naval Power in Home Waters	25
Grants to County Associations	124
Hadfield, Sir Robert, on the Industrial Dangers of Con- scription	170
Haking, General, on <i>Esprit de Corps</i>	109
Haldane, Lord, on Voluntary Service as a Policy	161
" " the Effect of Compulsion on Recruiting	142
" " the numbers required for a Territorial Army	121
" " " "Seeing a bit of Soldiering"	37

VOLUNTARY SERVICE.

197

	PAGE
Hamilton, General Sir Ian, and the Invasion Question ...	91
" " " and the Overseas Army under Compulsion	102
" " " on disaster in Recruiting market	112
Henderson, Colonel, on the "War of Secession"	45
Home Defence, a Naval Problem	18
Home Defence, Particular Problem of	81-97
Home Fleet Figures	25
Hopkins, Admiral Sir J. Ommaney, on Raids	94
Horse Census in England... ..	52
Illingworth, Mr. Percy, on "Fair Play for the Territorials"	162
Imperial Military Policy in Outline	18-30
Improbability of Compulsion	11-14
Incompatible Systems, Two	142
Industrial Dangers of Conscription	170
Inequality of the Burden of Compulsion	7-8
Inherent Characteristics of Armies	31-42
Inspector-General and Complaint of N.S.L. Agents ...	13
Interference with Personal Liberty	6
International Politics, Consideration of	1-4
" <i>International Revue</i> " on the Territorials	16
Invasion, General Langlois on	14
Invasion, Improbability of	21-3
Invasion, Naval Action and Fear of	81-2
Keene, Colonel A., on N.S.L. Estimates	119
Kemball, Brigadier-General, on Compulsory Service ...	46
Kuropatkin on the Reservists from European Russia ...	42
Labour and Compulsion... ..	5
Langlois, General, on Comfort of Camp Life	10
Langlois, General, on Invasion	14
Langlois, General, in praise of Voluntary Service ...	165
Larger Army and a Smaller Navy, A	136
Leadership of the Territorial Force	70-2
Limitation of the Expenditure on Armaments	134
Lloyd, Major-General Sir Francis, on the T.F.	164
Loire, Army of the	47
Maude, Colonel F. N., on Number of Men Trained to Arms	140
Max Muspratt, Mr., on Recruiting of Territorial Force ...	170
Meckel, at the Battle of Wörth	44
Methuen, Lord, and Where the Fault Lies	169
Militia Converted into Special Reserve	56
"Militia," the term defined	33
" <i>Militär-Wochen Blatt</i> ," on the Territorials	16
Military Formation of T.F.	51-3
Military Support of Continental Ally	91-6
Musketry Test Figures	177
Mobilisation, and what it Involves	88
Mobilisation of the Territorial Force easily accomplished...	53

	PAGE
Modern Industry and Moral Fibre	146
Moral and Physical Effects of Compulsion	8-10
National Politics and the Problem	4-10
National Reserve	29, 64
National Service League's Estimates	119-33
National Service League's Inconsistencies	172
National Service League's Programme	102-14
Naval Problem and Home Defence	18-20
Navies in Home Waters compared	25
Need for Volunteer Regular, The	34-6
Need for a Professional Army, The	42
New Zealand, Compulsion in	7, 156
Norfolk Commission, Admiral Sir J. Ommaney Hopkins before	94
Numbers, Question of, in Territorial Force	58-60
Objections to Compulsory Service	4-10
Officer Question under Compulsion	127-9
Officer's Training Corps	61-3
Opinions on Voluntary Service and the T.F.	160-75
Organisation of the Territorial Force	51-69
Overseas Empire and Defence	18-20
Overseas Trade and Defence	20
Overseas Dominions and Military Support	89-91
Peace Establishment and War Establishment of T.F., the same... ..	28
Personal Liberty, Interference with	6
Percy, Lord, Letter to the <i>Times</i> depreciating Voluntary Service	38
Physical and Moral Effects of Compulsion	8-10, 143-5
Political Parties, The, and Compulsory Service	183-9
"Pressed Men," The	43-6
Price Collier, Mr., on Cost of Compulsion in Germany	173
Problem in its Social and Political Aspect, The	1-17
Professional Army, The Need for a	42
Provision to meet Empire Needs	25-30
Public Opinion and the Territorial Force	13
Quality of Volunteer Army	36-9
Question of Numbers in T.F.	58-60, 175
Question of Training	46-9
Raids	83-7
Raids, The Provision to meet	87-9
Raiding Force not an Army of Occupation	83
Raids, Admiral Sir J. Ommaney Hopkins on	94
Recruits for Army and Navy	180
"Regular," The term defined	33

VOLUNTARY SERVICE.

199

	PAGE
Regular and Militia Armies	39-41
Regular Officers and their Influence on the T.F.	70
Religious and Ethical Objections	6
Restrictions on Employers	7-8
Result of obtaining a Continental Conscript Army	100
Roberts, Lord, on the Alleged Failure of the Territorial Force	163
"Science of War," by Col. G. F. R. Henderson, quoted	71
Sea Power, Compulsory Militarism and	135-8
Secession, War of, Colonel Henderson on	45
Seely, Colonel, on the Principle of Voluntary Service	162
Shortage in the T.F. Army, not so much a Money Problem as of Faith in the Force	76
Six Months' Continuous Training after Outbreak of War	96
Social and Political Aspect of Problem	1-17
South African War, Volunteering discouraged for	61
Sorb, Captain, on the Territorial Force	15
Special Reserve	27
Special Reserve abolished under N.S.L.'s Programme	120
St. John's Ambulance Corps	66
"Stale Libel," A	190
Standard of Training of T.F. much higher than V.F.	72
Statistics	178-82
Summary and Conclusion	134-47
Summary of Characteristics of Types considered	41
" <i>Summer Night's Dream</i> ," Meckel's, quoted	44
Supplementary Services of the T.F.	61-6
Swiss or Norwegian Systems	115
Terms of Enlistment in some branches of the Regular Army	178
Territorial Force, and the superior class of men attracted	75
" " not drenched with Reservists	59
" " Statistics	179
Territorial Force Composition Tables	191-4
" " and Public Opinion	13
" " and Training after Outbreak of War	96
" " Cost per head	124
Total Number of Men raised by Voluntary Enlistment	179
" " " available in time of national peril... ..	181
Training of the T.F.	72-7
Training, the Question of	46-9
Two Incompatible Systems	142
Types of Soldiers	32-4
Ultimate Aims of the Conscriptionists... ..	140-2
Unemployment not always the Recruiting Agent in a Voluntary Army	37
" <i>United Service Gazette</i> ," on the Voluntary System	171
Unwilling Soldier in a Conscript Army	45

	PAGE
Varying Opinions	176
Verdict of History, The	42-9
Voluntary Aid Detachments	65
Voluntary and Compulsory Service side by side impossible	142
Voluntary and Compulsory Armies	31-49
"Volunteer," <u>The Term, defined</u>	32
Volunteer Regulars	34-6
Volunteer Militiamen	39-42
War Value of the T.F.	77-80
"War Weariness," No Sign of, in South Africa, where Voluntary Troops were at work	48
" <i>War of Secession</i> ," The, Colonel Henderson on	45
Weston's Scheme, Colonel	12
Wolseley, Lord, on the Improbability of a Russian advance against India	89
Works, Closing of, during Term of Training under Com- pulsion	5
Wörth, Battle of, What Meckel saw at the	44

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